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The debate over nuclear weapons in Europe and their
utility as part of NATO's forward defense strategy has per-
sisted since the mid-1950s. Existing tactical nuclear em-
ployment doctrine and strategies are based on obsolete
criteria and defense concepts established when the U.S.
possessed superiority in nearly all nuclear categories.
NATO has allowed its tactical nuclear doctrine and arsenal
of battlefield nuclear weapons to deteriorate, choosing
instead to rely on the American strategic nuclear umbrella
for all but the most localized of conflicts.
This thesis examines the development, stagnation and
decline of NATO tactical nuclear doctrine and strategy from
1949 to 1984. It analyzes four tactical nuclear postures,
drawing from each to recommend a viable tactical nuclear
strategy for NATO today. The presence and potential em-
ployment of tactical nuclear weapons make it imperative
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I. INTRODUCTION
Doctrinal inadequacy is just as often the cause of defeat,
or of unnecessary reverses, as is technological backward-
ness. As often as not, conflicts are decided by which
side is less obsolescent conceptually, or which side is
able to learn more rapidly.
Colin Gray
The esoteric dispute over the respective significance of
"capabilities and intentions" in the West betrays not a
lack of insight into the nature of the problem but rather
of the courage to face its consequences. ,
Lothar Ruehl
The debate over short- and intermediate-range nuclear
weapons in Europe and their utility as part of NATO's
forward defense strategy has persisted since the initial
deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in the mid-
1950 1 s. Through the years the debate has been conducted
under such misleading rubrics as NATO's nuclear dilemma,
nuclear myth and nuclear crisis. As early as 1953, Fortune
magazine columnist Charles Murphy identified the problem of
an inadequate U.S. nuclear employment doctrine and wrote:
In recent weeks there have been intimations that the
[National Security Council] has under study a clear
statement of the government's position on the employ-
ment of atomic weapons. It is about^time the govern-
ment had a position on this subject.
That the debate has endured thirty years of investiga-
tion and speculation without satisfactory resolution reflects
its obstinate relevancy to NATO's present defense posture.
Rational discussion of the issue has been clouded by

politico-military compromise among allies, made worse by a
consistent lack of strategic foresight.
Nowhere is this more evident than in NATO's tactical
nuclear warfare posture. Existing TNW employment doctrine
is based on obsolete criteria and outmoded concepts estab-
lished in the late 1950 's and early 1960's when the United
States possessed a measurable superiority in nearly all nu-
clear categories. The strategic environment has long since
changed and many, if not most, of the fundamental assump-
tions upon which TNW employment was predicated are no longer
valid.
Adoption of the flexible response strategy by the U.S.
in 1961 and NATO in 1967 explicitly created a niche for
tactical nuclear weapons in the context of a controllable
escalatory sequence in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact con-
frontation. With the conventional force structure generated
by the shift to flexible response, however, the nuclear
threshold was believed to be sufficiently high that the
most likely nuclear employment scenario entailed large-scale
"strategic" exchanges. Former Secretary of Defense and
flexible response architect Robert McNamara explained the
reasoning behind the move to flexible response to Los
Angeles Times correspondent Robert Scheer in a spring 1982
interview.
...we moved from Dulles' strategy of massive retaliation
to what was called "flexible response." That was, I
think, a major advance because it substantially reduced
the risk of nuclear war. And the level at which nuclear
10

weapons might be used under flexible response was raised
so high that it was,
3
in effect, the equivalent of mutual
assured destruction.
Although the capability of United States and NATO forces
to raise the nuclear threshold never reached anywhere near
the level McNamara claimed, subsequent Administrations have
labored under the (mis) perception that it had and planned
accordingly. As a result, nuclear related planning, bud-
geting and strategy have been preoccupied with strategic
(intercontinental) forces and strategic nuclear employment
while tactical nuclear weaponry have been a nuclear pariah.
Moreover, enthusiasm for the maintenance of a clear-cut
distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict—the
so-called firebreak—and the widespread conviction that
limited nuclear employment would rapidly and inevitably es-
calate , has tended to discourage serious consideration and
development of tactical nuclear employment policies and
guidelines. The result is a NATO nuclear strategy for
Western Europe which, if a low-level nuclear response is
required or appropriate, is only marginally responsive to
political preferences and even less responsive to the threat
of Warsaw Pact soldiers, tanks and nuclear weapons.
With readily acknowledged inferiority in conventional
forces vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact, NATO has consciously
chosen to place all its security chips on the side of de-
terrance, and ultimately on the American-based threat of
assured Soviet destruction. To plan for a failure of
11

deterrence which calls for a limited nuclear employment is
considered "thinking the unthinkable." Such respected Amer-
ican policymakers as Robert McNamara, George Kennan and
McGeorge Bundy have recently called for the elimination of
limited nuclear warplanning altogether, accompanied by a
NATO movement toward a no- first nuclear use policy.
It seems much better that even the most responsible choice
of even the most limited nuclear actions to prevent even
the most imminent conventional disaster should be left out
of authorized policy.
McNamara reiterated these views in a Fall 1983 Foreign Affairs
article, stating that nuclear weapons serve no military pur-
pose whatsoever except to deter one's opponent from using
them.
The problem with NcNamara's conclusion is twofold. In
the first place, it avoids the speculative, but extremely
relevant, "what if" question in the event pre-war deterrence
breaks down and gives way to hostilities. By excluding
limited tactical nuclear options from the response menu,
NATO resigns itself to a misplaced reliance on an all or
nothing nuclear posture. It places the nuclear initiative
solely in Soviet hands and offers no viable riposte to
limited, but militarily significant, Soviet nuclear attacks.
A second and related problem is that mere presence alone
does not establish a deterrent as credible if the role of
these weapons in a test of NATO defenses remains uncertain
and undefined. The measure of credibility, or believability
,
assigned to NATO's nuclear deterrent is a function not only
12

of perceived (NATO) intentions but also capability, quali-
tative—the extent of viable employment options available--
as well as quantitative. U.S. strategic nuclear forces are
considered a credible deterrent largely because declaratory
policy is supported by appropriate employment plans embodied
in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and several
Presidential Directives, most recently PD-59.
No such preconceived plans or directives exist for tac-
tical nuclear weapons in Europe. The SIOP and PD-59 are
sufficiently concise to enable versatile employment plans
to be formulated yet vague enough to maintain a measure of
Soviet uncertainty as to the exact U.S. response to aggres-
sion. In the absence of a coherent tactical nuclear doc-
trine and strategy, the spurious and ad-hoc employment of
tactical nuclear weapons as a "last ditch" effort to res-
urrect conventional NATO defenses cannot hope to have a
favorable military or political impact on the conflict.
The dangers of escalation and collateral damage are partic-
ularly acute in the case of tactical nuclear weapons be-
cause of the large number of weapons readily available and
their close proximity to the heavily populated East-West
German border region.
Nuclear deterrent strategies have no doubt contributed
to the absence of a serious NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation
for over 30 years. However, strategic nuclear parity be-
tween the superpowers has made extended deterrence— the
13

protection of Europe by a U.S. nuclear umbrella—infinitely
more difficult, if not incredible. In the period of transi-
tion from Western nuclear superiority to parity , roughly
1960 to 1972, NATO failed to establish a satisfactory rela-
tionship between a policy of deterrence and a strategy of
defense. While the NATO nuclear deterrent most likely in-
fluences Soviet intentions, this influence may be insuffi-
cient to forestall aggression which Soviet military doctrine
explicitly reveals may include the limited use of nuclear
weapons. For a variety of strategic, economic, political
and emotional reasons discussed below, NATO has been unable
to come to grips with the prospects of and requirements to
defend against a limited nuclear war. Instead, it stubborn-
ly adheres to a traditional dichotomy which declares con-
ventional war defensible and nuclear war not only unwinnable
but unplannable. For NATO, the implications of such a
position are ominous. As Colin Gray has pointed out,
"doctrinal inadequacy is just as often the cause of defeat,
or of unnecessary reverses, as is technological backwardness."
Clearly, a NATO conventional force posture designed and
equipped to defeat a Soviet assault presents a strong deter-
rent with a quality of resistance to theatre nuclear esca-
lation not present in the flexible response strategy.
Nevertheless, NATO has historically abandoned the extensive
investment in conventional forces needed to attain a true
defense capability in favor of cheaper, more "threatening"
14

nuclear weapons. Existing U.S. Army and NATO tactical
nuclear doctrine, however, can only be described as obsolete,
uncertain and inapplicable in most Euro-Soviet confrontation
scenarios imaginable. In the absence of adequate conven-
tional forces, a defense (warfighting) strategy that effec-
tively weaves TNW into the flexible response strategy with
a minimum risk of escalation is required.
This thesis traces the development, stagnation and
decline of U.S. and NATO tactical nuclear doctrine and strat-
egy from 1949 to 1984. It offers several prescriptive
remedies to the tactical and theatre nuclear "dilemma"
facing NATO today. Chapters II through VI each outline a
phase in the tactical nuclear development process and de-
scribe the politico-military, economic, and social con-
straints which eventually inhibited practically all tactical
nuclear thought -within- official Alliance circles. Chapter VII
presents three alternative tactical nuclear postures for
consideration in addition to what may be termed the "up-
dated" flexible response strategy which presently governs
NATO force employment. The merits of each posture are
evaluated in the light of their ability to defeat a Soviet
armored invasion at or near the German border, escalatory
potential and collateral damage expectations. Chapter VIII,
the conclusion, discusses the problems of NATO's conventional
deterrent and dangers for NATO in presenting a nuclear de-
terent where declatory and action strategies are in fact,
or perceived to be, disparate.
15

Throughout the text of the thesis a distinction is made
between tactical and theatre nuclear employment. Although
no official definition exists, an outgrowth of recent inter-
mediate nuclear force (INF) arms control negotiations has
been a 1000 kilometer breakpoint. Nuclear weapons with a
range of less than 1000 kilometers are considered tactical
while those with a range of 1000 kilometers or more are
deemed theatre nuclear weapons. This somewhat arbitrary
standard facilitates a workable framework for arms control
but is less useful for analysis of employment doctrine and
guidelines. Similarly, classification by warhead yield is
of questionable utility for operational planning. Presently
deployed nuclear systems range from subkiloton nuclear
artillery to the selectable 60 to 400 kiloton yield of the
Pershing 1. The selection of weapon system and yield to be
employed is largely a function of the threat characteristics
of the potential target, not its proximity to the battlefield
For the purposes of this thesis, NATO tactical nuclear
employment is defined as the employment of short-range,
low-yield nuclear weapons approximately 100 kilometers
either side of the point or areas of direct contact of op-
posing ground forces. Tactical nuclear employment is lim-
ited to the battlefield use of these weapons against
strictly military targets, fixed or mobile. NATO theatre
nuclear employment, on the other hand, is the employment of
intermediate-range nuclear weapons (100-1000 kilometers) in
16

the theatre of operations extending from the immediate
battlefield to the Soviet-East European borders. Theatre
nuclear targets are therefore located solely within the East
European Warsaw Pact countries and include ammunition depots,
road and rail junctions, communication and transportation
centers, main and secondary airfields and the like. The
tactical nuclear arsenal is limited to nuclear artillery,
atomic demolition mines (ADM) and short-range missiles like
NATO's Lance and the French Pluton. Theatre nuclear weapons
include the Pershing 1A and II, Ground Launch Cruise Mis-
siles (GLCM) and land- and carrier-based aircraft delivered
weapons
.
Finally, in the course of my research, I have often
found the bibliography in many of the sources reviewed more
useful than the text itself, particularly when attempting
to identify primary references, cross-check data or locate
public or official statements. In an effort to aid sub-
sequent researchers in the subject area and for the benefit
of those seeking simply to enhance their knowledge of tac-
tical nuclear thinking, an extensive bibliography is in-
cluded encompassing tactical nuclear thought and strategy
in the United States and NATO since 1946.
17

II. THE POSTWAR PLANNING CLIMATE, 1949-1953
Are the nations which are to receive military aid making
a military effort comparable to that of the Soviet Union,
taking into consideration their relative size and popula-
tion, their economic strength, and the overall objectives
of the European Recovery Program?
Representative John Davis Lodge
The military effort being made by the European nations...
is the maximum effort feasible without sacrifice of
economic recovery and the maintenance of a stable economic
system.
5Secretary of State Dean Acheson
Economic recovery overshadowed all other requirements
of the European post-World War II governments. Britain,
once the second largest creditor nation in the world, had
become its. largest debtor. Its trade deficit ballooned as
postwar exports dwindled to 60 percent of the prewar total.
In Germany, industrial recovery stalled as the Allied oc-
cupation powers debated an equitable reparations agreement.
France and the Soviet Union began to strip their respective
zones of occupation of industrial material and equipment in
an effort to assist their own faltering economies. U.S. aid
poured into Europe, totaling over $15.0 billion by 1947.
Another $23.0 billion followed in Marshall Plan aid from
1947 to 1952.
In spite of its economic difficulties, the Soviet Union
was the only European power to maintain a substantial post-
war military establishment. Soviet intransigence at the
United Nations, Peace Treaty negotiations and hostilities
18

in Berlin, Eastern Europe, Iran and Greece raised fears in
the West that a weak Europe would be a future target for
communist aggression. Western Europe, absorbed in recon-
struction, was clearly unable to mount a credible and mili-
tarily effective defense effort alone. U.S. Army strength
had dropped from 89 divisions in 1945 to 10 under-equipped
divisions in mid-1949. Less than three remained in Europe,
and those with no coherent infrastructure. The Soviet Union,
on the other hand, was believed to be maintaining 25 fully
armed divisions in Central Europe and, overall, an estimated
140 of 175 divisions at battle strength. As a result, the
"numerical ratio of Soviet infantry and armored troops to
those of the West was at that time on the order of 5:1 or
6:1," far exceeding the 3:1 offense to defense ratio tradi-
tionally felt necessary for successful attack.
The Truman Administration took great pains to explain
to the U.S. Senate during the North Atlantic Treaty debate
in early 1949 that European rearmament would be sufficiently
limited to avoid impeding economic recovery. Similarly, the
Europeans were assured military requirements would be ori-
ented toward local defense, demand only modest defense ex-
penditures, and remain subordinate to domestic welfare
considerations. The original North Atlantic Treaty signa-
tors viewed the new alliance as a guarantee of American
protection and assistance while Europe rebuilt its cities
and fragmented society. On both sides of the Atlantic the
19

backbone of that security guarantee was America's monopoly
of "the absolute weapon."
Whether a case of strategic naivete or simply political
rhetoric, as a long-range plan this defense philosophy was
less than prudent. It was expected the Soviets would de-
velop the atomic bomb within 3-5 years, but NATO planners
were satisfied with short term solutions. If defense esti-
mates were correct, the combination of atomic weapons and
delivery capability development would take the Soviets 7-10
years, placing any Soviet atomic threat near the end of the
1950 's. Once bound by treaty, the United States' Strategic
Air Command (SAC) would suffice to ward off hostile Soviet
intentions. In the meantime, European recovery would enable
the slow but deliberate regeneration of an adequate con-
ventional defense establishment.
However, nuclear deterrent theory was yet to be fully
developed and popularized. Bernard Brodie ' s early discussion
of "The Absolute Weapon" remained an anomoly in the defense
literature. The consequence of the deployment of Soviet
atomic weapons comparable to those of the United States was
understood by only a few and articulated by a handful of
civilian strategists. The overwhelming imbalance between
West European and Soviet forces on the central front led
most to believe that the only viable alternative for the
defense of Europe was the rapid response of SAC and its
atomic weaponry. The era of the years- long conventional war
20

was viewed as over. For the Europeans, this was all the
more reason to defray wasteful defense expenditures in favor
of economic reconstruction while under the unchallenged Amer-
ican nuclear umbrella. President Truman explained to Congress
that the proposed military assistance program to Western
Europe
. . .will be limited to that which is necessary to help them
create mobile defense forces. Our objective is to see to
it that these nations are equipped, in the shortest pos-
sible time, with compact and effectively trained forces
capable of maintaining internal order and resisting the
initial phases of external aggression.
American military assistance was therefore targeted at cre-
ating a local defense capability, encouraging the belief
among Europeans that any attempt to offset the Soviet Army's
superiority would be futile.
The invasion of South Korea in June 1950 provided a mo-
mentary surge in NATO's concern for an adequate conventional
defense of Europe. The impetus for rearmament which ac-
companied the Korean War proved short-lived, however, for
three, mutually reinforcing reasons:
(1) Western Europe was only beginning its economic recovery
and, with limited funds, domestic economic requirements
took precedence over all others.
(2) The United States and Great Britain, in 1951 and 1952
respectively, elected governments which had promised
and subsequently implemented reduced defense expen-
ditures in favor of tighter budgets.
(3) After a year of fighting in Korea, the conflict ap-
peared to stalemate and no overt Soviet threat to
Western Europe emerged.
Soon after the North Korean invasion the European
governments announced plans to increase defense expenditures.
21

The caveat was that any significant increase would continue
to rely on U.S. military assistance because internal economic
matters still claimed the largest portion of available funds.
The European allies demanded a greater troop contribution by
the United States before moving ahead with their aggressive
defense plans. However, with Europe on the road to recovery,
the U.S. government tied increased financial support to
European progress in defense. The Americans promised more
troops only if similar European contributions were made.
This, claimed the Europeans, required more military assis-
tance. The rearmament "Catch-22" was ended when U.S. Con-
gressional action to reduce funds in the Mutual Security
Act of 1953 made it obvious such assistance was not forth-
coming.
Contributing to the difficulty of sustaining a rearma-
ment drive were the elections in the United States and Great
Britain. The two most influential NATO governments changed
administrations in the midst of the Korean War. Churchill
and Eisenhower successfully campaigned on platforms which
included reduced defense budgets, made possible by the
perception that it was purely the fear of the "striking
power of our atomic weapons" which had kept the Soviets at
bay and would continue to do so in the foreseeable future.
With the reduction of U.S. security assistance funds in
FY1953, Congress informed the Europeans they could not ex-
pect increased aid for defense programs in the future.
22

Between FY1953 and FY1955 total U.S. military assistance
dropped from $3.95 billion to $2.29 billion, a reduction of
q
more than 40 percent over the three years.
Similarly, the U.S. defense budget was reduced as prom-
ised. During the same three fiscal years (1953-1955) , total
major national security expenditures were reduced from
$50.36 billion to $40.64 billion. It was Europe which
most felt the defense budget pinch.
Such policies were hardly conducive to spurring conven-
tional rearmament. While Congress continued to call for a
greater independent European contribution to NATO, U.S.
defense strategy explicitly identified atomic weapons as the
mainstay of NATO's armament and conventional forces as es-
sentially useless in all but the most limited and localized
cases of aggression. The signal to Europe was clear. The
United States had no intention of fighting another long
ground war in Europe. The contradiction in U.S. defense
policy and the American's desire for Europe to rearm left
the European governments reluctant to rearm conventionally
and ready to accede to the emerging philosophy of massive
retaliation. This was particularly true in the period pre-
ceding German entry into NATO in May 1955. France was the
only sizable land power left on the European continent, and




Defense and rearmament programs begun before the Korean
War were accelerated and "caused steep rises in the price of
imported raw materials in relation to a slower rise in the
price of manufactured exports and thereby created acute
balance-of-payments deficits." This served to reinforce
Europe's predilection toward economic retrenchment, avoid-
ing costly rearmament while relying on American nuclear
striking power for security. This was not surprising con-
sidering that the U.S., by 1953, had amassed roughly 1,000
12
atomic warheads and more than 250 bombers.
The failure of an overt Soviet threat to Europe to con-
vincingly emerge during or immediately after the Korean War
as anticipated removed what incentives remained for a sub-
stantial European participation in a conventional defense
build-up. The long truce negotiations and cease-fires eased
the initial urgency felt in Europe, and to a lesser extent
the United States, to respond to potential Soviet aggression.
Both the Soviet Union and the United States had visibly ex-
ercised restraint to ensure the conflict in Korea remained
geographically limited. In March 1952, the Soviets demon-
strated their "good faith and peaceful intentions" by calling
for a four-power conference to discuss the unification of
Germany through all-German elections. Finally, the death
of Joseph Stalin in March 1953 was welcomed by all Euro-
peans, raising hopes that the new Soviet leadership would




By 1954 the grandiose goals of the NATO Lisbon Conference,
the European Defense Community, and West German rearmament
—
all of which had been given greater urgency as a result of
the Korean War—were each dismissed with little or no imple-
i 3
mentation. ~ In fact,
...certain European governments deliberately set their
faces against the development of a strong local defense
system in order, by so doing, not to limit the American
obligation to.defend them by the threat of nuclear
retaliation.
The American capacity for massive atomic retaliation
required minimal European participation and provided an un-
questionably effective shield against Soviet aggression.
NSC 162/2, approved by President Eisenhower in October 1953,
stated that "the major deterrent to aggression against
Western Europe is the manifest determination of the United
States to use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory
striking power if the area is attacked." Accordingly, "the
United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as avail-
able for use as other munitions."
For the Europeans, the additional U.S . -European defense
collaboration which accompanied the Korean War appeared
adequate. In December 1950, an American General, Eisenhower,
was confirmed as Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR)
.
Two months later the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE) was established. Simultaneously, the Ameri-
can troop contingent was raised by four divisions to total
nearly six U.S. divisions on European soil. An American
25

commander and his troops were the link coupling the U.S.
nuclear commitment to the defense of Europe.
In 1952 U.S. intelligence analysts estimated the Soviet
nuclear arsenal at approximately 50 atomic bombs. Unknown
to the Europeans was the fact that until 1951-1952 the U.S.
arsenal was not much larger. The margin of safety as-
sessed in 1949 as a 3-5 year Soviet nuclear development gap
disappeared with the Soviet's August 1949 atomic explosion
and new-found comfort was erroneously attributed to a 3-5
year Soviet nuclear delivery gap. This was believed more
than sufficient time for the United States to increase its
stockpile of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the recognition
of Soviet atomic developments from 1949 to 1953 should have
forced a fundamental reevaluation of NATO's massive retalia-
tion strategy. Ironically, just such a recommendation was
made in March 1950 in the final report of the House Armed
Services Committee investigating the B-36 bomber program.
The Secretary of Defense should initiate a study in the
National Security Council on the relationship to the
national objectives of atomic warfare and present , 7
strategic planning for the use of atomic weapons...
Little was accomplished toward this end, however, and
any changes in U.S. -NATO nuclear strategy were more termi-
nological than actual, effected under the guise of a shift
from massive retaliation to assured destruction. The real
value of the Soviet nuclear weapons, holding Western Europe
a "nuclear hostage" to American "good behavior," was not
26

readily acknowledged until 1957, when Sputnik opened many
civilian and military eyes.
The Soviet atomic threat was thus dismissed as long as
the U.S. possessed, or was believed to possess, an over-
whelming preponderance of nuclear force. NATO strategy,
reflecting American military doctrine and the sudden re-
quirement to construct a truly massive nuclear force, became
preoccupied with numbers of bombs and numbers of bombers.
The primary concern was not one of force employment but
targeting requirements, something the allies were satisfied
to leave to the United States for the time being. (Later,
the British were to use the uncertainties of American tar-
geting plans as a primary reason for constructing and main-
taining an independent nuclear force.)
One of the products of this strategic planning failure
was the tendency to rely on a self-assuring psychological
advantage of numerical superiority, obviating the need for
any serious employment doctrine beyond choice of targets.
Reliance on the American nuclear deterrent provided a sound
base for building public support in Europe for NATO and
elicited little domestic criticism. Between 1949 and 1954
moderate defense expenditures by the Europeans were rewarded
with maximum defense. However, by opting for the solution
(massive retaliation) which offered the least politico-
economic resistance, the groundwork was laid for several
notions of deterrence and defense which were to become
dangerously institutionalized over the next 7-10 years:
27

(1) that European resources were inadequate to create a
credible conventional defense against the Red Army
of some 175 divisions;
(2) that the Soviet Union would be deterred from aggression
by the threat of urban/industrial destruction poised by
American nuclear-equipped bombers;
And, as a result of (1) and (2)
:
(3) that devising alternative conventional strategies was
dangerous since it would only make calculations of an
invasion easier for the Soviets and therefore increase
the likelihood of that aggression;
(4) that limited war in Europe was inconceivable since any
serious Soviet aggression would inevitably escalate
into a devastating nuclear exchange with Europe as the
central battleground.
Each of the four "notions of deterrence and defense"
contained, to some extent, a measure of fallacy. European
resources were adequate to create a credible conventional
defense against the Red Army, which did not, in actuality,
possess 140 of 175 divisions at battle strength. Deterrence
by the threat of urban/industrial destruction relied on the
"correctness" of mirrow-imaging Western cost-benefit calcu-
lations on the Soviet leadership. If alternate strategies
did make Soviet calculations easier, they might not neces-
sarily change the results for the better. Finally, the
emerging Soviet deterrent force increased the likelihood
that a conflict could be limited to a European battlefield
by neutralizing the American strategic nuclear threat.
A. THE ORIGIN OF U.S. ARMY TACTICAL NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
Ironically, the Army was the only service branch pur-
suing a strategy which supported these latter conclusions.
Traditionally the heart of the American defense effort,
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the Army saw its previously central position being eclipsed
by the Air Force and Navy, whose nuclear delivery capabilities
made them focal points of U.S. strategic planning. The gen-
eral acceptance of massive retaliation and Congressional re-
luctance to support a large ground force contingent in
Europe relegated the Army to anchor position in the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) hierarchy. A strategy of massive
retaliation, predicated on a short atomic war, held no place
for a large land army. The U.S. Army, in spite of its
ground combat contribution in a limited war in Korea, strug-
gled to maintain a modicum of influence among the services.
Until 1952 atomic weapons material was relatively scarce
and devoted almost exclusively to research, development and
production of large yield strategic weapons. But tests at
Bikini Atoll in 1947 suggested new possibilities for the
tactical application of low yield atomic weapons. For the
Army, the potential of a tactical atomic weapon production
line offered an answer to combat the Air Force's, and to a
lesser extent the Navy's, increasingly dominant and influ-
ential position in defense strategy and policymaking.
As things stood, the Army was losing ground in the com-
petition for defense resources, sorely needed to modernize
its troops equipped with vintage WW II surplus and technology.
From 1949 to 1954 Air Force expenditures increased ninefold,
from less than $2.0 billion to nearly $16.0 billion. During
the same period the Army budget increased by a factor of
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18less than 2.5. Furthermore, unlike the Air Force, the
bulk of the Army's increase was absorbed by the Korean War.
Once the feasibility of low-yield, tactical atomic tech-
nology was accepted, Army strategists wasted no time in
entering the "Great Debate." If the future was in atomic
weaponry, to survive the Army would have to adapt.
. . .Army planners did not quite believe that the Air Force
could win a nuclear war all by itself. Nor did they
really see a future for the Army if they failed to find
an important nuclear mission for it... They had to find a
way of adapting nuclear weapons to ground warfare.
While the search for a nuclear mission was fueled somewhat
by the advent of low-yield weapon technology, it did have a
solid foundation in traditional Army ground combat doctrine.
The problem was not so much finding a mission as assessing
the role of ground forces equipped to fight on an atomic
battlefield without the benefit of experience. It was clear
to the Army that no matter how decisive the high-yield weap-
ons of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) were, the Air Force
could not fulfill such critical tasks as post-attack ter-
ritorial occupation and neutralization of enemy forces re-
maining after initial retaliation. Ground forces were still
vital to the U.S. defense effort.
Virtually all Army officers agreed that ground forces
should be equipped with tactical atomic weapons to facil-
itate an integrated conventional-atomic battlefield. There
the agreement ended. Recommendations for tactics, command
and control, employment and targeting were widely varied
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and indicated the absence of any Army doctrinal foundation
for atomic thought and strategy. Traditional issues of fire-
power, mobility and maneuver were suddenly given careful
scrutiny under the theoretical conditions of an atomic
battlefield.
Between 1945 and 1954 forty articles appeared in
Military Review—a professional journal of the U.S. Army
—
addressing atomic/nuclear combat. The diversity of the
articles and author's views reflected the lack of firm
consensus among Army officers as to how ground forces,
equipped with tactical atomic weapons, would be employed on
the battlefield. Curiously, while concern over the Soviet
atomic threat was more or less absent—at least until 1953
—
from the public debate on U.S. atomic strategy, it pervaded
the unclassified Army literature.
The potential for very high losses from the enemy em-
ployment of a single atomic weapon on the battlefield led to
a strong emphasis on maneuver and dispersion in the Army
writings. Yet, even on these fundamental tactics two
schools of thought emerged. In 1950, Lieutenant General
Leslie Groves characterized the atomic battlefield as one
of small, mobile forces, suggesting almost "guerilla-like"
tactics for atomic weapon equipped units.
The threat of the atomic bomb may well reduce the size
of units in combat... I do not see how large armies can
be supported in combat. I anticipate the use of widely





Likewise, General Matthew Ridgway noted that
. . .dispersion will be more pronounced than ever before
and units will be more widely separated. . .Small unit
actions will become more typical and decentralization
of control more pronounced.
Those views did not go unchallenged. A large body of
the literature argued that extensive dispersion would merely
weaken the main forces beyond a credible fighting capacity
and undermine the effectiveness of the offensive. The key,
according to these advocates, was concentration of force
and local atomic superiority.
. . .dispersion on the level necessary to thwart the effects
of atomic explosions is a sure way to defeat. It divides
the force—men and material—required to win. . .dispersion
in the-offensive , as well as in the defensive, spells
doom.
In early 19 51 Army efforts to develop a tactical atomic
weapon capability and build the requisite DOD support were
given a temporary boost. Under the joint control of the
Army, Navy and Air Force Project Vista was established at
the California Institute of Technology to conduct a study of
ground and air tactical warfare, focusing on the defense of
Western Europe and applying lessons learned to date in
Korea.
Initially the study was enthusiastically supported by all
three services. When the study recommended "bringing the
battle back to the battlefield," Air Force support quickly





...the early enthusiasm of the Air Force began to wane
when it realized that increasing emphasis on tactical air
support and tactical airlift would conflict with Air
Force views on strategic air power... that an all-out air
offensive was the only sound tactic and any diversion to
defense was a waste.
The final project report, completed in February 1952,
included a recommendation for the development of an Army
tactical atomic capability. However, Pentagon defense
thinking, dominated by the cost-effective strategy of mas-
sive retaliation, rejected the recommendation and the re-
port was never officially approved by the individual
services. Loath to give up its dominant position in de-
fense, the Air Force had successfully opposed the Army's
push for tactical atomic weapons. This type of interservice
rivalry, particularly between the Air Force and Army, con-
tinued to obstruct and interfere with Army efforts to de-
velop a coherent tactical atomic warfighting doctrine
through the 1950s.
At the heart of the Army's early atomic thinking was the
Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas and a study group there led by the
24
school's Commandant, Lieutenant General Manton Eddy.
Evolving out of the CGSC study, in November 19 51 the Depart-
ment of the Army published its first guidance for the bat-
tlefield employment of atomic weapons, Field Manual (FM)
100-31, "Tactical Use of Atomic Weapons." Although pub-
lished as a Field Manual—defined as the vehicle "to
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25promulgate military doctrine, tactics, and technique"
it was characterized by uncertainty, the result of a lack
of technical data and the Army's nebulous position in U.S.
atomic strategy.
The development of the doctrine did not mask the divi-
sions within the Army as to the utility of tactical atomic
weapons on the battlefield.
Brigadier General Herbert B. Loper, Chief, Armed Forces
Special Weapons Project... is reported to have told one
member of Lieutenant General Eddy's study group, "Show
me how to use this weapon in tactical roles if you can.
It is not a tactical weapon."
Virtually no mention is made in the manual of combined ser-
vice operations, perhaps indicative of the Army's lone sup-
port of a tactical nuclear weapon. In the introductory
pages, PM 100-31 warned that
...Further tests are needed to determine exact tactical
effects
.
...Presently available data of atomic missile effects
on tactical dispositions are inadequate. Acquisition of-
new data may require extensive revision of this manual.
Specifically, FM 100-31 recommended the widespread use
of atomic missiles over a short period of time to disrupt
attacking enemy formations. Following the advice of Gen-
erals Groves and Ridgway, the manual advocated greater dis-
persion of troop formations, advising commanders to avoid
large concentrations of man and material which presented
lucrative targets to enemy atomic fire. Major changes in
basic offensive doctrine were not suggested. Rather the
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offensive was still based on combining firepower and maneuver,
only now atomic weapons were incorporated into the operation.
In spite of its shortcomings, FM 100-31 was a very pos-
itive step toward developing a warfighting doctrine which
integrated conventional and atomic (nuclear) weapons on the
battlefield. These weapons, according to the manual, did
2 8
not change the Army's nine principles of war. They were
to be used carefully and coordinated with conventional fire-
power. Although the manual was distinctly defensive in ori-
entation, offensive actions were considered the key to
successful operations if attacked. Whenever possible, of-
fensive maneuver was to follow atomic strikes "to destroy
enemy forces disorganized by the explosions."
With the publication of FM 100-31 the Army followed,
perhaps for the last time, the most rational sequence of
strategy development: doctrine and employment guidelines
preceded the field deployment of the first tactical atomic
weapons. Simultaneously, officer training at the CGSC was
expanded and revised so that "consideration on the tactical
employment of atomic weapons was included in twenty- seven
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separate subjects." Officers preparing to enter the
field were at least moderately familiar with atomic weapons,
their effects, and the Army's concept of employment. The
Army had established an official position from which future
debates could proceed: atomic weapons could, and most likely




Unfortunately, it was the physical absence of the tac-
tical atomic weapons from US /NATO inventories which allowed
such rational doctrinal development. Other than in-house
support, little attention was paid to FM 100-31. Political
opposition was essentially non-existent and military con-
siderations were allowed to dominate strategy formulation.
Within the next three years, however, strong opposition did
develop, as the weapons were deployed in Europe. Exercises
Sagebrush and Carte Blanche , coupled with the highly pub-
licized fallout data from thermonuclear tests in the Pacif-
ic, made obvious the tremendous devastation tactical
weapons could cause. Both European leaders and U.S. polit-
icians recognized the Army's declaratory doctrine was based




III. SHIELDS, SWORDS AND SOLDIERS, 1954-1960
The atomic bomb cannot be subdivided. This is inherent
in the physics of the situation. . .There will be no shells
from guns carrying atomic explosives, nor will they be
carried by marine torpedoes or small rockets or in any
other retail way. Atomic bombs will be used only against





Vannevar Bush was wrong. In 1952 the Atomic Energy Com-
mission requested $3.0 billion for a tactical nuclear weapon
(TNW) development program which would provide "a complete
family of atomic weapons." Suddenly the policy outlined in
NSC 162/2 equating conventional and nuclear weapons on the
battlefield was given substance and atomic weapons were made
available to the ground forces expected to meet the Soviet
Army at the East-West German border. Between 1953 and 1958
U.S. forces in Europe were equipped with Honest John, Cor-
poral, 8-inch howitzers, atomic demolition munitions and a
few 2 80 mm atomic cannons. Despite the title "tactical,"
these weapons had yields ranging from subkiloton to 20 kilo-
ton. The majority of the earlier weapons more closely ap-
proached the upper yield. Only the 8-inch howitzer and
atomic demolition munitions had a subkiloton capability,




The TNW arsenal in Europe remained small and grew slowly
from initial deployment in 1953 until 1955. The rationale
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for the deployment was, in part, the result of NATO's per-
ceived need to counter the massive number of Soviet troops
and, in part, a desire to provide the most economical—that
is, inexpensive—defense. With Europe and the United States
unwilling to fund a conventional force capable of opposing
the Soviets, the alternative of TNW provided the means "to
redress the numerical superiority of the conventional So-
32
viet forces."
Initially, the strongest reactions to the new tactical
nuclear employment policies were not European but in-house
rivalries between the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force. Both
the Army and Navy challenged the Air Force's unilateral con-
trol over nuclear policy and weapons. The Air Force, fear-
ing loss of its predominant influence, "became decidedly
hostile to any notion that it might be necessary to find
33
ways of limiting war by eliminating strategic bombing."
The controversy was resolved in true bureaucratic fashion
with the Navy gaining carrier-based nuclear strike capa-
bility, the Army receiving battlefield TNW and creating
smaller atomic-equipped units known as Pentomic divisions,
and the Air Force retaining its dominant position in the
strategic strike role. However, aside from the Army's
reorganization into Pentomic divisions, there was little
discernible change in the force structure or posture of
NATO's forward forces. The fact that American strategy in
Europe was being directed at the time by two Air Force
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Generals, Lauris Norstad (SACEUR) and Nathan Twining (CJCS)
,
certainly must have influenced this trend.
NATO officially incorporated the tactical nuclear weap-
ons into its defense planning in December 1954. At the NATO
Annual Review the North Atlantic Council declared TNW in-
dispensable to the defense of Europe and plans based on TNW
use were implemented in early 1955. Claims that the TNW de-
ployment preceded, and therefore caused, NATO's failure to
build an adequate conventional defense organization were
frequently offered, but patently in error. Many Western
defense analysts and military historians described the TNW
deployment sequence as follows:
Tactical nuclear weapons were introduced, Western Europe
did not want to raise troops, and after the introduction
of tactical nuclear weapons, NATO dropped its troop_.goals
and began the process of doctrinal rationalization.
As described earlier, the NATO-Europe governments were
reluctant to dispute American recommendations and apparently
adopted the Lisbon goals with the full realization, before
the TNW deployment, that they would never be implemented.
In September 1952, only seven months after the Lisbon meet-
ing, British Prime Minister Churchill suggested that concen-
tration on nuclear weapons and strategic airpower would
facilitate a considerably smaller ground force than the
96 divisions agreed upon at Lisbon. The next month France
informed NATO that, in the absence of increased American
security assistance, it would be unable to meet its Lisbon
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35pledge. In 1954, under pressure from the European
governments, the NATO Council indicated that the rearmament
of the Alliance had ended as far as conventional weapons
36
were concerned. Thereafter, emphasis would be placed on
qualitative improvements of those forces-in-being. NATO
conventional force objectives were reduced to an official
goal of 48 divisions, well before the bulk of tactical nu-
37
clear weapons were deployed in Europe after 1957.
Similarly, the implication that NATO had no TNW doctrine
at the time of deployment was incorrect. FM 100-31, the
Army's doctrinal manual, was published in 1951, again well
before the delivery of atomic weapons to Europe. FM 100-31
provided guidance, albeit tentative, for atomic-equipped
U.S. ground forces. NATO tactical nuclear guidelines were
established in 1957, the same year as the first equipping
and training of non-U. S. NATO forces with TNW and coincident
with the plans to deploy the Thor and Jupiter IRBMs to
38Britain under bilateral (dual-key) control. NATO guidance
was much more hollow than the U.S. Army's, reflecting the
European attitude that TNW was merely a supplement to mas-
sive retaliation forces and therefore required little more
than passing attention.
As the tactical nuclear weapon made its way into the
NATO inventory, however, there was a conscious effort to
diminish the need for conventional forces, almost exclusively
led by the Americans and the British. A 1953 report issued
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by the British military chiefs, headed' by the influential
Chief of the Air Staff of the Royal Air Force Sir John
Slessor, concluded that the danger of Soviet invasion had
declined dramatically since 1950. The report advocated deep
cuts in conventional forces in favor of a nuclear air strike
strategy and the use of tactical nuclear weapons. According
to the report,
If such bombs were used against invading ground troops,
they would have deadly effect. There would be less need
for a Western military Behemoth; troop strength could be
considerably reduced. A proper British contingent might
be as small as 50,000 men.
Slessor' s recommendations became policy when the 1957
British White Paper on defense announced the decision to
reduce UK conventional forces from 690,000 to 375,000 by
1962, equipping the remainder with "atomic rocket artil-
lery." The British Army of the Rhine, an important contin-
gent in NATO's front line in Germany, would be cut from
77,000 to 64,000 immediately with further reductions to
follow.
Simultaneously, a similar strategic airpower theme was
developing in the United States under the Eisenhower Admin-
istration's "New Look" policies. Concerned with the "econ-
omy of defense" as well as pure military considerations,
President Eisenhower and Defense Secretary Charles Wilson
led the drive toward a reduction of conventional manpower,
rebuilding a reliable defense mobilization base, and in-
creased reliance on the Air Force's Strategic Air Command.
41

Based on exaggerated intelligence estimates of the Soviet
army, Eisenhower concluded that no acceptable defense ex-
penditures could close the gap between conventional NATO
and Soviet forces in Europe. In his memoirs, Eisenhower
claims
...we knew that the Soviets maintained something in the
neighborhood of 175 divisions active in Europe at all
times. The United States had twenty divisions, only five
of which were in Europe. Therefore, in view of the dis-
parity in the strengths of the opposing ground forces, it
seemed clear that only by the interposition of our nuclear
weapons could we promptly stop a major Communist aggres-
sion in that area. Two more divisions or ten more divi-
sions, on our side, would not make very much difference
against this Soviet ground force.
But I was not pessimistic. My intention was firm: to
launch the Strategic Air Command immediately upon trust-
worthy evidence of a general attack against the West.
The allies on the continent, however, were expected to
meet their as of yet unattained conventional force goals of
the 1954 NATO Council meeting. Contradictions and confusion
in U.S. policy and NATO-Europe practices became readily
apparent throughout 1955 and 1956. Two important events
effectively undermined U.S. efforts to induce a European
build-up of conventional forces once the TNW deployment had
begun.
On 13 July 1956 one of the lead stories on the front
page of the New York Times was "Radford Seeking 800,0 00
41Man Cut." Admiral Arthur Radford, then Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed reducing the U.S. Armed
Forces by 800,000 men by 1960, with the bulk of the cut
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targeted for the Army. Pentagon officials estimated the
cuts would translate into the withdrawal of approximately
40,000 U.S. troops from overseas in the first year of im-
plementation alone. Since any future war, according to
Radford's proposal, would most likely be short and involve
the use of nuclear weapons, Army forces assigned to NATO
could be reduced to "small token forces that would wave the
42flag" but be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons.
These views were supported, not surprisingly, by Air
Force Generals Twining and Norstad. Norstad claimed the
presence of TNW made reductions of up to 2/3 of the Lisbon
goals possible. Twining' s remarks were even more dramatic,
stating that the United States
...cannot afford to keep in our armed forces conventional
forces for the old type of warfare plus those for atomic
warfare. We have got to make up our minds that we have
to go one way or the other.
American policies and public declarations gave the Europeans
clear indication of which direction U.S. strategy was
moving.
The response from Europe, particularly Bonn, was quick
in coming and somewhat disgruntled. A very concerned Chan-
cellor Adenauer sent General Adolf Heusinger, Chief of the
German Armed Forces, to confer with key DGD officials. Un-
convinced of the benefits of building a substantial conven-
tional force while the Americans relied on strategic airpower
and atomic weapons, the West German cabinet, two months
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after Radford's proposals were made public, approved legis-
lation providing a 12-month term of conscription rather than
the initially proposed 18 months. The West Germans blamed
the reduced term of service on the United States, explicitly
referring to Radford's plan to cut U.S. forces. Although
the Radford Plan was never implemented, the damage was al-
ready done. West Germany was no longer able to meet its
previous obligation of 500,000 troops. In fact, in Feb-
ruary 1957, West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss
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stated that only 72,000 West Germans were in uniform.
The second event blunting the mid-1950s initiative for
conventional rearmament was the announced troop reductions
by the Soviet Union in August 1955 and May 1956, the latter
conveniently complementing Radford's proposals to reduce
U.S. armed forces. The Soviet cuts, 640,000 and 1,200,000
respectively, did not justify a sustained rearmament program
by the Europeans. On the contrary, it appeared to the Euro-
peans that a stable "imbalance of terror" was materializing
between the nuclear armament of the West and the Red Army
to the East. Until Sputnik in October 1957, U.S. nuclear
superiority was felt to more than adequately offset the
initial Soviet deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles.
Additional conventional forces would only fuel a costly
arms race which the Europeans were determined to avoid.
Khrushchev's call for "peaceful coexistence" was seen as
tangible evidence of the diminishing threat and the success
of the deterrent strategy of massive retaliation.
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Khrushchev's intentions in reducing the size of the Red
Army had little to do with his rhetoric of peaceful coexis-
tence. Aside from a very strong propaganda effect, the re-
ductions were the result of internal political requirements
and economic necessity and made possible by the growing
"quality and quantity of our [Soviet] nuclear missile arse-
45
nal." European leaders largely dismissed this "arsenal,"
preferring instead to rely on the Soviet leader's tension-
reducing pronouncements.
The Soviet propaganda effort was especially successful
in affecting the NATO government's perceptions of nuclear
war and nuclear strategy. The nuclearization of Soviet
forces in the mid-1950s naturally induced added caution and
restraint into NATO's strategic planning. P.M.S. Blackett
and Roger Hilsman attributed a nuclear capability to Soviet
ground forces as early as 1954, closely approximating Thomas
Wolfe's finding that Soviet MRBMs went into series production
around 1955. Until 1958-1959, with the deployment of the
SS-4/5, the FROG (free rocket over ground) and Scud short-
range missiles made up the bulk of the Soviet nuclear missile
inventory. Quantitative estimates, however, varied widely
and were inconclusive, ranging from 75 to 300 deployed mis-
siles by 1956. Whether the actual arsenal was less than 75
or more than 300 missiles was not an especially important
point. Americans and West Europeans alike believed the
Soviet arsenal was substantial enough to wreck havoc in
Europe and reacted accordingly.
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Thus, by 1957, West Europeans felt themselves under the
same cloud of nuclear destruction which NATO had introduced
to the Soviets in 1953-1954. European and American defense
planners felt that the combination of low accuracy and high-
yield which characterized the Soviet MRBM force precluded
any rational conception of limited nuclear war. Khrushchev
was not slow to capitalize on this Western fear and his fre-
quent claims that any nuclear war would inevitably lead to
a massive rocket exchange were reinforced by the writings
in Soviet military journals.
It is quite clear that the first attempt to use this
'tactical 1 weapon would lead to the mass use of atomic
and hydrogen bombs.
...the radius of [explosive effects of] nuclear
weapons and the nature of contemporary military ob-
jectives is such that it completely excludes the
possibility of their employment only on a 'tactical'
scale
.
As the non-US/NATO forces were equipped with TNW, Soviet
propaganda was stepped-up. In April 1957, a Soviet note to
the West German government warned against the Bundeswehr
participating in any NATO TNW arrangements. The note re-
minded the Germans of their vulnerability to Soviet missile
attacks and, in the event of a nuclear war,
One can easily see that Western Germany, whose territory
would become the target of the most powerful and concen-
trated blows of these weaoons , would be destroyed, would
become one big cemetery.
The success of the propaganda effort cannot be over-
estimated. The Soviets were using powerful words, backed
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by a small but credible nuclear missile force. If the
Soviets were expressing their strategic doctrine accurately,
then a failure of deterrence meant tremendous devastation to
the Europeans. If the localized use of TNW resulted in an
immediate Soviet missile retaliation, then the strategy for
TNW employment was faulty. Khrushchev's satisfaction with
the Soviet propaganda and the fear of limited nuclear war it
instilled in the European governments prompted him to write:
In this regard I must give our departed enemy Adenauer
credit for his sober-mindedness ... "I don't know what
you're talking about," [Adenauer] would say. "If a third
world war is unleashed, West Germany will be the first
country to perish." I was pleased to hear this. ...For
him to be making public statements like that was a great
achievement on our part. Not only were we keeping our
number one enemy in line, but Adenauer was helping us to
keep our other enemies in line, too.
In spite of the growth of the Soviet nuclear counter-
deterrent, both in intermediate- and intercontinental-range
missiles, U.S. nuclear superiority continued to be wholly
accepted as the only effective guarantee of European secu-
rity. The strategy of massive retaliation/assured destruc-
tion continued to fill NATO's deterrent needs. It did not,
as the NATO members were well aware and ready to accept,
satisfy defense needs. In effect, the Americans and the
European allies consciously chose a strategy which pre-
cluded any limited war options, conventional or nuclear.
"Local attacks," an undefined form of "sub-limited" war,
was the only form of aggression to which NATO's conventional
forces would respond. While this type of Soviet aggression
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was viewed as unlikely, it was the only form of aggression
to which NATO was prepared to respond conventionally. Tes-
timony by Secretary of Defense McElroy before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in 1959 illustrated that there
was a conceptual convergence of limited and local wars which
extended beyond mere rhetoric and into NATO strategic think-
ing and planning.
McElroy: . . .we must not degrade our ability to respond
to a general war possibility by any response
that we make to the limited war situation.





No, it does not.
I am not clear what it does mean.
It means that we cannot retain our capability
to deter general war while we are responding
to a limited war threat...
Fulbright: But if there is a limited war, what happens?
McElroy: ...It depends entirely on how big it gets.
Fulbright: It seems to me that if we are not to just up
and respond to a local war, we must maintain
an adequate ground force, Army, infantry. Do
you think we are retaining adequate ground
forces for local attacks ?
McElroy: I do indeed... We think the ground forces we
have in the Army and in the Marines are ade-
quate to deal with limited war situations we
visualize.
It was obvious from McElroy' s testimony that, by his
definition, limited war closely approximated Fulbright 's
"local attacks." It was equally obvious that, when the def-
inition was applied to the Soviets, aggression in Central
or Western Europe could never be categorized as limited.
The Secretary's remarks mirrored US DOD and NATO strategic
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thinking: minor "border skirmishes" would be combated with
conventional forces but nuclear weapons would continue to
be relied upon to deter major aggression. Between the two
extremes little effort was devoted to either building ade-
quate conventional forces or incorporating the TNW into NATO
war plans based upon conflict limitation.
No major NATO program better exemplified these notions
of deterrence over defense than the Thor/Jupiter interme-
diate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) deployment. On the
heels of the "missile gap" fears generated by the Soviet's
Sputnik launch in October 1957, the NATO Council resolved to
station the American IRBMs in Europe. The technological
achievement demonstrated by Sputnik was quickly applied to
the Soviet medium and intermediate range missiles and sud-
denly the protection provided by U.S. nuclear-capable bomb-
ers was not considered sufficiently responsive. Thor and
Jupiter were deployed as an interim measure to "fill the
gap" until U.S. land-based intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles (ICBM) went into production.
Virtually no attention was given to the military utility
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of the missiles, probably because there was so little.
Their provocative nature and vulnerability made them an un-
attractive addition to the massive retaliation arsenal. As
Albeet Wohlstetter explained in his classic article "The
Delicate Balance of Terror":
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The inaccuracy of an IRBM requires high-yield warheads,
and such a combination of inaccuracy and high-yield,
while quite appropriate and adequate against unprotected
targets in a general war, would scarcely come within
even the most^lax, in fact reckless, definition of
limited war.
Without question the primary motive behind the Thor/
Jupiter deployment was "to restore the diminished confidence
of European governments in the efficacy of the strategy of
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massive retaliation." As the "premier" nuclear weapons
in the US/NATO arsenal at the time, Thor and Jupiter set the
tone for forward-deployed nuclear weapon strategy; they were
weapons of retaliation, not useful military application.
The aversion to limited war and limited war strategies
was not a peculiarly European trait. While US DOD spokesmen
and defense analysts tended to blame the Europeans for fail-
ing to adequately rearm for limited war contingencies, they
ignored the importance and influence upon European strategic
thinking of statements made by prominent American civilian
and military officials in, or associated with, the NATO or-
ganization. As SACEUR, General Norstad continually espoused
the need for a substantial "shield" of forward-deployed
conventional forces.
If we concentrate only on weapons and forces for general
war, we deny to ourselves the capacity to dispose of
lesser situations, and could suggest an opportunity for
limited aggressions. . .we must be able to respond to less
than ultimate incidents with decisive, but less than ul-
timate , means
.
However, Norstad went on to explain.
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By this I am not suggesting that limited wars are
possible along this sensitive frontier of NATO. It
would be very unlikely, I feel, that a serious incident
could remain limited.
Norstad made it quite clear that he did not consider
warfighting the most important function of the shield forces
but rather a critical component to "to complete the deter-
rent." Advocating official U.S. policy, Norstad 1 s comments
indicated not only that U.S. forces were neither in position
for nor preparing to conduct any form of limited war on
European soil, but also that any breech of NATO borders be-
yond a "border skirmish" could only be countered with the
employment of strategic nuclear weapons.
The attractions of a "deterrence or total war" strategy
were obvious. It was inexpensive, requiring relatively
small defense expenditures in comparison to the deterrent
obtained. To a large degree, it reduced the prospects of
Europe becoming a battleground, conventional or nuclear.
In the event deterrence failed, the limited strategic ar-
senals of the superpowers might result in a nuclear exchange
over the heads of the Europeans. Finally, only minimal con-
ventional forces need be forward-deployed along the East-
West German border in order to provide what Raymond Aron
aptly called the "casus belli atomici" for U.S. nuclear in-
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volvement. America's superiority in warheads and delivery
capability made this a feasible, if not desirable, strategy.
The phrases "trip-wire" and "plate-glass window" were
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popular descriptions applied to those forward conventional
forces which embodied this NATO philosophy.
The strategy was strongly encouraged by the French,
whose support was founded less on strategic implications
than political motivation. The emphasis on small conven-
tional forces acted to satisfy French fears of a rejuvenated
German army. In addition, NATO's inclination toward a pow-
erful nuclear deterrent strengthened the argument for an
independent nuclear force put forth by influential French
military strategists such as Ailleret, Gallois and others.
Since the employment of tactical nuclear weapons was asso-
ciated almost exclusively with German soil, a Soviet break-
through to French borders left the French relying on the
response of U.S. strategic bombers, a response which became
increasingly uncertain with the growth of Soviet nuclear
forces. For the French, the most logical, and effective,
solution was to create their own independent nuclear re-
taliation force.
By 1958 the primacy of deterrence— in the form of mas-
sive retaliation—over defense was institutionalized among
the Europeans. No war, conventional or nuclear, would spare
Europe the destruction it had seen in WWI and WWII. Phrases
describing nuclear war as "laden with doom," "double sui-
cide," "likened to two scorpions in a bottle," and "power
to destroy all life on earth" were commonplace in profes-
sional journals as well as newspapers. Tactical nuclear
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weapons would only magnify that damage. A strategy of de-
fense seemed to assure the destruction of Europe. Only de-
terrence was feasible. There was little value in programming
TNW into an integrated defense strategy. The weapons served
only to enhance deterrence and negate the Soviet potential
for employing similar systems without fear of a response in
kind. Along with American troops, tactical nuclear weapons
were considered a crucial link coupling the defense of
Europe with that of the United States.
The adverse effects of adopting a purely deterrent strat-
egy were less obvious than the attractions. They would be-
come evident, although not totally accepted, only after the
U.S. shift to flexible response in 1961. Massive retalia-
tion left no room for a nuclear weapon considered ineffec-
tual in an environment which relied on a tremendous U.S.
nuclear strike as soon as the "plate-glass window" was
broken. Even with TNW, the forces present on the central
front were inadequate to halt a serious Soviet invasion.
Helmut Schmidt described the European view when he stated
that in an East-West confrontation, NATO.
...would have prevailed if--and the 'if is an important
one—the West had in fact immediately brought the whole
,-n
of its nuclear striking power to bear on the Soviet Union.
Aggravating the presence of TNW in Europe was the problem
of control. With the exception of the Thor missile squad-
rons deployed to England in 1959, all the weapons were under
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"single-key" American control, effectively removing the
European leadership from the decision-making process in-
volving their use, especially in the event of surprise at-
tack. Leery to debate with the Americans concerning the
control of the tactical nuclear forces and seeking to main-
tain a modicum of autonomy in security decisions, the two
most powerful European allies proceeded with their own nu-
clear weapons programs. For Great Britain, followed by
France, nuclear independence came not only as a strategic
imperative, but also one of prestige.
The preeminent danger of a tactical nuclear strategy
did not go unnoticed by its advocates. It meant crossing
the precarious, but well-defined firebreak between conven-
tional and nuclear war. Few doubted that the control of
escalation would be more difficult, although not impossible,
once the nuclear threshold was behind rather than ahead of
continued hostilities. Nevertheless, Generals Bradley and
Gavin supported the idea of an integrated battlefield using
conventional and tactical nuclear weapons. Both reiterated
the requirement for increased conventional forces to com-
pensate for the higher and more rapid attrition rates ex-
pected on a nuclear battlefield. Greater mobility and
dispersion were deemed essential. The importance of formi-
dable ground forces, quantitatively as well as qualitatively,
was not to be underestimated according to the Generals.
Without them, prospects for conflict limitation and
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escalation control were severely handicapped. Between 1957
and 1961 several seminal works appeared in print supporting
the General's conclusions: Limited War; The Challenge to
American Strategy ; Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy ; War
and Peace in the Space Age ; and perhaps the most influential,
The Uncertain Trumpet .
At the close of the 1950s, nearly seven years after the
introduction of tactical nuclear weapons to Europe, no co-
herent strategy had been developed for the limited, battle-
field use of these weapons. Through the entire range of
tactical nuclear systems the armed services had "never been
given a clear-cut statement allowing them to plan with com-
plete confidence on the use or limitation of use of atomic
weapons." By 1960, Air Force General Twining claimed
"the JCS had tried and failed to improve coordination in
6 2
nuclear planning." What Twining and others failed to re-
alize was that the real stumbling block was the divergent
conceptions of deterrence and defense between the U.S. Army
and other advocates of limited nuclear strategies on the one
hand and the governments of the United States and its Euro-
pean allies on the other. This divergence was remedied only
in rhetoric with NATO's adoption of flexible response in




A. THE RISE AND DECLINE OF U.S. ARMY TACTICAL NUCLEAR
DOCTRINE
The in-government opposition to the tactical employment
of nuclear weapons was not as prevalent in the early years
of the Eisenhower Administration. With his election to the
Presidency, the Army had continued to refine its early nu-
clear battlefield proposals' in the favorable climate of the
"New Look" policies. In the first year after Eisenhower's
election, the "New Look" was firmly implanted in the U.S.
armed services, although each service had reached somewhat
different conclusions as to how atomic/nuclear weapons would
be employed in support of U.S. military strategy. The Air
Force maintained its traditional post-WW II posture of re-
lying on strategic bombing via long-range airpower. The
Army, on the other hand, viewed the "New Look" as a move-
ment toward a more diversified nuclear arsenal which would
allow the application of a more appropriate amount of force
against a variety of targets.
Limited nuclear materials had previously restricted
weapon production to high-yield bombs for strategic targets.
With the development of thermonuclear technology, requiring
less nuclear material, and advances in small weapon design,
this restriction gave way in 1953-1954 to an era of "nuclear
plenty," enabling the Army to move from the theoretical
weapons described in FM 100-31 to forward-deployed systems.
The result, according to former Assistant Secretary of
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Defense Alain Enthoven, was "a race to equip everybody—even
63
the infantry--with nuclear weapons."
The opening of production lines for tactical nuclear
weapons such as Honest John and Little John short-range mis-
siles and the 8-inch howitzer shall, fostered an even great-
er internal consistency within the Army on tactical nuclear
doctrine than FM 100-31 alone had in 1951. No longer were
questions of use versus non-use applicable. With the weap-
ons entering the field at an increasingly rapid rate, the
unresolved "how to's" of atomic combat were brought to the
foreground. Questions of dispersion, mobility and firepower
were essentially resolved by Army strategists at the Command
and General Staff College (CGSC)
.
Between 1954-1956 the CGSC conducted three studies for
the purpose of upgrading tactical nuclear doctrine. The
instruction establishing the guidelines for the first study
(1954), known as the Easterbrook Committee, stated that
It is to be considered that nuclear weapons are now a
part of the battlefield as much as automatic weapons
and tactical airpower.
...it is desired to eliminate the existing inconsis-
tency between "atomic" and "nonatomic" units of instruc-
tion... in that atomic considerations are not stressed
except in selected atomic
fi
units of instruction or
atomic sections of units.
The remaining two studies , the Educational Survey Com-
mission (1956) and the Clow Committee (1956) , reached simi-
lar, if not identical, conclusions. In August 1956 the
Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC) issued
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a directive that ordered all combat arms branch schools "to
depict atomic warfare as the typical and to treat nonatomic
warfare as a modification of the typical."
The increased emphasis on tactical atomic warfare
brought on by the CONARC directive was reflected in the evo-
lution of the "tactical problems" taught at the CGSC in the
1950s. In 1952 the corps conducted attacks in possession of
6 atomic weapons with yields of 15-60 kilotons. In 1955,
the number of weapons was increased from 6 to 50. By 1957
the corps commander was allocated 78 nuclear weapons rang-
6 6ing in yield from 1 to 500 kilotons.
The operational outcome of the Army's aggressive ap-
proach to tactical nuclear tactics and training was the
reorganization, beginning in early 1956, of the ground
forces under the Pentomic concept. The new structure cre-
ated smaller, self-contained and nuclear-equipped divisions
capable of independent action over a significantly larger
battlefield area than their predecessors. The on-scene
commander was to locate the enemy and "destroy him by di-
recting atomic fire upon him." The fundamental tenets of
the Pentomic division directed the commander to concentrate
forces only briefly for attack, disperse widely for defense
and maneuver often to prevent accurate targeting of his
forces
.
The Pentomic division was to be prepared to fight with-
out the support of other corps. Command and control,
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tenuous at best on an atomic battlefield, was to reside at
the lowest level possible.
The small unit leaders. . .will be called upon to a
greater degree than ever before
fi
to make tactical
decisions upon the battlefield.
The new division structure was envisioned as capable of
sustained fighting without reinforcements and with organic
nuclear artillery (8-inch howitzer) and short-range missiles
(Honest John)
.
By 1959 all U.S. divisions stationed in Europe had been
reorganized under the Pentomic structure. During the period
of change (1956-59) NATO force goals were revised downward
for the second time since the Lisbon Conference in 1952.
NATO officials announced a new goal of 30 nuclear (Pentomic-
type) combat-ready divisions to face the estimated 140
active Soviet divisions. The decision to reduce, however,
was not made in response to the military-strategic implica-
tions of the shift to 30 "Pentomic" divisions. Most ana-
lysts and senior military men by then generally agreed that
a tactical nuclear strategy would require more, not less,
manpower. Rather, budgetary pressures on defense from the
Eisenhower administration in the United States and the NATO
governments in Europe prompted the acceptance of the con-
venient cost reductions provided by the move to the Pentomic
concept and its associated force level deflation.
In Europe, virtually no progress had been made toward
the 1954 revised goals of 48 combat-ready divisions. The
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Europeans continually claimed that 48 divisions were too
many soldiers and too much expense to apply toward a strat-
egy which called for the rapid and massive use of nuclear
weapons as a response to aggression.
In the United States, in February 1957, the Eisenhower
administration announced a $38 billion defense budget for
FY 1958, which would require a 10 percent reduction in mil-
itary personnel by each of the services. Five months later,
in July, Secretary of Defense Wilson presented a long-range
defense program to the National Security Council (NSC) which
specified additional manpower reductions in favor of retal-
iatory nuclear forces. According to General Maxwell Taylor,
present at the July NSC meeting, the program
...covered the period 1959 to 1961, and undertook to hold
the annual defense budget at approximately $38 billion by
reducing military manpower to compensate for the rising
cost of military equipment. Specifically, the overall
military manpower was to decrease from 2,500,000 men in
1959 to 2,200,000 men in 1961. The decline in strength
was to be particularly sharp in the Army, which would
drop from 900,000 to 700,000 men andgfrom 15 to 11
divisions in the three-year period.
The launch of Sputnik in October and the influence of
an Air Force General as Chairman-JCS reinforced the concepts
put forth by Wilson. While the impact of actual implementa-
tion of the program was less serious than initially thought
and eventually reversed by the Kennedy administration, the
impact on Army strategic planning was quite strong. Pentom-
ic divisions were already "cut to the bone" with respect to
manpower and further reductions would render them marginally
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effective. Logistics support, already made difficult by
dispersion and maneuver, would be even more so with fewer
personnel devoted to support functions. The Army's poten-
tial problems, however, were dismissed by the Secretary of
Defense and Chairman-JCS because only the Army was prepar-
ing for limited war, and limited war was not to be fought
in Europe. From the Army's viewpoint, underlying Wilson's
long-range plan "there was no consideration of the funda-
mental soundness of the background strategy of the Defense
,,70program.
Ironically, the entire series of events between 1956
and 1959--the shift to Pentomic divisions, Wilson's defense
proposals, and the NATO force reductions—occured at a time
when the Soviet threat was still estimated at 140 active
divisions and a "total force of 400 Soviet divisions [that]
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could be mobilized in thirty days." NATO resistance with-
out recourse to nuclear weapons seemed impossible.
In an atmosphere which imparted such an essential func-
tion to nuclear weapons, the Europeans should have had no
qualms about supporting the limited war strategy put forth
by the Army. In fact, they did not support it. Between
1956 and 1958 the Army became the lone advocate of a limited
war strategy, conventional or nuclear, as much by default
as by design. The failure of the NATO-Europe and United
States defense establishments to accept the Army's strategy
became evident as opposition to the entire Pentomic
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structure and its limited war concept of operations m u
along two "fronts"; one political, in Europe and the t
military, in the U.S. In both cases the ultimate eff c
to stagnate the progressive doctrinal and strategic d
opments the Army had made in the first half of the 19
tegrating tactical nuclear weapons into the battlefie
Several related factors generated an increasingly
opposition in Europe to the use of tactical nuclear w
In June 1955 an allied exercise titled "Carte Blanche '
conducted in Central Europe simulating the employment
335 tactical nuclear weapons over a 48-hour period ac
-
a Soviet armored assault. Exercise umpires estimated
1,500,000 military personnel and civilians were kille
an additional 3,500,000 wounded.
These results were widely publicized in newspaper
across Europe and the United States. Carte Blanche h
the results of a limited (tactical) nuclear defense p
fully obvious to the Europeans, and Germans in partis
With respect to nuclear weapons, "Exercise Carte Blar
was probably the greatest single shock to European
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opinion..." For most Europeans, it provided evide:
war in Europe was a no-win situation. Any hopes of 3
a war, qualitatively and geographically, by the "rest <'<".•
use of tactical nuclear weapons were more than balanc
the advantages offered by the strategy of massive rei
tion. It, at least, held out the possibility that a
62

could be waged "over their heads" as the Soviet Union and
the United States dedicated their retaliatory forces against
each other, sparing Europe the horror of nuclear devastation.
Against the background of "Carte Blanche," the Army's
Pentomic defense concept did more to foster European fears
than instill confidence. The statements and writings ema-
nating from the Army hierarchy revealed a wide disparity
between the Army's definition of conflict termination and
the European's desire for forward defense. FM 100-31, and
its subsequent revisions, advocated greater troop dispersion
across the battlefield, an inevitable by-product of poten-
tial tactical nuclear employment by the United States and
Soviet Union. As the Pentomic division was pressed into
service, the Army's concept of the nuclear battlefield grew
progressively larger.
(June, 1956) The combat zone in an atomic war will be
vastly extended in depth .
(June, 1957) I visualize that the atomic battlefield of
the future will have much greater breadth and depth than
battlefields of the past.
(October, 1958) Survival and victory on the atomic
battlefield requires the ability to disperse our combat
troops. . .There will be much greater frequency of movement
of combat elements...
(December, 1958) ...it is possible that such concentra-
tions [of armor] will only be able to operate effectively
in areas which are more extensive than was previously the
the case... with less well-defined distinctions between the
combat zone and rear area.
Similarly, the size of the battlefield in the "tactical
problems" taught at the Army CGSC paralleled the Army's
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public declarations. In 1952 a corps commander "attacked"
along a 56 kilometer front. In 1957 the problem was run
using divisions of the Pentomic configuration and outlined
a corps area of operations 75 kilometers wide and 15 kilo-
meters deep. The area was again extended in 1958 to 50
74kilometers wide and 75 kilometers deep.
Coincident with the expansion of the battlefield was the
Army's trend toward placing control of tactical nuclear
weapons at very low levels of command. According to the
Army, in the "fog of war" control of these weapons might
eventually reside with the division or battalion commanders.
The European governments, who generally viewed the use of
tactical nuclear weapons as a penultimate response to ag-
gression, did not want that decision in the hands of a
young Army officer who could inadvertently escalate the
conflict on his own.
Nuclear weapons have no business, therefore, either at the
front with the field army or at the forward airfields of
the air forces. As far as the ground forces are concerned,
they must be removed, not only from the control of the
brigade and divisional commanders, but also from the
control of corps and army commanders.
. . .Any possibility of a conventional conflict turning
into a nuclear one... must be carefully excluded by means
of appropriate provisions in political and military
planning.
In short, the Army's limited war Pentomic structure was
translated by the Europeans into an ever-widening battle-
ground fraught with the dangers made clear by "Carte
Blanche." At best, massive retaliation was the stronger
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deterrent and held some possibility of Europe surviving its
failure, which could not be said of the limited war strategy.
At worst, both strategies ultimately left Europe destroyed
but the quick-death of "holocaust" or "vaporization" envi-
sioned in massive retaliation was far more intellectually
and morally satisfying than the slow, inevitable death by
radiation which would threaten Europe following a war which
observed the widespread, but "limited" use of nuclear
76
weapons.
As in the case of Europe, the opposition in the United
States had its base in the supporters of massive retaliation,
most notably the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) . The public and government opposition so
pervasive in Europe was not nearly as strong in the U.S.
outside the DOD. For the American public, implementation
of a limited war strategy by U.S. Armed Forces still left
the battlefield overseas. Until Sputnik, Americans gener-
ally viewed themselves as invulnerable to Soviet nuclear
threats. This perception was bolstered by frequent public
statements by government and military officials as to the
superiority of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
The Army's peak in limited war planning occurred 1953-
1955, when doctrine, strategy and deployed weapon systems
formed a relatively cohesive concept of operations. Al-
though the plans were never formally accepted outside the
Department of the Army, the latter was prepared to conduct
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a war in Europe which integrated conventional and tactical
nuclear weaponry on the battlefield with the aim of de-
feating the enemy sufficiently forward to prevent even min-
imal territorial losses. Beginning in 1956, however,
enthusiasm in the U.S. for the limited war strategy involv-
ing nuclear weapons started to wane. Between 1956 and 1960
efforts to upgrade the tactical nuclear weapon doctrine were
neglected and relegated to the background with the election
of John F. Kennedy. The reasons for the decline were nu-
merous and complex, but two events appeared to be the key
catalysts which ensured a limited (tactical nuclear) war
strategy for Europe would lapse into obsolescence.
In the spring of 1956 the Joint Chiefs gathered to draft
77the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1960 (JSOP 60)
.
The Army, just initiating its Pentomic shift, pressed for
more troops and a greater conventional capability for the
initial, potentially non-nuclear, stages of combat. The
Army's requests were refused. With the exception of the
Army Chief of Staff, the JCS was "determined to eliminate
from military planning any consideration of the possibility
7 8
of a conventional war with the Soviet Union. The Chiefs,
again with the exception of the Army, went on to endorse a
short nuclear war concept in which the Army played only a
limited role. The Air Force strategy of retaliation through
airpower dominated JSOP 60. Strategic bomber vulnerability,
emerging as a problem in 1955-56, was partially remedied
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when the Air Force deployed its first operational long-
range surface-to-surface missile, the Matador, to West Ger-
many in 1954. The strategy of retaliation remained intact.
The second, and more important, event revolved around
the development and deployment of U.S. IRBMs. In 1955 the
Army and Air Force advanced proposals for an IRBM program;
the Army, Jupiter and the Air Force, Thor. The most pro-
mising design would be adopted and the other dropped. The
DOD position was that competitive design projects would
speed ICBM development with the entire missile community
benefiting from the technological advances introduced by
each project.
The Army's design criterion called for a mobile IRBM,
capable of reaching rear echelon targets in support of the
ground forces. Soviet strategy was thought to rely heavily
on large reserve forces and vital, fixed supply points be-
hind the immediate combat zone to maintain an offensive.
A medium-range missile under Army control was viewed as es-
sential to eliminate these time-urgent targets which lay
beyond the range of artillery and existing short-range
missiles
.
For reasons not entirely clear in the text, Secretary
of Defense Wilson issued a memorandum in November, 1956 al-
locating the sole responsibility for IRBM production and




In regard to the intermediate range ballistic missiles:
a. Operational employment of the land-based IRBM system
will be the sole responsibility of the U.S. Air Force.
c. The United States Army will not plan at this time for
the operational employment of the IRBM or for
q
any
other missiles with ranges beyond 20 miles.
In spite of the memo's declared objective of "improving
the effectiveness of operation of the DOD , " it is possible
to view the assignment of lone IRBM responsibility as a
quiet bureaucratic coup for the Air Force. Initial Air
Force research and development evolved out of air-breathing
missile technology, rapidly becoming obsolete. The Army, on
the other hand, viewed the IRBM as an extended range artil-
lery projectile and appeared to be having great success in
their Jupiter program. In initial flight tests Jupiter
outperformed Thor. The first five Jupiter tests were clas-
sified as successful while early Thor tests "all ended
abortively." 80
Considering their traditional opposition to and fear of
any changes in responsibility for strategic missions, it is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Air Force con-
sciously and successfully persuaded OSD to eliminate the
Army's long-range missile potential and shift the more pro-
mising IRBM program under Air Force cognizance.
Whatever the reason for the change, it was a tremendous
loss to the Army. The combination of Air Force defense
"psychology" and Sputnik turned Jupiter into an interim ICBM
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As speed of development assumed top priority, the Jupiter
missile gradually lost all the mobility characteristics re-
quested by the Army before and after its shift to the Air
Force. Fixed launchers could be put into production more
quickly than costly mobile launchers; hardening launch sites
provided greater ease of maintenance handling and was cheap-
er than mobile launchers. Jupiter joined the ranks of
Matador, Mace and Thor as a high-yield, immobile weapon with
absolutely no tactical utility.
The missile became a weapon of retaliation. Deputy
Secretary of Defense Quarles testified that
. . .what we are talking about instead is maintaining an
instant retaliatory position with these missiles and one
that can respond to tactical warning within fifteen q,
minutes and actually launch the missiles in such a time.
Such requirements, Quarles went on to describe, could only
be filled by a non-mobile missile. Several years later,
former President Eisenhower expressed his concept of the
IRBM as a retaliatory weapon:
...located on bases on foreign soil, [the IRBM] could
strike any target in Communist areas as well as could
an ICBM fired from the United States.
Thus, not only did the Army lose control of the IRBM,
it lost the capability to deliver, or order the delivery of,
a tactical nuclear weapon at ranges beyond the immediate
battlefield. The Air Force failed to provide any inter-
service coordination for the surveillance, targeting and
release of nuclear weapons against battlefield, or
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near-battlefield, time-urgent objectives. The targeting
priorities for the Air Force controlled weapons were vastly
different from the Army's requirements.
The advances of the new longer-range ballistic missile
technology probably would have been incorporated into the
Army's TNW doctrine had it retained control of the Jupiter.
Instead, Army doctrine stagnated without accounting for
advances in guided and ballistic missiles, smaller and
lower-yield weapons and increases in accuracy. Lacking
institutional support for its limited war Pentomic strategy
and the requisite modernization programs, Army tactical nu-
clear doctrine "froze" under the prevailing 1951 concepts
put forth in FM 10 0-31. With no upgrade in sight for the
already aging short-range tactical nuclear weapon systems
and without a bipartisan (USA-QSTAF) effort to integrate
forces on the battlefield, there was little to be gained




IV. FLEXIBLE RHETORIC, INFLEXIBLE RESPONSE, 1961-1967
Nuclear weapons, even in the lower kiloton ranges, are
extremely destructive devices and hardly the preferred
weapons to defend such heavily populated areas as Europe.
8 3Robert McNamara
In the years immediately preceding Kennedy's election
(1958-60) , the strategic climate in the United States under-
went a dramatic revision. Civilian and military strategists
began to refute the fundamental efficacy of massive retali-
ation to deter, and defend against, the vast majority of
likely aggression scenarios. Since the United States was
no longer the sole arbiter of nuclear force, NATO defense
policy had to take into account the growing Soviet theatre
and intercontinental nuclear capability. Problems of es-
calation and escalation control assumed centerstage in the
debate as to which direction the policy would move.
Kennedy had expressed his opposition to the use of tactical
nuclear weapons, fearing once initiated, escalation would
be difficult, if not impossible, to control. As a Senator,
Kennedy had stated:
Inevitably, the use of small nuclear armament will lead
to larger and larger nuclear armaments on_both sides,
until the worldwide holocaust has begun.
Then, during the election campaign, he wrote:
The Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons and the means
for their delivery. . .now makes certain that a nuclear
war would be a war of mutual devastation. The notion
that the free world can be protected simply by the threat
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of 'massive retaliation 1 is no longer tenable. .. responsible
leaders in the West will not and should not deal with
limited aggression by unlimited weapons.
After election, Kennedy and his key defense advisors
—
Robert McNamara, Alain Enthoven, and Maxwell Taylor—assumed
office with a unique composite of strategic perceptions
about tactical nuclear weapons in particular and limited
nuclear war in general.
(1) More manpower was required on a nuclear or integrated
(conventional-nuclear) battlefield than conventional
battlefield alone.
(2) Collateral damage and civilian casualties would be
difficult, if not impossible, to keep sufficiently low
to prevent further escalation of nuclear warfighting.
(3) The vulnerability of existing tactical/theatre nuclear
forces indicated a very short (few days) tactical nu-
clear exchange with strong pressures to escalate or
preempt to gain advantage.
(4) The Soviets had no intention of fighting a limited nu-
clear war in Europe as conceived by Western strategists.
(5) The absolute distinction between conventional and stra-
tegic nuclear war did not exist at the tactical nuclear
level, further reducing prospects for controlling es-
calation. That distinction was to be maintained as
clearly and unambiguously as possible.
(6) Removing already deployed nuclear weapons from Europe
would raise European fears of an imminent U.S. with-
drawal and was to be avoidedoUntil sufficient conven-
tional forces were in place.
Heavily influenced by General Taylor, then retired from
the Army and Kennedy's military representative at OSD, the
President moved to implement the requirements of Flexible
Response. Two events occurring almost simultaneously with
Kennedy's accession to office made the renewed emphasis on
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conventional capabilities explicit in Flexible Response a
logical and viable avenue of pursuit. First, the U.S. Air
Force reached its peak bomber strength in 1959-1960 with
1366 B-47s and 488 B-52s. Second, the first of 41 Polaris
ballistic submarines went to sea on its premier deterrent
88patrol in November 1960. With a stockpile of an estimated
18,000 nuclear warheads, America's strategic deterrent
seemed unassailable. In keeping with the Administration's
desire to raise the nuclear threshold, conventional force
revitalization was now essential and, more importantly,
feasible.
The primary reasoning behind the adoption of Flexible
Response was to "reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons for
deterrence and defense and increase the reliance on conven-
8 9tional forces, especially in NATO." In a special message
to Congress on 2 8 March 1961, President Kennedy outlined the
budgetary and strategic requirements of his Administration's
"New Look." They included: (1) a strengthened capacity to
meet limited and guerilla warfare, (2) expanded R & D on
non-nuclear weapons, (3) increased flexibility of conven-
tional forces, (4) increased non-nuclear capabilities for
fighter aircraft, and (5) increased personnel, training and
90
readiness for conventional forces. Doctrinally, Flexible
Response was a vast change from the massive retaliation/
unrestricted nuclear weapons use philosophy of the 1950s.
Practically, however, there was little change in the
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capabilities required to make the new strategy truly
effective
.
The NATO-Europe response to Kennedy's proposals, while
unexpected, was not out of strategic character. Less than
60 days after the special message to Congress, the West
Germans expressed their "uneasiness over the new emphasis
on conventional weapons in the strategic military planning
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of the Western Allies." Two weeks later British Minister
of Defense Harold Watkinson summarized the European allies'
feelings toward the new U.S. strategy:
. . .we do not believe that NATO can or should provide
massive conventional forces as could hope to deal with
any conventional attack, however large , without recourse
to nuclear weapons.
More to the point was the fact that Flexible Response
had suddenly brought to the surface key conceptual differ-
ences between Europeans and Americans concerning deterrence
and defense. While both were apparently ready to accept the
inevitability of "essential U.S. -Soviet equivalence" in
nuclear weapons, each had differing ideas about how to deal
with the problem. Many of the European political elite felt
that U.S. -Soviet strategic thought was beginning to converge
around a mutually acceptable concept of "Assured
Destruction.
"
The changes made in the second edition of [Sokolovsky '
s
Soviet Military Strategy ] , which came out shortly after-
wards , made it more apparent that the Russians were
themselves tending to draw the same conclusions .as those
emerging from the American strategic analysis."
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To embark on a massive conventional rebuilding program was
viewed as a destabilizing and dangerous movement away from
a stable strategic balance and toward establishing accept-
able boundaries for a European-theatre limited war. In-
creasing conventional forces would only undermine the
credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent by supporting the
widespread perceptions in Europe of U.S. reluctance to re-
sort to strategic nuclear systems to defend NATO-Europe
sufficiently early to prevent the "liberation of a corpse."
Whether or not the Flexible Response strategy actually
called for substantial increases in conventional forces was
contentious, but Europeans sincerely believed it did and
felt any substantive buildup would be useless against a
Soviet attack presumed to "go nuclear" at the onset of hos-
tilities. One German defense analyst wrote that Soviet doc-
trine viewed a European war as consisting of two phases, the
first of which
. . .will be of short duration and will begin with a massive
exchange of nuclear strikes which will destroy the larger
cities and industrial centers.
An anonymous French analyst expressed much the same conclu-
sion.
[Following a] massive nuclear strike. . .Soviet ground
forces will maneuver on broad fronts, advancing in the
direction of the main thrust at an average rate of 60
kilometers per day.
The European's conclusions were supported not only by
Soviet military writings but by Khrushchev himself. During
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a series of interviews with Walter Lippmann, published in
a widely read book titled The Coming Tests With Russia
,
Khrushchev stated that
...we do not see any value in small, tactical atomic
weapons. If it comes to war, we shall use only the
biggest weapons. The smaller
fi
ones are very expensive
and they can decide nothing.
While the Soviet Premier's statement was to be taken with a
large grain of salt, his words did support European analysis
of Soviet war-fighting doctrine.
Even if the conflict began and remained conventional for
a considerable length of time, Europeans doubted NATO non-
nuclear forces would be able to overcome Warsaw Pact ad-
vantages in geography, military initiative (surprise) and
mobilized (not mobilizable) manpower. Ironically, the Eu-
ropean allies considered the deployed tactical nuclear
weapon systems a vital escalatory threat at a time when the
Americans were attempting to reduce their impact.
(French) In the case of aggression by ground forces,
only an army provided with nuclear weapons is capable
—
whatever the initial form of aggression—of reacting in
a sufficiently flexible and powerful manner to break
the initial thrust of the adversary.
Only nuclear weapons will prevent our forces from
being submerged by numbers.
(British) But conversation with officers of, at any rate,
the British NATO contingent makes it clear that the doc-
trine has spread that it would be impossible to meet any
considerable Russian move, even if undertaken with con-
ventional weapons
fi
alone , except by using tactical nuclears
from the outset.
The presence and threatened early use of tactical nuclear
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weapons was believed necessary to maintain a high level of
uncertainty in the Soviet mind as to NATO's actual plans to
employ them.
Although Kennedy and McNamara never intended to wholly
replace tactical nuclear weapons, appropriate conventional
force increases would result in a more credible deterrent
and a higher nuclear threshold on the battlefield.
Secretary McNamara repeatedly indicated in his annual
posture statements that he was aiming for enough con-
ventional forces to be able to fight not just a small
delaying or local action in some critical area like
Berlin, but rather a large conventional war, for 90
days or more, against the whole field army maintained
by the Warsaw Pact Powers.
The U.S. position was interpreted by NATO-Europe as a
decisive more toward a limited war warfighting strategy. In
the mid- to late-1950's limited warfare was associated with
very localized "skirmishes." The Kennedy Administration's
concept appeared to extend the possibility of limited war
to include all of Europe and any conflict short of general
nuclear exchange.
Secretary of Defense McNamara, in a prepared testimony
for Congressional hearings in 1961, described the function
of limited war forces in some detail.
Our limited war forces should be properly deployed,
properly trained, and properly equipped to deal with the
entire spectrum of such actions...
What is being proposed at this time is not a reversal
of our existing national policy but an increase in our
non-nuclear capabilities to provide a greater degree of
versatility to our limited war forces.
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Europeans remained unconvinced that a strategy of de-
terrence based on a flexible, or graduated, response would
prove any more effective than one threatening an assured
nuclear retaliation. For them deterrence not only described
the preeminent defense strategy, but also circumscribed the
limits of a conventional strategy. Deterrence alone was of
much more immediate importance in spite of the well doc-
umented decline of the nuclear asymmetry which had previous-
ly supported it. "Europeans'," claimed French General and
strategist Andre Beaufre, "generally prefer to maintain de-
terrence at its maximum by the threat of total catastrophe
rather than open the possibility of limited war."
U.S. DOD attempts, particularly through systems anal-
ysis, to convince the European allies of the utility and
af fordability of flexible response were greeted with skep-
ticism and confusion. The more opposition Europeans ex-
hibited to the strategy, the "more refined" the systems
analysis appeared to get. Detailed reviews of the "measur-
able aspects of military effectiveness" were continually
studied, evaluated and reformulated. By 1965, the Office of
Systems Analysis in OSD estimated that at least half of the
175 Soviet divisions were essentially paper units while the
remaining divisions were only about 1/3 as effective as
those of the U.S. Division firepower scores, a rough measure
of the warfighting capability of a division unit, were re-
vised such that the U.S.: Soviet ratio rose from 1.1:1 in
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1962 to a peak of 1.7:1 in 1967, strangely enough the year
102NATO officially adopted the flexible response strategy.
In areas where numerology could not correct existing
quantitative imbalances, superior Western technology would
provide the margin of safety:
(1) Although NATO had only 55 percent of the Warsaw Pact's
tank inventory, NATO tanks were deemed qualitatively
better.
(2) Although Warsaw Pact tactical airpower exceeded NATO's
by 2 8 percent, NATO had "considerably more aircraft in
its worldwide inventory ,, and thus a much greater re-
inforcement capability."
(3) Although the Warsaw Pact ammunition stocks were larger,
NATO had better ammunition and greater firing accuracy.
(4) Although the Warsaw Pact had more soldiers and combat
vehicles, NATO had more men in logistics and more trans-
port vehicles per combat vehicle, therefore, a better
capacity to supply fuel and ammunition.
Europeans remained justifiably suspicious of the fre-
quently revised Pentagon analyses and produced their own
"to demonstrate the infeasibility of an all conventional
defense." Additional confusion arose from glaring in-
consistencies in the U.S. declaratory strategy and deploy-
ment practices. While the Europeans heard about the
necessity of increasing non-nuclear forces, they saw U.S.
active duty military strength fall from 1,066,404 in June
1962 to 969,066 in June 1965. Not until U.S. troops were
introduced into Vietnam did U.S. strength climb over one
million. With the exception of the Army's reorganization
away from the Pentomic division and a slight increase in the
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U.S. "tooth to tail" ratio, there was no change in the five
divisions deployed in Europe.
Paralleling the absence of U.S. conventional force
growth was a 60 percent increase in the theatre/tactical nu-
clear warheads in Europe. Between 1961 and 1964 the nuclear
arsenal grew from approximately 4000 warheads to over 7000,
most of which were short-range weapons (under 25 kilometers)
Of 180 Pershing 1A short-range missiles deployed, 72 were
placed under a dual U.S. -West German control system with the
United States maintaining custody of the warheads and West
Germany controlling the launchers. Simultaneously, the
M-110 203 mm nuclear artillery shell was deployed in Bel-
gium, Italy, Greece, Denmark and West Germany under similar
"dual-key" arrangements.
However flexible a force the United States was claiming
in its rhetoric, deployment practices signaled virtually no
change from the previous reliance on tactical nuclear weap-
ons. More than ever before nuclear weapons, strategic and
tactical, seemed to be at the core of U.S. defense strategy.
Stripped of its "rhetorical baggage," Flexible Response
amounted to little more than a strategy of controlled es-
calation in most relevant NATO-Warsaw Pact scenarios, Ken-
nedy's fears of escalation notwithstanding.
After two years in office, Secretary McNamara readily
admitted NATO conventional forces were still inadequate to
repulse a serious Soviet attack. The nuclear weapons
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deployed in the theatre in Europe were still an integral
part of NATO's defense, no less so than before Flexible
Response.
The presently programmed forces, in general, could by non-
nuclear means alone counter a wide spectrum of Sino-Soviet
bloc aggressions in regions other than Europe . With re-
gard to Europe, the presently programmed U.S. forces, to-
gether with the present forces of other NATO countries,
would not be able to contain an all-out conventional
Soviet attack without invoking the use of nuclear
weapons.
In early 1964 McNamara was even more explicit about the
weaknesses in the NATO conventional force structure, stating
that "the defense of Europe against an all-out Soviet at-
tack, even if such an attack were limited to non-nuclear
means, would require the use of tactical nuclear weapons on
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our part." Viewed through European eyes, the "New Strat-
egy" of Flexible Response offered no tangible advantages
over the existing strategy which relied first and foremost
on nuclear weapons.
The Europeans had come to view the tactical nuclear
weapon systems as an important link in NATO's defense pos-
ture, acting to "couple" American and European security in-
terests and bridging the gap between the questionably
credible conventional response to aggression and the ominous
initiation of strategic nuclear war. Aside from substi-
tuting for costly conventional forces, TNW under U.S. con-
trol ensured rapid American involvement in any critical
Euro-Soviet confrontation. Even though existing NATO TNW
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left Soviet territory unthreatened, the presence of these
weapons on European soil enhanced their political value with
respect to the European's conception of defense. However
outmoded, they still contributed to overall European secu-
rity, a (European) perception the Americans were reluctant
to acknowledge.
The entire Alliance seemed to realize that in order to
be effective some sort of coalition strategy was neccessary
which gave at least the impression of unity and common de-
fense interest among the members. Continued unilateralism
and intra-alliance bickering would erode the very under-
pinnings of NATO's deterrent posture and lead to a poten-
tially dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons in and
out of the Alliance. Already two members other than the
United States possessed independent nuclear forces which,
to the U.S., were a strategically unwise diversion of valu-
able resources otherwise available for conventional arma-
ment. For any strategy to be acceptable to NATO-Europe,
it would have to take into account European desires for an
equitable sharing of risk— in order to make the U.S. nuclear
deterrent as credible to the Europeans as to the Soviets
—
and rely substantially on defense via the putative deter-
rent effect of US/NATO nuclear weapons. The conventional
force-limited war option explicit in the Flexible Response
strategy was not a viable alternative because "such a stal-
wart local defense might make the world safe for war in,
,,10 8
ana confined to, Europe.
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The efforts to foster allied cohesion between 1961 and
1967 were rewarded when NATO unenthusiastically adopted
Flexible Response as its declaratory strategy in 1967. New
planning guidance was outlined in a NATO Military Council
document entitled "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense
of the NATO Area/' known colloquially by its serial number
MC 14/3. It replaced previous NATO plans (MC 14/2) for an
early and massive use of nuclear weapons in response to
Soviet aggression with a strategy of controlled and grad-
uated escalation across an entire force employment
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spectrum.
In order to accomodate the divergent US /NATO Europe
positions on tactical nuclear weapons, MC 14/3 was purpose-
fully written to reflect internal compromise and ambiguity.
While the document called for a serious effort at a non-
nuclear forward defense, it never precluded early nuclear
weapon use. For the U.S., the principles embodied in MC 14/3
meant that tactical nuclear weapons use would be "larger but
later and only if necessary." It offered the opportunity to
avoid a strategic nuclear exchange by terminating a limited
was in short order on European soil. The Europeans inter-
preted these same principles to mean that tactical nuclear
weapons use would be "smaller and earlier." Little change
was seen from previous TNW application policy except for the
modestly more selective and restricted nature of MC 14/3.
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Overshadowing these interpretations was the philosophy
that TNW would be used initially as a "demonstration of
NATO's resolve" to escalate the conflict if necessary. In
1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Clifford presented to NATO's
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) a plan calling for one or two
nuclear detonations in the early phases of a massive Soviet
assault into NATO territory. These demonstration type nu-
clear bursts, preferably exploded at sea, would be used to
show the Soviets that NATO was not afraid to resort to nu-
, 110
clear weapons.
The net result of this equivocal NATO approach to Euro-
pean defense was accurately summed up by retired French Army
Colonel, Marc Geneste. The shift to Flexible Response
...called for a large enough nuclear componet to give
the Europeans an excuse for not strengthening their con-
ventional forces, and relied sufficiently on conventional
capabilities to convince the American public that there,
,
was still a chance to avoid dreaded nuclear warfare. .
.
According to Geneste , the TNW employment guidance contained
in MC 14/3 was such that if deterrence failed and a war
erupted in the European theatre, the Soviet Army would reach
the Rhine while the allies debated whether to use tactical
nuclear weapons.
Geneste' s conclusions were on target. Since the guide-
lines established in MC 14/3 were sufficiently "flexible"
to accommodate all views, the contradictions in planned ap-
plication of TNW foreclosed any attempt to devise an effec-
tive war- fighting doctrine which included these weapons.
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Initial employment was designed to convince the Soviet's of
NATO's political will to escalate and thereby (with luck)
force a termination of hostilities. Tactical nuclear weap-
ons were to be used to effect a pause in the fighting, al-
lowing each side to reassess its risks, costs and potential
benefits. Early TNW use was not considered an applicable
military tool to defeat the enemy but rather one which would
bring him to his senses by dramatically heightening the risk
of further, more destructive escalation.
Finally, the outcome of the Flexible Response debate
and the subsequent adoption by NATO of that strategy was to
create an atmosphere for strategic thinking and planning
which separated a controllable and winnable conventional war
from any conflict involving nuclear weapons. The two were
established as distinct and mutually exclusive. Convention-
al wars involved calculable risks. Nuclear war, even if
limited, did not. Crossing the "firebreak" into the realm
of nuclear weapons meant entering the unknown. The McNamara
quote which opened this chapter continued with a concise
description of the Kennedy Administration's perception of
tactical nuclear weapon employment.
Furthermore, while it does not necessarily follow that
the use of tactical nuclear weapons must inevitably es-
calate into global nuclear war, it does present a very ,,
definite threshold beyond which we enter a vast unknown.
In short, conventional wars were viewed as defensible while
nuclear wars were only deterable.
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Flexible Response was just half a strategy. Deliberate-
ly vague to the Soviets about the precise nature of NATO's
response to aggression, it was also vague to NATO's own
forces and political leaders. The essential changes and
additions inherent in the shift to Flexible Response were
more often than not cosmetic and never implemented to the
degree needed to make the strategy viable. War fighting
doctrine and its development, where tactical nuclear weapons
were concerned, tended to assume a very low priority.
A. DENUCLEARIZING TACTICAL NUCLEAR THOUGHT: THE ROAD TO
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
Within the armed services, the transition from the nu-
clear oriented retaliation strategy of the 1950s to flexible
response took place in a relatively short span of time;
begun in earnest in 1959, it was essentially complete by
late 1962. The change coincided with the emergence of a
Soviet intercontinental nuclear delivery capability and the
West's gradual realization of the implications of this de-
velopment. The publicity given to the alleged "missile-gap"
between U.S. and Soviet nuclear delivery forces shattered
American perceptions of a one-continent nuclear war and
generated pressures for the adoption of a strategy which
would minimize the possibility of an escalatory process
eventually threatening the United 'States. The uncertainty
surrounding the role and missions of tactical nuclear weap-
ons in NATO strategy became a focal point in the
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trans-Atlantic debate over flexible response described
earlier.
The lapse of the Army's Pentomic concept and associated
employment strategies did not occur immediately following
Kennedy's election in November 1960. Official DOD and Army
positions on limited and nuclear war began to diverge in
late 1958 and 1959, entering a period of transition from
1959 to 1961. Rather than initiating changes to U.S. defense
doctrine and force posture, Kennedy's election accelerated
a movement already underway in the Department of Defense.
The Secretary of the Army's 1959 Annual Report indicated
that the Army considered Pentomic divisions sufficiently
flexible to manage all types of warfare, conventional or
nuclear. Although tactically oriented toward fighting on
a nuclear battlefield, each unit possessed "unprecedented
firepower" and "mobility" to defeat the enemy on all levels
of theatre combat. The Secretary's confidence in the ground
forces continued unabated into mid-1960. The introduction
of his FY 1960 Annual Report stated
. . . I am happy to report that, in fiscal year 1960, the
Army was qualitatively—in terms of its manpower, its
equipment, its training, and its combat readiness—the
strongest ^land force the Nation has ever had while not
at war
.
In spite of his very positive outlook, attitudes in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Congress were
changing. A study completed in 195 9 by the Washington
Center of Foreign Policy Research for the Senate Committee
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on Foreign Relations concluded that "heavy reliance on
tactical nuclear weapons cannot be expected to compensate
114for the numerical inferiority of local forces." The
approaching change in the official DOD position was re-
flected in testimony by Defense Secretary McElroy during
Congressional hearings in 1959 on missile and space activ-
ities. Commenting on the possibility of fighting a limited
war in Europe against the Soviet Union, McElroy concluded
that
The people of the country should realize that if we are
going to fight Russia, we are not going to fight them on
the ground in the main. There will be some conflict on
the ground, but general war is the, only kind of war that
we visualize fighting with Russia.
The Army's entire ground war philosophy and planning
for limited, potentially nuclear, war was relegated to a
category of wishful thinking. General war, connoting a
large-scale nuclear exchange, was emerging as the dominant
theme for a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, leaving the
Army, once again, a minor role in the most important theatre
of U.S. defense strategy, NATO-Europe. Although flexible
response was based on a concept of graduated escalation and
response, the concept was not extended to operational plan-
ning and practice. The ability to escalate or de-escalate
at all levels of combat within a given theatre of operations
was not to be incorporated into the Army's land warfare doc-
trine for Europe because of the perceived unlikelihood of
establishing reliable processes of escalation control with
the Soviet Union after the onset of hostilities.
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The Army begrudgingly accepted the President's directive
to reorganize away from the Pentomic division. By 1961, of-
ficial Army posture was in step with the Administration's
flexible response strategy. The prospect of and preparation
for limited nuclear ground warfare was omitted and replaced
by the voguish distinction between limited conventional war
and general nuclear war. The Army Secretary's FY 1961
Annual Report , the first since Kennedy's election, brought
into sharp focus the effect of the strategic changes on
Army strategic thinking. "The transitions and changes which
began in the later part of fiscal year 1961/* the report
stated,
...represent a realization of and response to the dual
requirement for a stepped up capability for non-nuclear
land power and limited war on the one hand and a simul-
taneous, capability for all-out nuclear warfare on the
other.
The changes instituted under the new organizational con-
cept called ROAD, Reorganization of Army Divisions, were
more administrative and structural than positive additions
to firepower and flexibility. The Pentomic division had a
serious capability for either conventional or nuclear war-
fare. The new ROAD division forfeited the tactical nuclear
weapon option in exchange for a maximum of 2 500 men and a
modest increase in conventional firepower . The following
chart illustrates the changes in manpower per division
from 1953 to 1962. 117
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Pre-Pentomic Pentomic ROAD Percent Change
(1953-55) (1956-60) (1961) (1956-61)
Airborne Div. 17,085 11,486 14,000 21.9%
Infantry Div. 17,455 13,748 15,000 9.1%
Armor Div* NA
*Approximately 15,000 throughout period
because of its inherent mobility and
heavy firepower.
The new divisions detracted from the Army's flexibility
in the field. The Secretary of the Army's FY 1962 Annual
Report contained none of the confidence and optimism exhib-
ited less than two years earlier in his FY 1960 report
(p. 87) . The tone of the 1962 report was one of recovery,
not strength.
During the past year the Army has attained renewed vigor
and vastly improved readiness ... operational capability
and combat readiness have been markedly enhanced .
Limited non-nuclear aggression became the standard to-
ward which Army planning would orient. The shift in nation-
al policy in 1961 was followed by an equally dramatic change
in the direction and emphasis in Army training, interest,
and doctrinal development. Training : In 1962, of 7 major
US/NATO training exercises involving U.S. ground forces, 3
were Command and Control procedural exercises, 1 was logis-
tically oriented, and 4 were small scale division field ex-
ercises on a nuclear-free battlefield. The largest US/NATO
ground force exercise in 1963, BIGLIFT, trained units in
overseas reinforcement and use of prepositioned stocks,
again in a nuclear-free environment.
90

Similarly, classroom training reflected the decline of
120tactical nuclear planning. The curriculum of the Army's
Senior Officer Nuclear Weapon Employment Course was re-
vamped and the course retitled the Senior Advanced Operations
Course. The CGSC Department of Nuclear Weapons briefly be-
came the Department of Special Weapons before being abolished
in 1962. Compared with the 614 annual hours of nuclear weap-
on instruction in 1957-1958, the CGSC curriculum contained
33 hours of such instruction in 1962, 21 hours in 1966,
and only 16 hours after 1967.
Interest ; Previously the center of attention, U.S. forces
in Europe were "demoted" by a combination of the growing war
in Vietnam and the Administration's preoccupation with stra-
tegic nuclear doctrine and posture. In spite of the Army's
increase from 11 to 16 combat-ready divisions, the European
contingent remained static at 5.
In January 1968, Secretary McNamara announced a decision,
based on foreign exchange deficits, to redeploy roughly
34,000 troops from Europe to the United States. The Sec-
retary of the Army attributed the reduction to a relaxation
in East-West tensions. According to the Secretary,
...no real East-West crisis marred the international
picture. Thus the cost of maintaining five U.S. Army
divisions in Western Europe and a separate brigade in
Berlin was reassessed during the year . . . ancUit was de-
cided to reduce the force by about 28,000.
Not only was the Army hampered by the explicit deemphasis
of a battlefield nuclear option, but it would now have to
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conduct its mission in Europe with fewer forward deployed
forces.
Even the DOD Annual Reports revealed the declining im-
portance of European-based U.S. forces and tactical nuclear
strategy. In 1962, the Annual Report discussed these forces
in 4% pages; in 1963, 1% pages; and in 1964 , 25 sentences.
By 1967, Europe, Africa and the Middle East were combined
into one section less than 1% pages in length. Each year
the reports were revised, progressively deemphasizing tac-
tical nuclear warfare and the Army's associated capabilities.
In 1964 McNamara outlined the DOD's achievements as of
June in all areas of defense:
Compared to 1961, we had achieved on 30 June 1964:
—A 150 percent increase in the number of nuclear
warheads available in the Strategic Alert Forces;
—A 50 percent increase in the number of strategic
bombers on alert;
—A 45 percent increase in the number of combat-ready
divisions;
—A 75 percent increase in airlift capability;
—A 44 percent increase in the number of tactical
fighter squadrons;
—A 800 percent increase in the Special Forces trained
to deal with counterinsurgency.
Conspicuously absent—even more so considering McNamara'
s
penchant for precision with numbers and percentages—was
any reference to the 60 percent increase in deployed tac-
tical nuclear weapons during that same period. While the
failure to mention the TNW increase was a clear indication
of the Administration's effort to play down the weapons,
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the apparent contradiction between declaratory and action
policy was more difficult to explain.
Left to itself, the Kennedy Administration probably
would have reduced the deployed tactical nuclear arsenal
substantially. However the momentum of a (nuclear) de-
ployment initiated well before Kennedy's election was much
more difficult to break than defense officials had antic-
ipated. In the first place, the sheer politics of removing
all or part of an American weapon system from Europe, es-
pecially a nuclear system, invoked almost insurmountable
obstacles. Delivery vehicles had been purchased or ordered
by the Europeans to enable them to employ those weapons
kept under a dual-key control arrangement. Simultaneously,
the European governments had expended a great deal of energy
justifying the expense and inherent dangers of the weapons
to the public. A reversal would not only look foolish but
undermine confidence in the leadership. Second, the visi-
bility of the tactical nuclear weapons and the parallel em-
phasis on the uncontrollability of escalation once the
tactical nuclear weapons were released quelled European
fears of U.S. "decoupling." Enacting a substantial re-
duction of the TNW arsenal would make the United States a
target for a myriad of accusations from "abandoned allies."
Third, the Soviet Union showed no signs of reducing its
theatre nuclear forces. If nothing else, a large U.S.





Finally, the professional interest in limited nuclear
warfare and battlefield nuclear weapons, as expressed by
articles in the open literature by Army officers, waned as
interest in Vietnam- like unconventional warfare boomed.
From 1961 to 1967 a total of 24 articles appeared in
Military Review related to nuclear warfare compared with
112 on unconventional warfare. To put these figures in per-
spective, in the five-year period covering 1955-1959, 132
124
articles on nuclear combat appeared in Military Review .
Without institutional support there was little motivation
for devising means to employ a dead-end strategy which in-
cluded the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Doctrine : Through the early and mid-1960s, Army tactical
nuclear thought went into remission, constrained by politi-
cal pressure from both sides of the Atlantic. FM 100-30
(1951) remained the most thorough and "current" unclassified
guidance available in the Army field manual library. The
introduction of smaller and more accurate nuclear weapons
into the arsenal was virtually ignored.
FM 61-100, "The Division" (1962) , was among the last
manuals to discuss battlefield nuclear warfare in any depth.
The introduction stated that the purpose of the manual was
to cover "division level operations under active or non-
active nuclear conditions. When appropriate, modifying
125guidance for non-nuclear warfare is included .
"
The manual, while indicative of the Army's reluctance as
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late as 1962 to abdicate the nuclear battlefield concept,
was devoted largely to offensive action subsequent to nuclear
fire. Little, if any, guidance is offered governing era-
polyment options, alternatives or tactics. After 1962, the
FM series lay dormant with respect to tactical nuclear weap-
ons, doctrine and strategy.
The guidance provided in MC 14/3 in 1967 committed NATO
to conduct deliberate, but controlled, escalation if aggres-
sion could not be contained. Not only did the guidance thus
restrict NATO forces to a nuclear defensive role, it lacked
any clarity as to targets, timing and size (yield and num-
ber) of weapon employment. Defensive employment doctrine,
which should have been treated exhaustively, was, at best,
nebulous because of uncertainties about Soviet use of TNW
and West European permission to use NATO nuclear weapons.
The problem was evident in testimony by General Norstad
in 1966 before Congress concerning NATO's nuclear response
options to Soviet aggression. Norstad explained nuclear
employment might mean the use of as few as five or as many
12 6
as 2 00 weapons. "We are talking in that range."
Moreover, this ambiguity of response was reinforced by
the White House and DOD positions described earlier and con-
tinued by the Johnson Administration after Kennedy's death.
President Johnson explicitly ruled out limited nuclear war
options as a component of U.S. defense strategy in his 1965
"State of the U.S. Defenses" message to Congress.
95

The strength, deployment, and mobility of our forces
must be such that, combined with those of our allies,
they can prevent the erosion of, the free world by
limited non-nuclear aggression .
By failing to make an investment in the capabilities to
fight a low-level nuclear war, the Administration and De-
fense Department consciously excluded an entire range of
options implicitly a part of a flexible response strategy.
According to James Schlesinger, writing in support of a tac-
tical nuclear capability before his tenure as Secretary of
Defense, this was "not only because of the expense, but be-
cause the creation of options might tempt us to go through
the firebreak, and would certainly give others the impression
12 8that we were willing to do so." No doubt the move to
flexible response had improved the United States' ability
to respond to wholly conventional, localized wars such as
Vietnam. However, in the context of a NATO-Warsaw Pact con-
frontation, the new doctrine allowed for little more flex-
ibility than was possible during the Eisenhower years of
massive retaliation. NATO response to an impending con-
ventional defeat remained early resort to strategic nuclear
systems
.
In addition, the characteristics of a large portion of
the operational nuclear force in Europe precluded a truly
tactical employment option. The Sergeant surface-to-surface
missile took approximately 30 minutes to position, erect and
complete pre- launch preparations, followed by a 44 minute
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countdown, the last 20 of which were automatic. Each
Pershing 1A had similar pre-launch requirements and required
129
a conspicuous train of four support vehicles. In either
case, a one-hour launch cycle preceded by lengthy request-
release procedures lent the missiles a questionable real
time tactical value.
By the time NATO officially adopted the Flexible Re-
sponse strategy in 1967, the tactical nuclear arsenal in
Europe was aging and unable to effectively support tactical
missions beyond battlefield artillery range. A prescient
German had observed the decline in the quality of U.S. nu-
clear thinking as early as 1962 and noted that "the U.S.
has, furthermore, fallen behind in the very field that was
130
once peculiarly its own—that of nuclear strategy." That
a European should have made that observation was especially
important. His words should have keyed U.S. policymakers
and strategists to the shortcomings of a nuclear doctrine
bound exclusively in "intercontinental" terms.
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V. THE DIALOGUE BEGINS, 1968-1977
...the biggest fault with current NATO strategy has been
a failure to relate its conventional force improvement
program to a doctrine for nuclear weapons. .-,
Richard Burt
By 1968 detente and the American involvement in Vietnam
were already dominating domestic debate on foreign policy.
The importance of detente discouraged the formulation of any
unnecessarily provocative military policies toward the Soviet
Union. Relations were "too good" to risk the tenuous sta-
bility which seemed to pervade East-West interactions. Sen-
ator Mike Mansfield, supporting the amendment bearing his
name to reduce U.S. troops in Europe, argued that the threat
of Soviet invasion had diminished. He claimed that "rela-
tions between all NATO countries and the Soviet Union are
excellent-first rate... The contacts are good, economically,
132
culturally, and socially."
The increase in trade between East and West and the psy-
chological reassurances inherent in detente were extremely
important, particularly to the West Germans, and impacted
heavily on European perceptions of national security. De-
signing a tactical nuclear weapon employment doctrine out-
lining a war- fighting posture for NATO would not be
considered "in the spirit of detente." The Nuclear Planning
Group's solution was to use a small number of tactical weap-
ons as a warning and indication of NATO's resolve. The
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next step would involve some degree of escalation to stra-
tegic systems.
In the United States, American involvement in an (un)
conventional war in Vietnam continued to stifle tactical nu-
clear thinking and placed serious discussion of the NATO-
Europe aspects of flexible response on a back burner.
Meanwhile, civilian officials at the Pentagon and State De-
partment were eager to maintain the outmoded "firebreak"
concept, arguing that the use of tactical nuclear weapons
would inevitably erase the existing distinctions between
conventional and nuclear war. What nuclear thinking was
done was confined to strategic nuclear systems and the So-
viet, and developing Chinese, ICBM threat.
The McNamara promises of a revitalized conventional
force in Europe, however, had failed to materialize as U.S.
defense dollars and soldiers were funneled into southeast
Asia. By 1971 the success of the flexible response strategy
was highly questionable. A Brookings Institute analysis of
U.S. forces in Europe revealed little change in the funda-
mental U.S. position since the mid-1950s. According to
Brookings analyst, John Newhouse, the role of U.S. soldiers
in Europe in 19.71 was
...to deter the Warsaw Pact from applying military force
against NATO and, in the event of conflict, to create the
likelihood that non-nuclear combat will be sufficiently
intense and prolonged to allow the nuclear powers (1) an
opportunity to work out a diplomatic solution. .. and (2)
time to take a measured decision regarding the use or
non-use of nuclear weapons.
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The Brookings description sounded much like the
"tripwire" and "plate-glass" strategies of the Eisenhower
era when U.S. forces were present to generate a pause in
the fighting for the same reasons outlined by Newhouse above.
Virtually no progress had been made toward building a cred-
ible conventional deterrent or even a conventional adjunct
to the nuclear forces.
In fact, erosion of a truly "flexible" response was al-
ready well underway when it was finally adopted by NATO in
1967. Soviet force expansion and modernization dwarfed the
scarce advances made by NATO. The so-called equalities and
advantages for NATO had essentially disappeared in the ten
years following the OSD's systems analysis of the NATO-
Warsaw Pact balance. Echoes of 1960 were present in a 1971
statement by the West German Defense Minister that the "con-
ventional forces at the disposal of NATO in Western Europe
...are inadequate for defending NATO territories in Europe..
134for any length of time."
Coincident with the deterioration of the flexible re-
sponse posture in Europe between 1971 and 1973 was a dra-
matic alteration in the strategic nuclear environment. The
negotiations and agreements resulting in the SALT I treaty
(May 1972) and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear
War (June 1973), both bilateral U.S. -Soviet agreements, were
conducted and concluded in the midst of growing doubts about
Flexible Response. The composite of these events prompted
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a reappraisal of NATO-Europe strategy similar in scope to
the reappraisal which led to the shift to Flexible Response
in 1960-61. The period 1971-1973 was a key turning point in
theatre/tactical nuclear thinking. Waning interest in the
subject began a slow, but notable, reversal.
SALT I acted to codify a U.S. -Soviet balance which, in
the eyes of Europeans, offset the U.S. strategic nuclear
threat. According to Helmut Schmidt, "SALT neutralizes
135their (U.S. and Soviet) strategic nuclear capabilities."
Parity effectively foreclosed early resort to a strategic
nuclear option for the United States, placing in doubt the
backbone of NATO's deterrent. In spite of tacit acceptance
of "essential equivalence" since the mid-1960s, its implica-
tions were more or less ignored until SALT I. The SALT I
treaty, in conjunction with questions of U.S. hard target
kill capability and vulnerability of U.S. land-based stra-
tegic forces, gave official recognition to the new balance
and raised a myriad of perceptual, if not actual, problems.
At issue was not so much any notion of absolute supe-
riority as the relative confidence and credibility with which
the United States could provide NATO with an extended de-
terrent. That deterrent rested not only on Soviet attitudes
toward, but Allied confidence in, NATO strategy.
One of the original and ongoing justifications for tac-
tical nuclear forces was the linkage established, in time of
war, between a failing conventional defense in Europe and
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U.S. willingness to respond with strategic systems after a
brief tactical nuclear "interlude." The credibility of this
link was seriously undermined if U.S. strategic forces were
held in check by the Soviet's arsenal. The ultimate effect
was to magnify the existing disparities between East and
West theatre nuclear and conventional forces (Table 1)
.
Since little could be done to affect the strategic nuclear
balance following SALT I and the conventional force balance
had again assumed "uncorrectable" proportions, theatre nu-
clear forces began to receive newfound attention. Analysts
soon realized that the average age of NATO's tactical nu-
clear weapons was nearly 15 years, impacting heavily on the
expected, and required, reliability of the force. More dis-
tressing was the fact that the bulk of the weapons were
stored at less than 50 well-marked and poorly defended
1 -a g
sites." As a result, they were highly vulnerable to a
preemptive Soviet missile and/or aircraft strike. A similar
vulnerability appeared to be emerging for U.S. land-based
ICBMs as estimates of Soviet ICBM accuracy began to fall
within hard-target kill tolerances.
The Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (APNW)
had a similar effect, but for different reasons. Negotia-
tions were conducted in parallel with the strategic arms
talks, generating fears among many Europeans of an impend-
ing U.S. -Soviet condominium, a bilateral pact between the
two superpowers allowing each to peacefully dominate its
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TABLE I: NATO AND WARSAW PACT LAND-BASED THEATRE NUCLEAR
AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES— 1973
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Warsaw Pact aircraft include SU-7 Fitter, MIG-21/23.
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own European "sphere of influence." These fears assumed a
measure of credibility following a Brezhnev-Kissinger meet-
ing in Moscow in April 1972. At the meeting Brezhnev pro-
posed an agreement on nuclear weapon targeting which
proscribed the employment of nuclear weapons against one
another's home territory, thereby limiting the nuclear bat-
tlefield, in the case of NATO, to central Europe. Describ-
ing the incident, Kissinger wrote
[Brezhnev] asked to see me alone and suddenly introduced
the idea of an "understanding" not to use nuclear weapons
against each other. He called it a step of "immense
significance," a "peaceful bomb." That it was.
Although the proposal was "politely turned aside," the
potential development for such a condominium opened two
courses of action to European, and in some cases American,
defense officials. The first was the increased emphasis on
strengthening the linkages of the NATO triad: conventional,
theatre nuclear and U.S. strategic forces. Particular at-
tention was placed on the theatre nuclear forces as NATO
quietly acceded to U.S. proposals for their modernization,
including the deployment of the dual-capable Lance missile
and initial support for enhanced radiation weapon research
138
and development.
The second course of action related to devising a more
credible defense posture incorporating theatre nuclear
forces to a greater degree than ever before into NATO's
forward defenses. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was
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tasked with analyzing NATO's nuclear strategy. According
to a NPG communique, the study was undertaken
...for the purpose of gaining deeper insight into policy
matters pertaining to the defensive tactical use of nu-
clear weapons. This step, in turn, is expected to con-
tribute to the further_refinement and elaboration of
existing guidelines.
However, as late as 197 5, the NPG had offered no sub-
stantive recommendations concerning the employment of tac-
tical nuclear weapons. The principal recommendations
revolved around a sort of "NATO C3" : command, control and
consultation procedures for European-based nuclear weapons.
The June 197 5 NPG meeting closed with a communique sounding
much the same as the 1973 communique, although the defense
ministers had altered their focus somewhat to deal with TNW
employment in cases where initial use, in other words "dem-
onstration bursts," had not achieved its purpose.
The pressure generated by European concern about US/NATO
theatre nuclear doctrine and capabilities sparked a series
of Congressional inquiries on the subject in the U.S. In
May and June 1973 the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy con-
ducted extensive hearings on the military applications of
nuclear technology. Less than a year later the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on nuclear weap-
ons and U.S. foreign policy. A few months earlier, in
September 1973, the Senate Committee had published a staff
report reviewing U.S. security issues in Europe, one of the
140
main topics being European-based U.S. nuclear weapons.
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The rash of Congressional investigations culminated on
5 August 1974 with the adoption of the Nunn Amendment to the
DOD Appropriation Authorization Act of 1975, known as Public
Law 93-365. The amendment directed the Secretary of Defense
to study the overall concept for the use of TNW in Europe
and its relation to deterrence and conventional defense.
The Secretary was directed to report the results on or
before 1 April 1975.
The Secretary's reply to the Nunn Amendment constituted
an unprecedented release of previously classified DOD in-
formation and was the most thorough description of U.S.
theatre nuclear force posture in Europe to date. The im-
pact of SALT and elimination of U.S. strategic superiority
was evident in the opening paragraphs of the report.
The threat of mutual annihilation limits the range of
hostile actions which can be deterred by strategic forces
and places more emphasis on the deterrent roles of
theatre nuclear and conventional forces .. .Now, in the era
of strategic, equivalence, their importance has further
increased.
With those forces in mind the document concluded that NATO
had "a nuclear strategy and posture which is coordinated
and overall is rational."
The text of the document, however, failed to support the
Secretary's conclusions. It was no less ambiguous than
MC 14/3, the NATO guidance which lay at the base of theatre
nuclear posture questions in the first place. Schlesinger '
s
report revealed that NATO's theatre nuclear posture was
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seriously flawed and contained critical and exploitable
weaknesses
.
The most salient inconsistency in NATO's posture made
obvious by the report centered on a crucial component of the
Flexible Response strategy—the process of controlled es-
calation. In an apparent attempt to accommodate both U.S.
and European views on the subject, the report merely served
to amplify existing uncertainties. Initially the utility
of theatre nuclear forces was attributed to their inherently
lower escalation potential.
Theatre nuclear forces, because they do not pose a major
threat to the Soviet homeland, constitute a retaliatory
capability which carries a perceptively lower risk of.^
escalation than the use of strategic nuclear forces.
However, several paragraphs later, the report states
that "the first use of theatre nuclear forces, even in very
limited ways, carries grave risks of escalation and should
be considered only when the consequences of conventional
143defeat would be more serious." This later phrase, so
distinct from the first, reflected the DOD ' s attempts to
reconcile European fears of U.S. intentions to fight a
limited nuclear war in Europe with the U.S. requirement for
a credible deterrent. West Germans in particular stubbornly
adhered to the position that prospects for controlling es-
calation were, at best, dim. A West German Colonel summed
up his country's viewpoint in two sentences:
Since the mechanism of escalation is uncertain, a limita-
tion to the lowest level of destruction does not seem
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possible. It is, therefore, essential to the Federal
Republic of Germany that no tactical .nuclear war what-
soever is fought on her territory.
Moreover, Schlesinger ' s strategy of controlled escala-
tion depended heavily on conditions that no longer existed;
U.S. and NATO nuclear superiority at virtually all levels
of possible escalation. In other words, the ability to
achieve "escalation dominance." NATO threats of escalation
required survivable second-strike strategic and theatre nu-
clear forces capable of penetrating Soviet defenses to be
effective. Aside from the erosion of U.S. numerical nuclear
superiority, the actual vulnerability of one force (theatre
nuclear) and the perceived vulnerability of the other
(strategic nuclear) severely undermined Schlesinger ' s de-
claratory strategy of controlled escalation.
A second inconsistency in NATO's nuclear posture evi-
dent in the Secretary's report was NATO's failure to real-
istically account for Soviet military strategy in Europe.
The Warsaw Pact's orientation toward nuclear operations and
heavy, rapid armor assaults was adequately described. How-
ever, the report indicated that NATO theatre nuclear plan-
ning clearly disregarded, or at least downgraded, any notion
that a major Soviet attack would most likely be meticuously
prepared and certainly make allowances for some degree of
NATO tactical nuclear employment.
By applying a potentially inappropriate Western cost-
benefit framework, NATO tactical nuclear weapons were
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supposed to dramatically "change the assessment of Warsaw
145
Pact political leaders regarding early or cheap victory.
Little credence was given to the probability that the Soviet
leadership did not anticipate a "cheap" victory and might
well be prepared to wage a very costly war, in Western
terms, in view of the prize at stake. Consequently, at the
time of Schlesinger ' s report, both U.S. and European ideas
about the initial use of tactical nuclear weapons were more
or less convergent. Sounding much like the Secretary's re-
port, the 1975/1976 West German White Paper indicated that
the initial employment of nuclear weapons in Europe was
"not intended so much to bring about a military decision as
to achieve political effect."
Finally, Schlesinger ' s report made it clear that, in
spite of the Soviet's offensive nuclear doctrine, NATO
theatre nuclear force posture was based on NATO having the
choice "to escalate or not to escalate," a vestige of the
1950s. Implicit throughout the report was the perception
that NATO would be the regulator of qualitative force ap-
plication. While it may have been true as late as the
1960s, by 1975 a credible Soviet theatre nuclear force and
doctrine placed this conclusion in jeopardy.
None of the ambiguity and uncertainty so pervasive in
the theatre force doctrine seemed to characterize US/NATO
strategic nuclear doctrine. The Secretary of Defense's
FY 1975 Defense Budget and Five-Year Defense Program
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(1975-79), which preceded Schlesinger ' s theatre posture
report to Congress only briefly, described the function of
strategic nuclear forces in much more exacting terms than
theatre nuclear forces. According to the FY 1975 report,
the strategic nuclear arsenal included:
...forces to execute a wide range of options in response
to potential actions by an enemy. . .while at the same time
minimizing unintended collateral damage... the availability
of carefully, tailored
,
pre-planned options will contribute
to that end.
In contrast, the tactical nuclear force description
conveys considerably less clarity and confidence. The
enigmatic nature of theatre nuclear warfare was unmistak-
able in the same 1975 report.
...as a practical matter, the initiation of a nuclear
engagement would involve many uncertainties. Acceptable
boundaries on such conflict would be difficult to es-
tablish. .. the decision to initiate the use of nuclear
weapons—however small, clean, and precisely used they
might be—would be thep>most agonizing that could face
any national leader.
The impression given was that strategic nuclear ex-
changes could be carefully controlled, and limited , while
employment of tactical nuclear weapons could not. The ad-
monition "Acceptable boundaries on such a conflict [tactical
nuclear] could be extremely difficult to establish" did not
appear in the discussion of strategic nuclear warfare. The
belief that strategic exchanges could be controlled and
limited was incorporated into official U.S. defense doctrine
in National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)-242 (Jan-
uary 1974)
,
popularized by Schlesinger and later by
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Secretaries Rumsfeld and Brown as a "countervailing strat-
egy." The memorandum specified the possibility of employ-
ing land-based ICBMs on limited nuclear missions, so-called
Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs) , against the Warsaw Pact.
No equivalent or similar document existed for theatre/
tactical nuclear forces; no such rung in the "escalation
ladder." For reasons of intra-Alliance doctrinal incompat-
ibility, NATO preferred to rely on an ad-hoc theatre nuclear
strategy, as obscure to the Allies as it was to the Soviets.
Nonetheless, the revival of theatre nuclear thinking be-
tween 1971 and 1975 did generate initial answers to such
questions as what was the contribution of theatre nuclear
forces to deterrence? How did they relate to conventional
forces? How could they be used? What modernization pro-
grams needed to be implemented?
The first tangible evidence of any real impact from the
strategy reappraisal begun in 1971 was seen in the FY 1977
Secretary of Defense Annual Report , released 27 January 1976
The tone of the report was more confident and positive con-
cerning the use of theatre nuclear weapons than the Annual
Report of just two years earlier. The FY 1977 report re-
flected a maturing of U.S. strategic thinking and, simul-
taneously, a tacit admission of the declining efficacy of
U.S. strategic forces. Unlike its predecessors, it stated
in no uncertain terms that
NATO must be capable of executing effective nuclear
attacks against Warsaw Pact military forces, with
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discrimination and limited collateral damage, in response
to major conventional or limited nuclear attack.
...and allow NATO to militarily exploit the use of
nuclear weapons with conventional forces in order to bring
about a termination/ settlement of qthe conflict on terms
which are advantageous to NATO
.
In effect, the strategy transferred several of the missions
of an increasingly ineffective strategic nuclear force to
the more militarily useful theatre nuclear forces.
The Europeans were not slow to respond to the apparent
shift in U.S. declaratory strategy. Less than a week after
the FY 1977 Annual Report was issued publically, an article
in the German Tribune , carried on the front page, gave U.S.
defense officials notice that any change in NATO strategy
along the lines prescribed in the new Annual Report would be
met with opposition not unlike that which accompanied Flex-
ible Response between 1960 and 1966.
The article in the German Tribune iterated the West
German position quite clearly. In discussing the article,
West German Army Colonel Klaus Reinhardt explained:
Since even a classic victory in central Europe would des-
troy everything we wish to maintain, our security policy
must aim at preserving a situation of "non-war." Exist-
ing nuclear, weapons are, therefore, not intended for
actual use.
The West German White Paper published in 1976 was equally
explicit. Beyond the possible initial use for political
effect, "further escalation would mean that strategic nu-
clear weapons would be used against the attacker's own
territory." As a war-fighting instrument, tactical nuclear
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weapons were simply not considered by Europeans as part of
the West's arsenal.
Caught in the middle of the trans-Atlantic debate was
the Army, whose Field Manuals reflected the conventional
emphasis of the Kennedy-Johnson-McNamara era while .official
guidance seemed to press for a more integrated conventional-
nuclear doctrine in the European theatre. A rash of Field
Manual updates during 1976-1977 reflected Army efforts to
produce a revised tactical nuclear doctrine with greater
emphasis on a combined arms approach to battle. The result,
however, was a doctrine no more robust and effective than
those which preceded it.
A. TACTICAL NUCLEAR DOCTRINE: IT'S NOT ALL IN THE PACKAGING
The period from 1971-1977 produced several attempts to
establish new doctrinal guidelines for tactical nuclear em-
ployment. Considering the politico-military atmosphere
within NATO at the time, it was not surprising that none
provided definitive, well articulated guidance for the
battlefield commander. The constraints of working within
a framework which limited nuclear war was not a viable op-
tion eliminated most of the planning alternatives involving
tactical nuclear weapons.
The bulk of the unclassified guidance focused on re-
quest-release procedures and described battlefield scenarios
that gave NATO uncontested first choice of TNW employment.
No effort was made to contend with a Soviet first-use
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preemptive situation. The manuals failed to acknowledge
that in any shooting war, the Warsaw Pact would be the ag-
gressor and it, not NATO, might very well originate the
"ground rules." Schlesinger ' s "Theatre Nuclear Posture"
report to Congress had minimal impact on the Army's tac-
tical nuclear doctrine revision process. Doubts about the
Secretary's motives in proclaiming theatre nuclear war a
"plannable" possibility and the longevity of such a phi-
losophy within the Department of Defense were supported by
the absence of any directive from the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense to the Army to incorporate tactical nuclear
weapons into its war plans. As a result, the Secretary's
report was interpreted not only as a document to inform
Congress but rhetoric to influence Soviet perceptions of
deterrence in a period of waning strategic nuclear
credibility.
The event which did influence the Army's doctrinal re-
vision process was the Arab-Israeli war in 1973. The July
1976 version of Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5 , "Operations,"
claimed that "the war in the Middle East might well portend
the nature of modern battle." " The war confirmed the
Army's high-tempo, short-war concept and made clear the
lethality of modern conventional weapons. The lessons
learned from the war, valid as far as they went, did not
take into account that (1) neither side was equipped with
tactical nuclear weapons or (2) even had they been so
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equipped, the ability of the Arabs or Israelis to absorb
multiple nuclear blows and survive was considerably less
than the analogous situation in Europe and that alone might
have served as a strong deterrent to nuclear use.
Prior to the 1973 war and Schlesinger ' s report the Army
published an interim manual on Tactical Nuclear Operations,
FM 100-30 (Test) . Although the manual was never published
in final form or officially approved for distribution, it
reflected a significant departure from earlier Army thinking
embodied in FM 100-31 (1951) . FM 100-31 envisioned the
widespread use of battlefield atomic weapons but no major
changes in offensive doctrine. FM 100-30 (Test) , on the
other hand, spoke of a complex transition from conventional
to nuclear operations in which "the combatants must practice
some degree of arms control and must refrain from actions
152that encourage escalation." While the older FM 100-31
adopted a war-fighting position with credible use of nuclear
weapons, FM 100-30 (Test) was more concerned with the polit-
ical difficulties of employment. In short, it provided no
153
war-fighting doctrine for the nuclear battlefield.
The philosophy contained in FM 100-30 (Test) was car-
ried over into 1976-1977 field manual revisions. In spite
of statements in the newly revised manuals to the contrary,
actual attempts at integrating conventional and nuclear
weapons on the battlefield were illusory and the two remained
as distinct as oil and water.
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The 1976 version of FM 100-5 related that, with the
development of accurate tactical nuclear weapons, "the
pendulum has swung from conventional war to nuclear war and
154
now to the present concept of conventional-nuclear war .
"
Similarly, an opening note to the user described FM 6-20,
"Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations," as a new manual
which illustrated how to integrate all fire support, direct
and indirect, into combined arms operations . However, the
cursory attention devoted to tactical nuclear doctrine in
FM 6-20 revealed no intention of developing a truly combined
arms approach to the battlefield. The entire section on
Tactical Nuclear Doctrine, reprinted below, was characterized
by its brevity and shallow guidance it provided the reader.
Tactical Nuclear Doctrine
U.S. Army tactical nuclear doctrine describes the method-
ology for employment of nuclear weapons on the battle-
field and for conducting operations in a nuclear conflict.
For the purposes of this chapter, tactical employment
means the use of nuclear weapons by the battlefield com-
mander—usually at corps or below—in support of maneuver
forces in his command.
Because nuclear weapons represent combat power of tremen-
dous magnitude, the initial use of nuclear weapons will
result in a significant change in the nature of any con-
flict. While tactical nuclear planning by the corps will
be oriented toward the achievement of tactical goals, any
employment of nuclear weapons will have a fundamentally
political aspect of which planners at all echelons must
be aware. Whether nuclear weapons should be used during
a given conflict and the degree of their use are strategic
decisions that high level political/military authorities
will make.
The Army's tactical nuclear doctrine specifies the manner
in which corps and divisions will conduct nuclear opera-
tions within political and military constraints. Such
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constraints may include geographical or political bound-
aries, yield limitations, time, number of weapons to be
used, collateral damage preclusion guidance, and restric-
tions on using specific delivery systems or attacking
specific types of targets.
Both field manuals, 100-5 and 6-20, contained separate
chapters on Offensive and Defensive operations. In more
than 180 pages of discussion and description in these chap-
ters, tactical nuclear weapons were not mentioned. The
chapters were oriented entirely toward conventional opera-
tions. The chapter in FM 100-5 titled "Tactical Nuclear
Operations" described nuclear weapon effects, nuclear weap-
on packages and control of nuclear release but not operations
Another 16-page chapter devoted to operations within NATO
mentioned nuclear weapons only in a peripheral sense re-
lated to battlefield command and control.
The most dramatic change in procedure and doctrine in-
dicated in the revised manuals was the adoption of the
"nuclear weapon package." A package was defined as "a
group of nuclear weapons of specific yields for employment
in a specified area, within a limited timeframe to support
a tactical contingency." " A corps nuclear weapon package
was foreseen as consisting of between 100 and 200 weapons.
The nuclear weapon package concept created and was ac-
companied by an array of problems and obstacles to effective
in-theatre nuclear weapon use. First, discussion of the
package and its application in the Field Manuals was vague
and made no reference to specific weapon systems. No
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substantive mention was made of aircraft delivered weapons
(the Forward-Based Systems) or missiles (Honest John, Lance,
or Pershing) . The emphasis throughout all package descrip-
tions implied a nuclear artillery barrage only. Although
precise elaboration of specific weapon systems was impossible
in these unclassified manuals, the relevant FMs contained
less information and guidance about tactical nuclear weapon
employment than Schlesinger ' s 1975 report to the Congress.
A second problem with the nuclear weapon package as it
existed was the requirement for each package to be treated
as a separate entity for the purpose of request and release.
While the on- scene commander could use fewer weapons than
allocated in a particular package, he was under pressure to
expend the entire package to achieve maximum effect, not
knowing if a follow-on package would be released in time to
be tactically useful. The request-release sequence was es-
timated to take approximately 18-24 hours from corps re-
quest to corps receipt of release. Another 6 hours were
expected to pass before physical weapon firing. Figures
1 and 2, from FMs 100-5 and 6-20 respectively, graphically
displayed the lengthy procedures involved.
In addition, the on-scene commander was required to work
within a very restrictive employment window and had only
marginal leeway to modify the firing and targeting plans.
All weapons in the package were to be fired in the
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FM 6-20, p. 6-39,
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directed that "all nuclear weapons will be employed as a




To make matters worse, the instructions describing situa-
tions which warranted nuclear weapon request were confusing
and often contradictory. The Army manual devoted to tac-
tical nuclear operations, RB 100-30 , "Tactical Nuclear
Operations-Doctrine," illustrated the problem.
Unless the enemy uses them first, nuclear weapons will not
be authorized before conventional defenses have been
severely tested and found inadequate The situation fac-
ing the corps at the time nuclear weapons are requested
must therefore be grave—under sustained attack by supe-
rior forces, own forces becoming fully committed and
not likely to hold, reinforcements not available , in-
sufficient combat support and combat service support
available to sustain the defense, and the survivabi lity
of the force in question .
The situation which was to exist before requesting nu-
clear weapons release was fairly explicit. However, that
same corps commander, faced with the ominous situation out-
lined above and knowing it might take up to 2 4 hours from
actual request to physical weapon release, had to apply ad-
ditional criteria before executing his request.
One of the criteria to be followed by the corps commander
in requesting release of nuclear weapons is that the
corps defensive capability must not be allowed to dete-
riorate to the point where the corps could not defend
conventionally . After the release and execution of the
nuclear strike, the corps must have sufficient forces
available to conduct a conventional
.
forward defense
against the remaining enemy forces .
The dichotomies were obvious. First, the corps com-
mander was not to allow his defensive capability to
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deteriorate "to the point where the corps could not defend
conventionally." Yet the scenario which prescribed the re-
quest of nuclear weapons was one which fit, or would short-
ly, that very description. Second, a corps commander whose
force survivability was in question was nonetheless supposed
to have sufficient forces remaining 2 4 hours later to con-
duct a "conventional forward defense." Finally, even though
reinforcements were not available and there was insufficient
combat support and service available, nuclear weapon pack-
ages would somehow make their way to the front and into the
commander's hands!
The guidance was procedural, not tactical. It provided
information to facilitate a decision on whether or not the
situation called for nuclear weapons. The combination of
pressures to expend the entire package, the extremely narrow
timeframe for employment, and inadequate request guidance
severely hampered the corps commander's flexibility. To-
gether they precluded effective real-time use of tactical
nuclear weapons in the rapidly changing environment of a
high-tempo, predominantly armored, Warsaw Pact assault. The
guidance provided was limited to a situation which was al-
ready on the verge of being lost and tactical nuclear weap-
on employment would most likely be too little too late. As
designed and administered the nuclear weapon package could
only have been effective if the Soviet's attack was slow,
conventional and conformed to prehostility planning
122

conceptions. In reality, the package was structured more
to fit the West German's conception of "political applica-
tion" than to impart any military utility to the weapons.
The ten-year phase of tactical nuclear doctrine de-
velopment, extending from 1968 to 1977, was thus a dismal
failure. Compared with the aggressive doctrine of the 1950s,
tactical nuclear doctrine in 1977 was less integrated into
the overall NATO defense structure. Hastening conflict
termination, referring to some sort of return to a status
quo ante, and not victory became one of the primary
functions of tactical nuclear weapons.
Finally, the DOD FY 1977 Annual Report claimed that U.S.
military strength had dropped to "600,000 below 1964 levels,
while opposing military capabilities have grown quantitative-
ly and qualitatively. In Europe this was evident in the
number of U.S. troops stationed in West Germany which had
declined to 4 divisions and 3 maneuver brigades in West
Berlin. While defense officials and politicians in Europe
and the U.S. discussed, bemoaned and feared the growing im-
balance in nearly all NATO-Warsaw Pact military indicators,
no action was undertaken to devise a more credible and
integrated strategy with NATO conventional and nuclear
forces "in-being." Within the Alliance solutions focused
on more equitable defense burden sharing. Outside of NATO
itself, alliance leaders looked toward arms control,
particularly SALT II and the Mutual and Balanced Force
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VI. DECISIONS, DECISIONS, 1978-1984
Deterrence is not, and cannot be, bluff.
1 fi 1President's Commission on Strategic Forces
It is against the background of bankruptcy in U.S. /NATO
tactical nuclear doctrine that two of NATO's most important
and controversial nuclear related decisions must be viewed:
President Carter's April 1978 decision to defer production
of the enhanced radiation warhead (ERW) and the implementa-
tion, beginning in December 1979, of a long-range theatre
nuclear force (LRTNF) modernization and deployment program.
Both decisions generated unprecedented public involvement
in and opposition to NATO's nuclear strategy in Europe and
the United States. Adding fuel to the opposition's fire was
the European's pervasive lack of confidence in Carter as a
leader of the Western Alliance. His abrupt reversal, fol-
lowing events in Afghanistan in 1979, of what many considered
too soft a stance toward the Soviet Union reinforced Euro-
pean perceptions of an uncertain and insecure American
President.
In the case of the enhanced radiation warhead, the op-
position strongly influenced Carter's decision to defer
production, with Carter fearing his Administration "would
be stamped forever as the Administration which introduced
162bombs that kill people but leave buildings intact."
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The LRTNF program, originally a European proposal which the
United States only halfheartedly endorsed, has come under
heavy attack by "peace-niks" and politicians alike through-
out Europe. Although the initial stages of the LRTNF de-
ployment proceeded as scheduled beginning December 1983,
development of acceptable employment strategies will be in-
credibly difficult in the wake of a widely supported and
influential European anti-nuclear movement.
The ERW debacle began 4 June 1977 when the Washington
Post broke the story "Neutron Killer Warhead Buried in ERDA
»*163
Budget. The article was accompanied by an editorial
which claimed the ERW was a weapon that the military would
view "as being sufficiently small, safe and controllable to
be used without fear of starting a general nuclear war."
The Post '
s
story kicked off a heated debate in the Senate
and a spate of often factually distorted editorials in the
U.S. and overseas. President Carter assumed the offensive,
supporting the production and deployment of the ERW in an
11 July letter to Senator John Stennis and during a national-
ly televised press conference the next day. During the
press conference Carter stated that the ERW "ought to be one
of our options in the nuclear weapons field." Shortly
thereafter, and in spite of his positive endorsement, Carter
bowed to growing pressures to defer a final production de-
cision pending additional study.
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The debate in Europe initially mirrored the polarization
of proponents and opponents of the ERW in the United States.
The opposition was particularly vocal in West Germany, led
by Social Democrat Egon Bahr. A close advisor to SPD Chair-
man Willy Brandt, Bahr melodramatically declared the ERW to
164be "a symbol for the perversion of human thinking." West
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt remained noncommittal,
awaiting further clarification of the weapon's impact on
East-West relations and the arms control process.
By the spring of 1978 the ERW had weathered several
House and Senate attempts to eliminate funding and the swell
of opposition had fallen off to a ripple. Schmidt assured
Carter that West Germany would accept the ERW if another
NATO country did the same. French President Giscard
d'Estaing publically supported deployment while several
other uncommitted NATO-Europe countries appeared "per-
suadable." 165
Amidst slowly growing support, Carter abruptly re-
versed course. On 3 April the New York Times reported that
Carter had decided against producing the ERW. Supporters
of the weapon, including former President Gerald Ford, urged
Carter to implement production. West German Foreign Minis-
ter Hans-Dietrich Genscher met with Carter on 4 April to
relay his government's favorable disposition on deployment.
The meeting with Genscher changed nothing and on 7 April
Carter issued a statement which essentially killed the ERW
issue for his Administration.
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I have decided to defer production of weapons with
enhanced radiation effects. The ultimate decision
regarding the incorporation of enhanced radiation
features into our modernized battlefield weapons will
be made later, and will be influenced by the degree to
which the Soviet Union shows restraint in it conven-
tional and nuclear arms programs and force deployments
affecting
fi
the security of the United States and Western
Europe
.
The European governments politely issued statements en-
dorsing Carter's decision. The leading West German opposi-
tion parties, probably reflecting true government opinion,
uniformly touted the decision as sending a weak and dan-
gerous signal of U.S. /NATO resolve to the Soviets. The
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) warned that Carter's de-
cision had placed European confidence in the United States
in jeopardy. Likewise, the Christian Social Union (CSU)
claimed Carter's action raised serious doubts about his
leadership capabilities. From London, the Tories called the
decision a major propaganda victory for the Soviet Union.
In the words of Carter's national security advisor, the en-
tire affair became "a major setback in U.S . -European
i fc . ,,167relations.
'
At no time did the debate center on the military utility
(or non-utility) of the enhanced radiation warhead. Only
after the Post'
s
disclosure in June did Carter order a DOD
study of the weapon. At his direction even this study was
oriented less toward combat employment potential than the
impact of ERW production and deployment on arms control ne-
gotiations, particularly SALT II. Not until September,
128

three months after the issue surface publically, was a DOD
team dispatched to Europe to discuss the ERW and solicit
the views of the allies.
During the Senate debate proponents of the ERW avoided
discussion of the weapon's positive design characteristics
of reduced blast and reduced residual radiation, choosing
instead to focus on the deterrent and force modernization
requirements. Testimony by Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat-
Georgia)
,
one of the weapon's more ardent supporters, summed
up the pro-ERW argument.
Those who oppose the warhead apparently believe in self-
deterrence; that is to say, that we should keep the
weapons so destructive we would never use them or if we
did use them, it would be only under the most desperate
of conditions. The fault with this argument is that if
• the Soviets perceive this to be our posture, then de-
terrence is weakened. . .we encourage the very war we
seek to avoid.
If we do not have usable weapons, then we do not have
deterrence, and if we do not have deterrence, then we may
end up being forced to use unusable weapons or to capit-
ulate. We ..must not invite the very aggression we seek
to deter. I6 *
The opposition, on the other hand, harped on the im-
morality of a conscious decision to employ a radiation-
killer weapon and the need to maintain the distinct "fire-
break" between conventional and nuclear war, a concept they
believed the ERW would blur. Senator Dick Clark (Democrat-
Iowa) repeatedly claimed that "the introduction of supposed-
ly 'clean' weapons, the illusion of some sort of benign
nuclear exchange, threatens to blur that distinction, and
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as such is potentially a dangerous trigger to nuclear
holocaust." Fellow ERW opponent John Heinz (Republican-
Pennsylvania) went so far as to compare the enhanced radia-
tion warhead with the horrors of chemical warfare. He noted
that "it is bad enough that this weapon seems akin to chem-
ical warfare, not only because it targets people rather than
property, but because it will subject them in many instances
170to excruciating death by radiation."
These accusations were backed by no empirical evidence.
The Senator's moral discourse against the ERW could just as
well have been directed toward the existing tactical nuclear
arsenal in Europe. Cast in the context of a comparision
with those fission weapons, it is impossible to conclude
that the ERW is immoral while fission weapons are not. The
mere fact that ERW opponents used the "radiation-kill" as
a supporting argument for their position reflected just how
ill-informed they really were. Even before the enhanced
radiation warhead the Army considered radiation the primary
kill mechanism of a low-yield nuclear weapon against pro-
tected personnel, a fact well documented in numerous Army
field manuals.
One problem which contributed to the lack of informed
Congressional debate was the fact that the Army, sole bene-
factor of any ERW production, remained strangely silent.
It was to receive the only enhanced radiation warheads, the
W70-3 for the Lance missile and the W79 for the 8-inch
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howitzer, sorely needed to modernize their aging nuclear
arsenal. The Army's quiescence can be attributed to a com-
bination of (1) a lack of understanding of the potential
military applications of the ERW weapon and (2) its surprise
at the outrage over what it considered a simple moderniza-
tion program.
In fact, Army support for the ERW came only after the
original DOD preference for incorporating new warheads
based on "old" fission technology was rejected by the Joint
Commission on Atomic Energy (JCAE) . According to S.T. Cohen,
father of the enhanced radiation concept, "had the JCAE
given its approval to production of these fission warheads
originally requested by the Army, it seems doubtful that




Carter's 7 April decision to defer ERW production
quickly fell from the list of central defense issues in the
wake of the hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion
of Afganistan. His promise of an "ultimate decision" on
the weapon, to be influenced heavily by Soviet restraint in
defense-related programs, was apparently forgotten or ig-
nored. In the period between the April 1978 decision and
the November 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, the Soviets de-
ployed more than 100 SS-20 nuclear missiles against Western
Europe and added approximately 70 Backfire bombers to their
inventory. Conventional armament programs reflected similar
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increases. Fighter aircraft, helicopter, tank, armored
vehicle, towed artillery and multiple rocket launcher pro-
173duction were at higher levels in 1980 than 1978.
The LRTNF program established in 197 9 is viewed in a
completely different light than the enhanced radiation war-
head by government officials on both sides of the Atlantic.
Soviet deployment of the SS-20 nuclear missile, coupled
with President Carter's failure to act on the ERW issue to
demonstrate American leadership of NATO nuclear strategy,
generated pressures for a revitalization of the traditional
U.S. /NATO nuclear linkages.
These pressures were accentuated by widespread criticism
of the SALT II negotiations. According to European ob-
servers, a critical analysis of the SALT II process reveals
four serious dangers to Western security, three of which are
directly related to the European theatre nuclear balance and
NATO's strategy of flexible response.
(1) The credibility of the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee
has been impaired;
(2) Grave imbalances at the so-called Eurostrategic level
have been aggravated by SALT II;
(3) The consequent and imperative quest for theatre nuclear
modernization may be hindered by SALT II;
(4) U.S. behavior in SALT II provides little warrant for
confidence that further SALT negotiations will produce
favorable results.
Finally, there is a subtle, but very important, dis-
tinction between the ERW debate and the LRTNF modernization
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and deployment program. In the ERW debate nearly all the
political participants in the United States, supporters and
opponents alike, structured their arguments around the fun-
damental premise that limited nuclear war was a non-sequitur
.
No one appeared to doubt the inevitability of uncontrolled
escalation once nuclear weapons were employed. Rather, dif-
ferences arose in defining what type of nuclear force con-
stituted the most credible deterrent to war; a force designed
for war fighting or one designed for punishment. The enhanced
radiation weapon conveniently embodies popular preconceived
notions about limited nuclear war. Design characteristics
of high accuracy, low-yield and reduced collateral damage
make it a useful nuclear warfighting instrument . ., The bulk of
the criticism of the LRTNF program, however, has revolved
around questions of political need to respond to changes in
the European theatre nuclear balance, political viability
of the deployment, and its arms control implications. The
LRTNF weapons, Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Mis-
siles (GLCM) , are of much higher yield than ERW warheads and
175have been billed exclusively as a deterrent force. As
a result, nuclear warfighting has not been a critical issue
in the deployment debate. The controversy surrounding the
LRTNF program has been considerably more rational and much
less emotional than the highly charged ERW debate.
So that the Administration's intentions would not be
misconstrued, the State and Defense Departments have gone to
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great lengths to make the deterrent nature of the LRTNF
program clear. Speaking before an audience in Brussels,
Richard Burt, the State Department's director of Politico-
Military Affairs, explained that the deployment "does not
represent a step toward the development of a NATO nuclear
warfighting capability. . .This deployment will force on
[the Soviet Union] the realization that NATO will not fight
1 7 fi
a war on their terms."
From the outset, the GLCM/Pershing II deployment has
been a decision lacking a vigorous strategic foundation.
The number of weapons and basing modes selected have ne-
glected important military considerations and have been de-
termined largely by political criteria and intra-Alliance
compromise. A striking parallel exists between the 1957-59
deployment of the long-range Thor and Jupiter missiles and
the 1979 NATO LRTNF decision. Both were devised to correct
a decline in the confidence of U.S. strategic nuclear forces
and simultaneously offset a Soviet theatre nuclear threat.
Although written in 1962, a change in dates and missile
names would make the following statement virtually indistin-
guishable from any written in the last three or four years.
In 1957-58 the NATO Council resolved to station American
IRBMs in Europe. This decision was made under the impact
of the Soviet long-range missile potential and was de-
signed to offset it. This was duly implemented by the
stationing in Britain of Thor, and in Italy of Jupiter...
Other European members of NATO refused to station such
missiles on their territory and others were not considered
for either military or geographic reasons. The main
political motive behind this undertaking was doubtless to
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restore the diminished confidence of European governments.
in the efficacy of the strategy of massive retaliation.
The December 198 3 deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM
is viewed in similar terms as (1) a means of "recoupling"
the U.S. to West European security and (2) a deterrent re-
sponse to the Soviet SS-20 missile. Comparison of the 1984
DOD Annual Report description of the LRTNF modernization and
Schmidt's statement above is disconcerting, giving the im-
pression that NATO nuclear strategy has made little headway
in 20 years.
The Soviet Union... has been engaged since 1977 in a sig-
nificant buildup of its LRINF arsenal with deployments of
the MIRVed SS-20 ballistic missile...
The Soviet buildup led to concern throughout the NATO
alliance that a perceived gap had been created in NATO's
spectrum of nuclear deterrence. The fear was that the
Soviets might believe—however incorrectly--that they
could conduct or threaten limited strikes against Western
Europe from a sanctuary in the Soviet Union, on the as-
sumption that, without strong theatre-based systems ca-
pable of reaching Soviet territory, and given the loss
of U.S. strategic superiority, NATO lacked an appropriate
means of response. The December 1979 Alliance decision
authorizing deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM. .
.
represented NATO's efforts to redress this imbalance.
...Construction of GLCM bases is under way in the United
Kingdom and Italy, and preliminary GLCM basing preparar
tions have begun in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Throughout the 1960's and early 1970 's politicians and
military men in the West were well aware that the American
strategic nuclear edge was rapidly dissipating. Even though
SALT I had the effect of readily distinguishing between
strategic and theatre weapons and codified a superpower nu-
clear balance in strategic systems as early as 1972,
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widespread realization of parity took an additional four to
six years. Suddenly, in 1977, there was a pressing require-
ment to address the SS-4/5 and growing SS-20 theatre nuclear
179
arsenal of the Soviets.
In July 1977 President Carter called for the moderniza-
tion of NATO theatre nuclear forces, "especially in support
180
of NATO's deterrent strategy of flexible response." Two
and a half years later, when the NATO defense ministers an-
nounced their LRTNF modernization program, Soviet land-based,
long-range (greater than 1000 kilometers) theatre nuclear
forces poised at Europe included over 2000 "ready-to-fire"
warheads. Comparable NATO systems included no long-range
missiles, 56 aging British Vulcan bombers and 156 U.S.
F-111E/F bombers. Table 2 outlines the LRTNF balance at the
time of the NATO minister's December 1979 decision and the
situation prior to the December 1983 Pershing II/GLCM
deployment
.
The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) took charge of
modernization plans shortly after Carter's July statement.
The NPG created two subgroups. The High Level Group (HLG)
would accomplish a complete review of the theatre nuclear
balance and prepare deployment plans. The Special Con-
sultative Group (SCG) would investigate the arms control and
political considerations involved in the modernization and
set guidelines for arms control talks.
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TABLE 2: UNITED STATES /NATO AND SOVIET UNION LAND-BASED LONG-RANGE






War Launchers/ War Range
heads Missiles heads (Jon)
110/220 660 243/486 1458 5000
450/450 450 380/380 380 2000/4100




























18/18 18 18/18 18 3000
33/1 33 33/1 33 (800)
Number refers to number of bombs carried when aircraft are
specified.
2
The British Vulcans have been "denuclearized" in preparation for
the aircraft's retirement.
Adapted from Gregory Treverton, Nuclear Weapons in Europe
, pp. 31-84;
Anthony Cordesman, "Europe's Quiet Profile in Courage," Armed Forces
Journal International , June 1981, p. 38; Donald Cotter, James Hansen
and Kirk McConnell, "The Nuclear Balance in Europe: Status, Trends,
Implications," USSI Report 83-1 (Washington, D.C.: United States
Strategic Institute, 1983, pp. 23-42.
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The bifurcation of responsibilities by the NPG eventually
evolved into the December 1979 "dual-track" decision; paral-
lel deployment plans and preparations for the Pershing II
and GLCM, scheduled to begin in December 1983, preceded, and
if necessary followed, by bilateral U.S. -Soviet arms limita-
tion negotiations. Inherent weaknesses and inconsistencies
have since plagued each "track," however, leaving the im-
pression that the inputs of the HLG and SCG were incorpo-
rated separately by the NATO defense ministers into the
modernization program with little attention paid to their
combined effects on the program's final appearance.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that the two
groups met together only once, 28 September 1979. Shortly
thereafter a draft integrated decision was prepared by HLG
chairman David McGiffert, U.S. assistant secretary of de-
fense for international security affairs, and presented to
the North Atlantic Council on 6 November. It was approved
on 2 8 November and announced in a NATO Communique on 12
December 1979. The position adopted by the defense minis-
ters suggests that military (i.e., warfighting) considera-
tions were more of an afterthought than a serious area of
concern throughout the LRTNF program development. This is
particularly evident in the HLG's arrival at a deployment
figure of 572 weapons and the SCG's arms control approach.
An initial range of 200-600 missiles was proposed by
the United States. It was felt more would be provocative
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while less would send too weak a signal to the Soviet Union.
Equality was dismissed as defeating the very purpose of the
deployment. "To equal the Soviet force numerically ... could
have a 'decoupling' effect, as it could imply no need to
escalate to American strategic forces, and could thus
181threaten to limit a war to Europe."
As a result, the decision to deploy 572 weapons was de-
termined by internal NATO politics and preconceived notions
of dealing with the Soviets in future arms control negotia-
tions. The decision did not encompass tactical employment
or targeting considerations because the weapons were not in-
struments of war, but a deterrent force. In short, the
planned deployment had to provide a sufficiently credible
deterrent against the Soviet long-range theatre forces to
offset their existing escalatory advantage and bring them to
the negotiating table while at the same time reassuring
allies that the U.S. had no intentions of fighting a lim-
ited nuclear war on European soil.
In a similar fashion, the SCG's arms control recommen-
dations were directed more toward making the deployment
decision more palatable to European domestic constituencies
than achieving real bargaining leverage at any negotiations.
In conjunction with the deployment of 108 Pershing II and
464 GLCMs , the ministers announced a reduction of 1108 nu-
clear warheads stockpiled in Europe. One thousand warheads
would be removed from the short-range stockpile plus the
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removal of the 108 Pershing 1A to be replaced by the Pershing
II. As stated in the NATO minister's 12 December 197 9
Communique
,
The program will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear
weapons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an
integral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 U.S. nuclear
warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible.
Further, ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads
should be accommodated within that reduced level, which
necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away
from warheads for^delivery systems of other types and
shorter ranges.
The intent appears to have been to portray the LRTNF as
a positive tradeoff of "usable" short-range systems for a
more stable, deterrent force of long-range systems, thus
further reducing the prospect of limited nuclear war. In
the process, however, the Army was losing a valuable mid-
range weapon, the Pershing 1A, and gaining a weapon with a
completely different role. The relative scarcity of the
Pershing II, its long-range characteristics, and high yield
(selectable 60-250 kiloton) precludes any battlefield or
second echelon role similar to that of the shorter range
Pershing 1A. This leaves the Army the 110 kilometer Lance
dual-capable missile as the longest range nuclear asset
under its own control.
The focus on longer-range systems has diverted much
needed attention away from and obscured the importance of
the more prevalent shorter-range systems. More than 7 5
percent of NATO's nuclear arsenal is composed of weapons
with less than a 300 kilometer range. Nearly 60 percent
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of the Soviet theatre nuclear arsenal consists of similar
systems. Table 3 outlines the short-range nuclear balance
in mid-1983.
Of all the available nuclear systems, these weapons
truly deserve the title "grey area weapons." They are nei-
ther restricted by arms control agreements nor a direct part
of any ongoing negotiations. Any formal arms control agree-
ment limited to long-range systems risks spurring an ex-
pansion of the shorter range arsenals. The recent growth of
such Soviet systems, SS-21, 22 and 23, already portends a
serious imbalance in theatre nuclear weapons excluded from
the Geneva INF talks
.
A. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE REVISITED
These trends have not gone unnoticed by the European
public. The LRTNF debate has educated people and increased
their awareness of the dangerous uncertainties dominating
NATO's nuclear deterrent strategy. Poor representation by
NATO about how it intends to use theatre nuclear weapons,
short and long range, in conjunction with its inferior con-
ventional forces has fueled justifiable doubts as to the
effectiveness of NATO's overall defense posture.
The absence of American leadership and initiative in the
nuclear realm has contributed significantly to doubts. The
newly emerging East-West military balance requires not only
a deterrent philosophy but innovation in strategic thinking
and a credible warfighting defense concept. Neither have
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TABLE 3: UNITED STATES/NATO AND SOVIET UNION LAND-BASED SHORT-RANGE















SU-7 Fitter A (1959)
SU-17 Fitter C/D (1974)
SU-19/24 Fencer (1974)
MIG-21 Fishbed J/N (1970)














































30/1 10-2 5kt 600
Number refers to number of bombs carried when aircraft are
specified.
Adapted from Treverton, Nuclear Weapons in Europe
, pp. 31-34:
Cotter, Hansen and McConnell, "The Nuclear Balance in Europe," pp.
23-42; Porro and Olive, Nuclear Weapons in Europe
, pp. 68-70; Barnaby,
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
, pp. 110-136; North Atlantic Assembly's
Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Second Interim Report on
Nuclear Weapons in Europe , Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, 98th Cong., 1st session (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1983) p. 59.
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materialized in official U.S. statements or literature. As
the gap between NATO and Waraw Pact conventional and nuclear
forces widens, the utility of theatre nuclear forces in
NATO's declaratory strategy has become increasingly nebulous,
In 1979, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown claimed that "the
U.S. theatre nuclear forces have a symbolic importance that
transcends their direct military value. They are the visi-
ble linkage between our deployed posture and the strategic
183
nuclear forces." A similar remark in the West German
1979 White Paper claimed that the essential equivalence of
NATO-Warsaw Pact nuclear potential was the result of the
" conceptual and structural interlinkage of the central
strategic forces of the United State with the nuclear forces
184in Europe.
The Department of Defense Annual Report for FY 1981,
written under the auspices of then Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown, outlines five steps to deal with the theatre
nuclear dilemma. In brief, these steps are:
(1) modernize and protect tactical nuclear weapon command
and control capabilities;
(2) develop mobile missiles, in particular Pershing II and
GLCM;
(3) deploy the Pershing II and GLCM;
(4) outline an arms control approach to LRTNF;
18 5
(5) withdraw 1000 nuclear warheads from Europe.
None of the measures are remotely related to develop-
ing an employment doctrine or guidelines. While physical
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deployment of the weapons and arms control measures receive
high priority, no mention is made of what to do with the
weapons in time of crisis. The most significant mention of
short-range systems is to reduce the arsenal by 10 war-
heads, not how to employ the remaining 60 001
A year later, amidst voluminous literature highlighting
the theatre nuclear weapon problem, Secretary of Defense
Casper Weinberger perpetuated the tradition of short-sighted
tactical nuclear thinking and reinforced the image of tac-
tical nuclear weapon non-utility. Assured his predecessor's
five steps to correct the problems were in progress , he de-
fined the "purpose" of nuclear forces:
(1) to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its
allies;
(2) to deter conventional attack on the United States and
its allies;
(3) to deter escalation of war involving nuclear weapons;
18 6
(4) to negate prospects of Soviet nuclear blackmail.
Missing from Weinberger's list is a role for the em-
ployment of nuclear weapons to assist in defeating the So-
viets should any of (1) through (4) prove inadequate.
Unfortunately, Secretary Weinberger has outlined an entire-
ly passive nuclear strategy which can only serve to under-
mine the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent. Both
Secretary Brown's and Weinberger's remarks may reflect an
intentional omission of any discussion of nuclear employ-
ment strategies in order to avoid presenting what might
144

be perceived as an overly aggressive nuclear posture in
Europe. However, it is equally likely that the omission is
the result of NATO's inability to reconcile the requirement/
implicit in flexible response, to conduct limited nuclear
warfare with a Western defense philosophy solidly grounded
in deterrence.
In a section entitled "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in
Strategy," the latest DOD Annual Report specifies that one
of the goals of the strategy of flexible response is
to provide the President with the option of using nuclear
forces selectively (rather than massively) , thereby re-
storing credibility and stability to our nuclear deterrent.
. . .we must plan for flexibility in our forces and in our
response options so that there will be the possibility of
terminating the conflict and reestablishing deterrence at
the lowest possible level of violence, thus avoiding
further destruction.
Conceivably, the lowest level of violence may be at the
theatre or tactical nuclear level, hence the requirement for
nuclear forces other than those of a purely strategic na-
ture. A war might escalate to include the use of tactical
nuclear weapons and then deescalate as deterrence was re-
established and war termination negotiations began. Under
such circumstances a limited nuclear war would have been
conducted. The point is that inherent in flexible response
is the concept of controlled escalation along a continuum
of conventional and nuclear response.
Yet, Administration officials, for reasons of uncer-
tainty or to alleviate fears of a limited nuclear war or
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both, have persistently denied the feasibility of actual
combat being confined to theatre or tactical exchanges. The
Reagan Administration's brief flirtation with notions of a
controllable nuclear war drew heavy criticism from at home
and abroad. In mid-1981 Secretary of Defense Weinberger
presented the President with a plan to revitalize U.S. nu-
clear forces, with emphasis on correcting survivability
deficiencies in command-control-communications (C3) and
improving warhead accuracies. Portions of the plan were
naturally leaked to the press which attacked the Administra-
tion as being hawkish and unnecessarily aggressive in its
attempts to build a capacity to fight and win a nuclear war.
In October, asked if he thought there could be a limited
nuclear exchange in Europe, President Reagan responded
I don't honestly know... I could see where you could have
the exchange of tactical weapons against troops in the
field without it bringing either one of the major powers
to pushing the button.
Although there was more than a grain of truth in
Reagan's comment, it prompted a massive public outcry, es-
pecially in Europe. Anti-nuclear activists had a field day
attacking the Administration that "was planning a nuclear
war." Los Angeles Times correspondent Robert Scheer, albeit
in a somewhat exaggerated account, described the public
reaction in his book "With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and
Nuclear War.
"
When word of the Administration's stance toward nuclear
war began to spread, the result was a powerful sense of
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alarm among the general public, both in this country and
abroad. . .Whatever else Reagan and his aides may have ac-
complished, they greatly stimulated the dormant peace
movement in the free world and gave the Russians a fine
opportunity to trumpet far and wide that the United States
was the more bellicose of the
a
two superpowers, the great-
er threat to human survival.
A short six months later the Administration's "peaceful"
rhetoric stood in stark contrast to its earlier "bellicose"
plans for nuclear war. In the spring of 1982 the President
announced his intent to pursue Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks (START) with the Soviets. In a January 1983 address
in West Berlin, Vice President Bush stated that nothing in-
furiated the President and him "more than the suggestions
that we are preparing to fight a nuclear war, because we
are not preparing to fight a nuclear war. We are preparing
to deter war.
Where nuclear strategy is concerned, it appears NATO has
succumbed to relying strictly on deterrence and invoking
ad-hoc options for coping with failures. The myriad of
contradictions in U.S. declaratory policy and strategy has
fostered confusion throughout official and extra-official
ranks in the Alliance as to NATO's nuclear intentions during
a Soviet assault. The visible absence of American leader-
ship and partial paralysis of NATO-Europe governments by
strong domestic anti-nuclear sentiment has contributed in
large measure to the present "crisis" of NATO military in-
feriority and accompanying feelings of insecurity.
Figure 3 illustrates the dramatic decline, beginning in 1969,
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FIGURE 3: PERCENT RESPONDING U.S. AHEAD MINUS PERCENT










*"Neither Ahead" response omitted. Average "Neither Ahead" response
for all countries, all years was 27.5%.
Adapted from Kenneth Adler and Douglas Wertman, "West European
Security Concerns for the Eighties: Is NATO in Trouble," paper
delivered at the annual meeting of the American Association of
Public Opinion Research, May 1981; Leo Crespi, "Trends in U.S.
Standing in West European Public Opinion," U.S. International
Communication Agency Report R-4-82; Bruce Russett and Donald
DeLuca, "Theatre Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe,"
Political Science Quarterly 98, No. 2 (Summer 1983) , pp. 179-196.
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of perceived U.S. military strength vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union by the four leading NATO-Europe powers.
Today, NATO faces an adversary which fields a qualita-
tively superior warfighting doctrine which integrates con-
ventional and nuclear weapons on the battlefield. NATO's
response, as ineffective today as twenty years ago, is to
continue its attempts to persuade the Soviets of the futil-
ity of fighting a nuclear war.
We, for our part, are under no illusions about the
dangers of a nuclear war between the major powers; we
believe that neither side could win such a war.... it is
essential that the Soviet leadership understand this as
well.
However, the Soviets have thought about and planned for
the "unthinkable," while NATO continues to blind itself to
the very real possibility of its occurrence. Officially,
NATO has concluded that nuclear war in any form is simply
192
unwageable. Such a philosophy fails to admit that a
Soviet incursion into Western Europe will undoubtedly be
prefaced by a conscious awareness among Soviet leaders that
nuclear exchanges are possible, victory will not be easy,
but that the war is winnable. The Soviet's capability for
initiating or shifting into a tactical nuclear campaign is
as imposing as its capability for a large-scale conventional
assault, and, inter alia, more likely to succeed against NATO
defenses ill-prepared to defend against a limited nuclear
attack. Under certain circumstances— fear of a NATO pre-
emptive nuclear strike, serious territorial losses—the
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Soviets may be willing to take the "nuclear chance." With-
out coupling a strategy of weapons employment to deterrence,
the Soviet Union faces no more of a credible deterrent with
the addition of 572 long-range missiles to NATO's arsenal
than presently exists in Europe without them.
B. DEEP STRIKE OR DEEP TROUBLE: THE "HI-TECH" CONVENTIONAL
OPTION
NATO's skepticism about its ability to defend against
a Warsaw Pact attack without resorting to U.S. central stra-
tegic systems coincides with the recent growth in usable
Soviet military power supported by what is widely believed
to be a very credible warfighting doctrine. This skepticism
has encouraged the resurgence of demands for a NATO no- first
use policy governing nuclear weapons, more in the hope of
forestalling a tactically successful Soviet first-strike
against Europe than out of any clear moral aversion to
limited nuclear war. Advocates of no-first use claim that
NATO's highly visible reliance on the early first-use of
nuclear weapons may force the Soviets to preempt with their
own nuclear strike. This, in turn, will force a premature
escalation to general nuclear war as NATO responds with its
only surviving weapons system, U.S. and possibly European
strategic nuclear weapons
.
The idea that NATO adopt a no-first use policy is not
new. In 1962 Englishman John Strachey wrote that "the West
would have much to gain and little to lose by making a
declaration that we would never use nuclear weapons
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193first." There was, however, a caveat which rings as
true today as in 1962. Strachey felt, as George Kennan and
his coauthors recently echoed in Foreign Affairs , that the
principal advantage of such a policy was not necessarily in
its believability . It was in the resultant adoption of
military doctrines and postures based on conventional ground
and air forces "genuinely adequate in both quantity and
quality to put up the most determined resistance to a Rus-
194
sian conventional attack."
The need for wholesale conventional force improvements,
"in both quantity and quality," has long been recognized by
NATO members and has permeated Alliance rhetoric since 1961.
While few have argued the point, little action has been
taken to go beyond the minimum conventional requirements
believed necessary to force a nuclear escalation decision
upon the Soviets. In the era of U.S. nuclear superiority
(1945-1972) there was a measure of credibility to such a
strategy.
However, U.S. nuclear superiority became a thing of the
past following SALT I; whether in actuality or in the minds
of men is unimportant. Since then, conventional force
trends in the West have conspicuously failed to adapt to the
strategic environment of nuclear parity. Figure 4 illus-
trates this by depicting the evolving Warsaw Pact: NATO
ratio in five conventional force categories. Since the
1972 SALT I treaty the "bean-count" in the conventional
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FIGURE 4: NATO CENTRAL REGION CONVENTIONAL FORCE TRENDS 1968-1983-















Aaapted from John Collins and Anthony Cordesman, Xmna lance or" Power :
Shirting U.S. -Soviet Military Strengths (London: Macdonald and Jane's,
1978)
, pp. 271-280; Anthony Cordesman, "The NATO Central Region and
the Balance of Uncertainty," Armed Forces Journal International (July
1983) , pp. 18-58.
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balance has steadily moved in favor of the Warsaw Pact. In
no case does NATO field superior numbers and in tanks, com-
bat aircraft and artillery, Soviet forces outnumber NATO by
greater than 2:1. This is not to imply that bean-counts
and numbers alone are decisive. NATO's flexible response
strategy explicitly avoids the need to match the Warsaw Pact
on a one-to-one basis. NATO has concentrated its conven-
tional defense efforts on improving its reserve and rein-
forcement capabilities, relying on a mobilization period of
seven to thirty days to augment forward deployed forces.
However, a recent study by Phillip Karber, director of the
Strategic Concepts Development Center at the National De-
fense University in Washington, D.C. , concludes that after
17 years of effort by NATO, guided by the precepts of
flexible response,
...the ratio in conventional weaponry upon mobilization
is still 2:1 in favor of the Warsaw Pact, and even more
significantly, the ratio in conventional weaponry prior
to mobilization—armament in forward deployed active
units—has increased to NATO's disfavor from 1.5 to
2 to 1. 5
Moreover, NATO's technological edge, a critical force
multiplier for the West in the past, is also losing ground
to Soviet technological advances in many key areas of war-
fare. Present imbalances throughout the East-West force
postures have grown so serious that it is no longer pos-
sible to satisfactorily "rationalize" an ever-widening gap.
Attempts to attribute the growth in Soviet military power
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to defensive intentions and traditional Soviet insecurities
blatantly overlooks an aggressive Soviet military doctrine
and recent demonstrations of its implementation.
NATO's response to these Soviet advances has been an
intensive conventional weapons program applying the latest
in high technology weapons and sensors in a strategy de-
signed to defeat a massive Soviet assault quickly and on
East European territory. The program is a combination of
advances in computer and circuitry miniaturization, a per-
ceived need by NATO to reassert technological superiority,
and, most importantly, an attempt to raise the nuclear
threshold. It relies almost entirely on recent developments
in so-called smart and precision guided munitions (SPGMs)
.
The concept of application, dubbed "Deep Strike" or
"Assault Breaker," is aimed at denying Warsaw Pact forces
follow-up reinforcements from rear echelons required by
their strategy to maintain the momentum of a rapid break-
through of NATO defenses. It is accomplished through the
carefully planned application of SPGMs against time-critical
targets formerly designated as nuclear targets. These
include:
(1) Counter-air (main and secondary aircraft operating
bases)
(2) Interdiction targets (bridges, road junctions, rail-
heads)
(3) Echeloned and mobile follow-on ground forces.
196
(4) Massive armor attacks in the zone of contact
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The idea is sound and technology well tested. Three
obstacles, however, preclude any measurable implementation
of a SPGM-based strategy for NATO at least into the early
1990 's. First, the "hi-tech" option does not adequately
compensate for growing numerical imbalances between NATO
and Warsaw Pact forces which will soon outstrip any con-
tribution of hi-tech weaponry. If NATO does not field large
numbers of these weapon systems—as it appears it will not
—
the force multiplier effect of the SPGMs will be insuffi-
cient for NATO to credibly claim a conventional defense
capability.
The second problem, directly related to the first, is
the cost of developing and producing an adequate SPGM arse-
nal to cover all vital mission areas. In order to be ef-
fective and not merely self-defeating, the "Deep Strike"
strategy must raise the nuclear threshold through the entire
European theatre of operations, not just in selected mission
areas.
Cost estimates range from a minimum of $10.0 billion to
$320.0 billion to support the program into the early 1990 *s.
This will require an additional 1-2 percent real increase
in defense spending by the NATO countries, over and above
the planned 3 percent goal of the 197 7 LTDP. Meanwhile,
most of NATO-Europe has fallen short of that 3 percent goal,
struggling with high inflation and overriding domestic
priorities. Although claims abound that an adequate
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conventional defense can be purchased with a 3 percent real
annual increase in defense spending, General Bernard Rogers
(SACEUR) has stated that "the current force goals (1983-88)
which NATO nations have accepted can be achieved with a
4 percent real increase in defense spending for each of
197those six years." That 4 percent does not include the
requisite SPGMs specified by advocates of the "Deep Strike"
strategy.
The final problem is one of initiative. European de-
fense ministers are clearly opposed to making the necessary
investment to truly raise the nuclear threshold through a
conventional build-up. The minister's lack of enthusiasm
for the hi-tech option is based on what they believe to be
a matter of "dollars and sense." Economically/ the 3 per-
cent LTDP has already pressed most European governments to
the limit of domestically acceptable defense spending.
When the "Deep Strike" technology and strategy were first
officially introduced at the semiannual meeting of NATO de-
fense ministers in Brussels in December 1982, the European
ministers were in general agreement "that any additional
defense spending for such advanced systems under present
198
economic conditions was 'unrealistic'."
The French trimmed nearly $2.0 billion off 1982 military
expenditures as part of President Mitterand's budget cutting
program. Orders for at least 15 Mirage 2000 fighter/bombers,
47 AMX-10 tanks and 26 155mm artillery batteries were
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cancelled while the 24.6 percent of the defense budget
allocated to nuclear forces went untouched. On 20 April
1983 the French government approved a five-year defense
spending program which will reduce conventional land forces
by 7-10 percent (about 30,000 men), including the dissolu-
tion of an army corps, an armored division and an infantry
division. Two of the principal beneficiaries of the in-
crease in nuclear expenditures are the M-4 nuclear submarine
missile and Hades tactical nuclear missile. The British
will soon have to confront the need to make similar cuts in
199
order to support their Trident missile program. British
armed force strength has already declined by more than
7,000 over the past year (1982-1983). Finally, Italy's
Socialist-led government recently approved tough austerity
measures for 1984, combining higher taxes and $21.0 billion
in spending cuts to keep the budget deficit at $63.0 billion
dollars. It is most unlikely the Italians will encourage
even greater defense spending in order to rehabilitate con-
ventional forces in the next 3-5 years.
Incentive from the United States has also been lacking.
In spite of strong support by the Secretary of Defense for
the hi-tech strategy, big ticket nuclear items such as MX,
the B-1B bomber and two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
continue to receive highest budget priority. In the past
six years Congress has disproportionately cut Army procure-
ment requests compared to action taken on Air Force and
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Navy requests. In the combined fiscal years 1979 through
1984 defense procurement requests, the Army suffered a 4
percent cut in a total request of $58.3 billion. The Air
Force, however, lost only 1 percent of a $119.2 billion re-
quest, while the Navy enjoyed a 1 percent increase over
original requests totaling more than $135.0 billion.
As a result, the Army's budget cannot withstand the
large hi-tech munitions orders required to make an exclu-
sively conventional option viable. Furthermore, as late as
the end of 1982, the Air Force—with more than twice the
Army's budget authority—had yet to program the procurement
of one submunition dispenser for its tactical aircraft.
Taken as a whole, these events do not display a trend toward
developing a serious conventional NATO defense and do not
provide the encouragement to European leaders to renew the
conventional emphasis.
Strategically, the SPGM option offers a trade-off which
the Europeans are apparently unwilling to make, exchanging
a nuclear war for a potentially equally destructive conven-
tional one. The existing nuclear deterrent has worked well
for over 30 years. The concern is that a bold move toward
a credible conventional defense option based on SPGMs might
pave the way for a dismantling or, at best, a deemphasis of
the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe. Although the end
product might be a more credible conventional defense capa-
bility, the prospect of a Soviet conventional attack would
also be proportionately raised.
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C. MOBILITY, VELOCITY AND INDIRECT APPROACH: LIDDELL HART
AND THE NEW U.S. ARMY STRATEGY
In spite of European reluctance to move toward the con-
ventional option described above and the Department of De-
fense's inability to purchase sufficient SPGMs, the U.S.
Army has wholeheartedly adopted the concept and incorporated
the "Deep Strike" strategy into its latest revision of the
"Operations" field manual, FM 100-5 (1982). 201 Based on an
exhaustive study of the defense of Europe titled "AirLand
Battle," the Army has restructured its strategy to combine
Assault Breaker technology with highly mobile counter-offen-
sive operations against a Soviet attack.
FM 100-5 (1976) based defense of the European central
front on tactics of attrition. Following an initial Soviet
assault, the manual recommended sending a brigade-size cov-
ering force to identify the main axis of Soviet advance.
Remaining brigades would then mass across the path of Soviet
advance and attempt to envelop the attacking formations in
heavy fields of artillery and air-to-ground fire. If a So-
viet breakthrough appeared imminent, tactical nuclear weap-
ons could be employed to slow the advance and signal to the
Soviets a dramatic escalation of the conflict.
Critics of the doctrine were convinced it was too de-
fensive. Moreover, it was dangerous to confront the Soviets
head-on with a strategy of attrition considering the numer-
ical superiority of the forces they could field on short
notice. Within the Army, dissatisfaction mounted as
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"commanders became convinced as a result of field training
and war games that they would be unable to defeat the So-
202
viets using the doctrine of 1976." Attrition studies
tended to support these conclusions.
Attacking Pact forces would probably try to—and would
with present forces—establish a local battlefield supe-
riority of about 5 to 1 at those points where they plan
to force a breakthrough. Even if a well-prepared, de-
liberate forward defense could inflict 40% losses on
those forces during the first 36 hours of the war, and
could hold NATO's own losses to only 2 5%, the ratio of
NATO to Pact strength would change to about 6% to 1 as
Russia's second echelon formations reached the front.
Even if NATO could continue for another 36 hours to in-
flict 40% losses on the attacker and hold its own losses
to 25%, Warsaw Pact units would have a
n
^0 to 1 advantage
three days after the outbreak of war.
FM 100-5 (1982) outlines a dramatic redirection of the
ground force effort in Europe when compared to FM 100-5
(1976) . To cope with Soviet forces close to the forward
edge of the battle area (FEBA) , the new revision prescribes
an indirect approach, the framework for which was described
by Liddell Hart in the 1950 's. The "Deep Strike" concept
of operations provides the means to attrite Soviet second
and rear echelon forces before they join the battle at the
FEBA. The object is to isolate and destroy the forward
forces and prevent reinforcement by striking at rear echelon
targets.
The 1982 manual implicitly acknowledges Soviet superi-
ority in the field and assumes a guerilla warfare-like tone




[Army units] will maintain the agility necessary to shift
forces and fires to the points of enemy weakness. Our
operations must be rapid, unpredictable, violent, and dis-
orienting to the enemy.
The best results are obtained when the initial blows are
struck against critical units and areas whose loss will
degrade the coherence of enemy operations, rather than
merely against the enemy's leading formations.
Ironically, even though the Army has incorporated the
AirLand Battle concept and associated "Deep Strike" strat-
egy into its doctrinal bible, FM 100-5 (1983) , NATO Com-
mander General Bernard Rogers has adamantly declared that
it is not NATO strategy. In a spring 1983 article in
Strategic Review General Rogers wrote that NATO ' s strategy
"should not be confused with the U.S. Army's concepts of
'AirLand Battle' and 'AirLand Battle 2000'." Rogers ex-
plained that the Army concepts were "developed independent-
ly of ACE's (Allied Command Europe) initiatives or its
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concept of operations." According to Rogers, associating
ACE doctrine and defense plans with purely national con-
cepts like AirLand "is not a desirable NATO process."
General Roger's dissociation of U.S. Army and NATO
strategies is probably the least salient of the problems
generated by the Army's new strategy outlined in FM 100-5
(1982) . Most obvious is the lack of munitions to accomplish
the deep strike mission. Second echelon high technology
munitions such as the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)
,
the Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS) , and the Con-
ventional Attack Missile (CAM) are several years away from
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operational deployment. In the absence of the SPGMs and
delivery vehicles specified in the hi-tech option, the man-
ual identifies artillery as one of two primary strike assets
y o fifor deep attacks, the other being air interdiction.
Present artillery units, however, cannot hope to accomplish
the deep strike mission without extensive and large-scale
penetration of enemy territory, an unlikely possibility for
U.S. or NATO forces early in battle. Table 4 illustrates
these characteristics for modern U.S. artillery units.
TABLE 4: CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. FIELD ARTILLERY
105mm 155mm 155mm 8-inch 8-inch
M102(T) M109AKSP) M198 MllO(SP) MllOAl(SP)
Maximum range (km) 11.5 18.1 24/30 2 16.8 20.6
Sustained rate of
fire (rds /minute) 3 1 1 0.5 0.5
Maximum rate of




Adapted from FM 6-20 , "Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations,"
pp. B-A-l to B-A-3.
The most significant failing of FM 100-5 (1982) is in
its exclusive focus on conventional operations against non-
nuclear aspects of a Soviet threat which is patently nuclear
in orientation. The "myth" of NATO first-choice of nuclear
weapons is perpetuated. The opening chapter mentions the
importance of "integrating conventional, nuclear, chemical,
and electronic" means of defense but no further discussion
of integration is contained in the manual.
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In contrast to the 1976 edition, the 1982 revision of
FM 100-5 contains no separate chapter on tactical nuclear
operations, does not discuss the nuclear weapon package,
employment, or chain of command, and avoids reference to
nuclear weapons altogether other than noting they are
"particularly effective in engaging follow-on formations or
forces in depth." There is, in fact, more detailed dis-
cussion about the battlefield use of smoke than of tactical
nuclear weapons.
Finally, the Army's new "AirLand-Deep Strike" strategy,
as outlined in FM 100-5 (1982) , is incompatible with the use
of the long-range theatre nuclear forces deployed
beginning December 1983. To be effective the strategy re-
quires large numbers of conventional SPGMs and submunitions
to cover a significant proportion of over 2500 time-urgent
Warsaw Pact targets (Table 5). Such arsenals, however, do
not exist and will not until the mid-1990 's. In the interim,
the Department of Defense claims the Pershing II and GLCM
can be assigned those tactical deep strike missions.
By virtue of their high accuracy, both Pershing II and
GLCM will provide an effective capability to attack hard
targets while limiting collateral damage. . .Pershing II
offers a high assurance of penetrating future Soviet
defenses, has the capability to strike time-urgent tar-
gets , and takes advantage of the existing Pershing 1A
infrastructure. GLCM's longer range will allow it to
attack deeper-targets and to be based further
rearward. .
.
While claims can easily be made in Annual Reports and
public statements, actual employment of the weapons in a
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TABLE 5: HIGH VALUE, TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETS IN WARSAW PACT 2ND AND






0-30 30-100 100-300 300-800 Total
13 31 28 72
Choke Points (Bridges,
Railyards , Highway
Obstructions) 12 10 91 78 191
Underground /Nuclear
Storage, C , Fuel Sites) 27 87 43 16;




Division Force 832 132 426 294
Nuclear Missile and
Support Units 256 129 104 87










SOURCE: Scheiraner , "Nato's New Strategy," p. 55
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limited, tactical deep strike role is dubious. Under the
existing deployment scheme the 572 LRTNF missiles provide
coverage for less than 50 percent of the time-sensitive
targets between 100 and 800 kilometers from the expected
20 8FEBA, assuming 100 percent missile reliability. Only
a very small portion, roughly 10 percent, are fixed and
hardened targets requiring the high yield of the Pershing II
(250kt) and GLCM(200kt). Consequently, use of these mis-
siles against "softer" targets would squander an important
and limited intra-war deterrent, exceed any rational con-
ception of proportionality of force, and offer a poor in-
centive for controlling subsequent counter-escalation.
Complicating matters even further will be the difficulty
of dispersing the Pershing II and GLCM. As Richard Betts
correctly points out, "the political and psychological con-
straints against dispersal, however, will be even stronger
than against authorizing full alert, mobilization, and re-
209
mforcement of conventional ground forces." Since dis-
persal of the weapons might be interpreted as a first-strike
intention, NATO leaders will invariably wait until the last
minute to disperse and thereby risk losing the weapons by
a similar Soviet first-strike, conventional and/or nuclear.
In brief, while the Army's "Deep Strike" strategy is a
viable concept, it is at least a decade away from reality.
In addition to the problems of procurement already men-
tioned, European' governments will remain reluctant to
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endorse the strategy until a comprehensive arms limitation
agreement is negotiated which codifies a theatre nuclear
balance in short and long range systems. Until then, the
imbalances in theatre nuclear capabilities favoring the
Warsaw Pact will continue to make serious attempts at con-
ventional defense appear futile. Because NATO has forsaken
the pursuit of nuclear superiority, an adequate convention-
al defense capability can be developed only after a mutual-
ly deterring theatre nuclear balance is believed to exist.
Once this is accomplished and European leaders believe the
prospects for nuclear war, limited or otherwise, are ap-
preciably lower than they are today, the requisite attention
and resources can legitimately be diverted toward conven-
tional rearmament.
For the time being, FM 100-5 (1982) prescribes a strat-
egy which the Army ground forces in Europe cannot apply.
The weapons for the vital deep strike missions are not in
NATO arsenals. The more traditional objective of halting
Soviet attacks at the West German border remains the most
salient measure of NATO's success. Since NATO's conven-
tional forces are most unlikely to accomplish this in any
but the most ideal circumstances, NATO must continue to rely
on nuclear systems as the inevitable backstop for a falter-
ing conventional defense.
The absence of a doctrine and employment guidance for
theatre nuclear systems may eliminate the possibility that
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a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation will be limited to the
lowest level of violence. Short range battlefield nuclear
weapons have been given only ancillary attention since the
LRTNF assumed the limelight. Early employment of Pershing II
and GLCM, however, erases a conspicuous termination point
for a low-level nuclear escalation-deescalation process.
It is deceptively easy to expect these weapons, along with
so-called limited nuclear options (LNOs) , to offer similar
prospects for controlling escalation as the shorter range
systems such as nuclear artillery, Lance or Honest John.
Comparison of employment options, yields, launch points,
targets, collateral damage and the like indicate they do
not.
Outlining a theatre/tactical nuclear doctrine and
strategy does not imply a reflexive nuclear warfighting
strategy. On the contrary, it provides the defender with
additional options in the event he has to fight such a war
other than resort to strategic systems. NATO's existing
nuclear policies invite an inordinately high level of
escalation too early. Even though NATO-Europe may prefer
the inherent uncertainties in this strategy, one need only
consider the consequences of its failure to realize the
need for a lower level nuclear employment strategy.
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VII. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR ALTERNATIVES
Nuclear strategy is the art of the impossible because in
the final analysis nuclear weapons are too horrific for
their use to be contemplated in a rational calculation of
possibilities. Now that we are perched on this moral
high ground, some might say that the discussion must
end... Alas, the world of moral and intellectual purity is
rarely the world of politics. Because nuclear weapons
exist, and because there is an enemy against whom defense
is perceived to be necessary
,
2
the art of nuclear strategy
needs to be explored further.
Virtually all political leaders and military strategists
in the West are in agreement that the fundamental tenets of
the flexible response strategy—direct forward defense, de-
liberate and controlled escalation, and general nuclear re-
sponse
—
provide a sound strategic base from which NATO can
deter or defend against a Soviet attack. However, accom-
panying the latest developments in advanced conventional
munition technologies and the LRTNF modernization and de-
ployment program has been a flurry of criticism directed at
NATO's flexible response forces. While self-criticism of
its force structure is not a new phenomenon, NATO's failure
to respond to the rapid growth of Soviet military power
through the 1970' s has generated harsh and abundant com-
mentary from its own leaders, including many intimately
associated with the NATO military organization.
Belgian General Robert Close, formerly Commander of the
16th Armored Division of NATO Forces in Germany, claims the
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Soviets now have the capability to occupy West Germany
•'211
"from the iron curtain to the Rhine" within 48 hours.
In a summer 1982 article in Foreign Affairs , General Bernard
Rogers reported that NATO forces could sustain conventional
combat in Europe for only a matter of days. As a result,
NATO "must now depend upon the use of theatre nuclear weap-
212
ons to accomplish our missions of deterrence and defense."
One year later the situation, according to General Rogers,
had gotten no better. During a July 1983 interview with
Armed Forces Journal International he stated:
We're fairly close to massive retaliation today. We can
only fight conventionally for a relatively short period
of time. . .Our publics need to know we have only. a de-
layed tripwire instead of massive retaliation.
General Rogers' ominous claim is no mere "scare tactic"
to generate additional defense funds from NATO governments.
It is substantiated by facts. Figures 5 and 6 depict the
primary avenues of approach of a Warsaw Pact assault and the
corps sectors of military responsibility in NATO's Central
Region. The North German plain is considered the most
likely main attack axis with terrain that is highly con-
ducive to large-scale tank operations. Its defense will be
difficult in any scenario which includes powerful Soviet
armored operations. In 1981-1982, the 1st British Army Corps
in West Germany revamped its ground strategy for the forward
defense of the British sector. Corps Commander Lieutenant
General Nigel Bagnall found that a stalwart defense at the
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FIGURE 5: WARSAW PACT AVENUES OF APPROACH
TO WESTERN EUROPE
/ SWITZERLAND jj A U S T
* '
K
Source: Adapted from Richard Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, U.S. Force





FIGURE 6: CORPS SECTIONS OF MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY
IN NATO'S CENTRAL REGION*
*NORTHAG (Northern Army Group) and CENTAG (Central Army Group) are the
two subdivisions of NATO forces in West Germany. The line dividing
the two runs from Belgium through West Germany, just south of Bonn
and into East Germany.
WEST GERMAN \s
Source: Adapted from Richard and Jeffrey Record, U.S. Force Structure
in NATO (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974),
p. 31 and also from U.S. Army materials.
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border would cause tremendous losses in manpower and
equipment. Instead of a true forward defense, he has opted
"to select the best defensive ground from which he could
214
counterattack and gain time." The trade-cff is that a
sizable portion of West Germany may be sacrificed, at least
initially, to a Soviet assault. Further complicating an
effective forward defense is the fact that only a few bat-
talions of Dutch and Belgian troops are actually stationed
in their sectors in West Germany. The majority of those
forces must be deployed from inside their respective
. • 215
countries.
Weapons and ammunition shortfalls continue to plague all
of NATO's forward deployed forces. Moreover, the ammunition
on-hand, both conventional and nuclear, may be ineffective
against key Soviet targets. The U.S. Army has advised Con-
gress that the 105mm high velocity gun and ammunition used
on the M-60 and M-l Abrams tanks cannot defeat the frontal
armor of the two latest Soviet tanks, the T-80 and improved
2 16
T-72, in a frontal engagement . ** A suitable 120mm gun for
the M-l capable of penetrating the Soviet armor will not
enter the field until 1986 or 1987. With respect to non-
strategic nuclear weapons, the bulk of the nuclear artillery
shells in the NATO arsenal today are not ballistically
matched to conventional shells used for spotting and correct-
ing artillery shell trajectories. Delivery accuracy is
therefore highly susceptible to changes in wind speed and
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direction and differences in the ballistic characteristics
of nuclear and conventional shells. New enhanced radiation
shells being produced are ballistically matched to their
conventional counterparts but are stockpiled solely in the
United States.
Contrary to the high expectations surrounding NATO's
1967 adoption of the strategy, flexible response has only
marginally reduced the automaticity and escalatory level of
NATO's nuclear response options to Soviet aggression. As
conventional force imbalances became increasingly apparent
during the early and mid-1970' s, NATO Nuclear Planning
Group studies indicated that the deterrent value of the
threat of nuclear escalation was becoming dependent upon
linking first (NATO) nuclear use to the course of a land
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war in Europe. At this critical juncture m the 1970 's,
where the military balance was conspicuously shifting in
favor of the Soviet Union, NATO failed to move decisively
toward either a credible conventional or nuclear defense
strategy. Coupling such an action to NATO negotiating po-
sitions in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR)
talks and SALT quite possibly would have enabled NATO to
reverse, or at least slow, the destabilizing trend of the
Soviet military build-up. Instead, NATO conventional force
posture went essentially unchanged and serious discussion of
nuclear employment strategy remained taboo.
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The net result, which NATO has carried into the 1980' s,
is a self-imposed reliance on nuclear weapons for the de-
fense of Europe grounded in a strategy which the NATO Com-
mander has appropriately dubbed a "delayed tripwire."
Ironically, the situation today poses many of the same pro-
blems for NATO which prompted the shift to flexible response
in the first place. While remaining heavily reliant on nu-
clear weapons, the lack of consensus on theatre and tactical
nuclear employment strategies continues to raise serious
doubts as to NATO's ability to effectively prosecute a
European-theatre war and impose some sort of qualitative
limitation or restraint should nuclear weapons be intro-
duced into the conflict. NATO faces unavoidable and poten-
tially costly delays during an East-West crisis as Western
governments agonize over nuclear employment decisions.
According to a former High Level Group member, "NATO has not
yet managed to agree on guidelines for the follow-on use of
nuclear weapons if a first attempt to communicate NATO's
intentions through a controlled demonstrative use did not
2 18
succeed in persuading the adversary to halt hostilities."
Official U.S. efforts to resolve issues of NATO nuclear
strategy have been infrequent and lackluster and act to
perpetuate the confusion. Since the mid-1960 *s successive
Administrations have been obsessed with establishing un-
ambiguous linkages among and between the different levels
of nuclear response—battlefield, theatre and strategic.
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Unfortunately, this has been more of a reaction to NATO-
European concerns over U.S. "coupling" than to the needs
of deterrence and defense vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact. As a
result, all U.S. nuclear forces "are governed by a single
coherent policy. . .There is no separate U.S. policy for non-
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strategic nuclear forces."
Under a "single coherent policy," a nuclear weapon is a
nuclear weapon, regardless of size, shape, yield or target.
Accordingly, adherents to a single coherent policy claim
that there is no reason to devise distinct employment guide-
lines for various classes of nuclear weapons, particularly
at the theatre and strategic nuclear levels. However, the
output of the various arms control forums, the myriad of
NATO nuclear study groups, and volumes of Congressional
testimony reveal that, at a minimum, theatre and strategic
nuclear weapons are conceptualized differently. Dissimilar
targeting options, yields, accuracies, and cost reveal im-
portant practical differences exist as well. It is unlikely
that a government, NATO or Warsaw Pact, would employ or re-
spond to a limited nuclear attack originating with a land-
based ICBM reentry vehicle the same as an attack which was
restricted to theatre-based nuclear weapons such as Lance or
Pershing.
Coincident guidelines cannot simultaneously govern the
employment of both strategic and theatre nuclear weapons.
NATO's failure to distinguish between their warfighting
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capabilities and elaborate separate employment guidelines
forecloses nuclear response options which would employ only
one class of nuclear weapon or deliberately adhere to a con-
trolled escalation sequence. Contrary to one of the funda-
mental tenets of the flexible response strategy, present
NATO nuclear doctrine makes no provision for an obvious
intra-war stopping point and is not conducive to interrup-
tion or termination before large-scale nuclear exchanges.
Instead, it invites a rapid escalation process that may be
extremely difficult to reverse.
Furthermore, the United States is attempting to capi-
talize on the uncertainty facing the Soviet leadership of a
NATO nuclear response as the keystone of NATO deterrent
strategy at a time when its ability to do so is dwindling.
General Alexander Haig summarized the importance of this
uncertainty, a point made by nearly every defense official
in the past 15 years.
...it is essential to recognize that the deterrent value
of those [strategic nuclear, theatre nuclear, and conven-
tional] forces lies not in their independent warfighting
capabilities, but in their independent contribution to
the uncertainty of our potential response.
According to Thomas Schelling, it is this uncertainty
which permits NATO (and the Soviet Union) to manipulate the
risk of general war before and during hostilities and makes
a nuclear deterrent strategy credible. The whole purpose
of introducing theatre and tactical nuclear weapons is to
"create and signal a heightened risk of general war" for all
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221participants. Schelling's theory of risk manipulation
accurately describes the psychological aspects of NATO's
flexible response strategy. NATO relies on the everpresent
threat of escalation, heightening the risk of general war,
to deter and, if necessary, limit conflict in Europe and
force early termination of hostilities. That is the essence
and value of the controlled escalation aspect of flexible
response.
In the mid-1960* s and early 1970' s, NATO politicians
and military planners believed their pre-war bargaining
position, their ability to manipulate the risk of general
war, to be equal or superior to that of the Warsaw Pact.
They also believed, probably correctly, that NATO's "Second-
Strike" position would remain virtually unchanged after the
onset of hostilities. Throughout this period NATO could
credibly respond to or threaten violence at varied and in-
creasingly advantageous levels of escalation, lending strong
support to its pre- and intra-war bargaining positions. In
defense jargon, NATO possessed undisputed escalation
dominance
.
The situation which exists in the 1980' s is radically
different. NATO is no longer able to "risk manipulate" with
the same confidence of a decade ago. Soviet achievement of
superiority in most, if not all, measures of military power
has severely eroded NATO's perceived intra-war bargaining
position. Reluctance to agree upon a nuclear employment
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doctrine and strategy has undermined NATO's pre-war bargain-
ing position and its ability to exploit the risks inherent
to nuclear threats and a nuclear strategy. Soviet "uncer-
tainty," crucial to NATO's deterrent, is substantially
reduced as NATO decisionmakers debate if any nuclear option
can be implemented in response to Soviet aggression, not
which option will be most effective. Schelling is quick to
point out that critical issues between major adversaries
...are decided not by who can bring the most force to bear
in a locality, or on a particular issue, but by who is
eventually willing to bring more force to~bear or able to
make it appear that more is forthcoming.
A. ESCALATION MYTHS, ESCALATION FEARS
The indiscriminate nature of a single policy governing
strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and the un-
certainty that permeates NATO's own perception of its re-
sponse to Soviet aggression nurture Western fears of a
runaway escalation process once nuclear weapons are intro-
duced into a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Defense analyst
Barry Schneider has summarized the most relevant criticism
of a theatre/tactical nuclear employment strategy. Opposed
to the idea himself, Schneider claims that the arguments of
advocates of a limited nuclear warfighting strategy are
"contradicted by a more powerful set of arguments that ex-
plain why the idea of being able to fight a limited nuclear





He identifies five supposedly insuperable problems of a
nuclear war fighting strategy:
(1) Once the nuclear threshold has been broken, there is no
easy stopping point on the way to the top of the es-
calation ladder. Pressures to launch more escalatory
and preemptive attacks would be enormous.
(2) A nuclear war is likely to grow simply because command
and control procedures will break down in battle. Po-
litical leaders are likely to lose control of their
nuclear forces in the field.
(3) Once nuclear weapons are detonated over the battle area,
radars and electronics equipment may become useless be-
cause of the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) caused by such
explosions. The logical next step would be the launch-
ing of "blind" volleys of longer-range, higher-yield
tactical nuclear weapons.
(4) The introduction of nuclear weapons into the battle
would create enormous confusion and stress at all
decision-making levels. The stress upon U.S. and Soviet
decision-makers could easily trigger irrational and
emotional responses.
(5) Escalation of a limited nuclear exchange would seem in-
evitable because Soviet military forces apparently em-
phasize high-yield theatre nuclear weapons that would
spread- lethal radioactive fallout to cover large
areas.
Schneider, along with most opponents of limited nuclear
strategies, argues that escalation is far more likely to
occur than limitation. The first-use of nuclear weapons by
NATO would invariably trigger "massive Soviet and Warsaw
Pact nuclear responses leading to further escalation."
These conclusions, as any concerning tactical nuclear war-
fighting, are not based on empirical facts or experience




Nevertheless, the inherent uncertainties of a nuclear
war, limited or otherwise, should not act to perpetuate the
emotionalism which has long dominated nuclear strategic
planning. Adherents of the "Schneider Philosophy" auto-
matically exclude middle level nuclear warfighting options
which may prove to be stabilizing during a superpower con-
flict. Contrary to a popular but unfounded belief, the
planning and availability of nuclear options does not in-
crease the likelihood of nuclear war. A planning process
which comes to grips with nuclear employment problems and
constraints in advance may, in fact, reduce the chances of
a nuclear war or at least minimize the possibility of ex-
traneous casualties. Aware that various options and re-
sponses are available, government leaders will be less apt
in a crisis to quickly resort to rash nuclear employment
strategies laden with emotion. Rather, the probability that
"cooler heads will prevail" is enhanced.
With the exception of the EMP problem, none of Schneider's
criticisms are intrinsic to nuclear weapons themselves but
are largely a function of the failure of NATO tactical nu-
clear doctrine to deal with the problems. In the first
place, while the line between conventional and nuclear war-
fare is undoubtedly clear and unequivocal, the distinction
between strategic and battlefield nuclear weapons is not
altogether ambigious. This is particularly evident in the
recent trend toward low-yield nuclear weapons providing
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very tailored effects, such as the enhanced radiation
weapon. Development of flexible employment guidelines and
a wholesale revision of the single nuclear weapons policy
would make feasible a controlled escalation sequence which
recognized and made recognizable the distinctions between
classes of nuclear weapons.
Second, a complete breakdown of battlefield command and
control will not necessarily lead to a widespread, unautho-
rized use of nuclear weapons. Considering the existing
Permissive Action Link (PAL) security systems and rigid nu-
clear release authentication procedures, it is just as
likely that such a breakdown will result in the paralysis
of nuclear employment options since battlefield commanders
will be unable to launch weapons. Moreover, nuclear com-
mand and control is presently receiving the Defense Depart-
ment's highest priority for modernization and survivability
improvements
.
Third, although the EMP problem is a serious one, it is
not as insurmountable as Schneider and others claim and is
subject to effective countermeasures . According to Samuel
Glasstone, "for locations that are not within or close to
the deposition region for a surface or air burst, both the
amount and rate of EMP energy received per unit area on or
near the ground will be small, regardless of the type of
225
nuclear explosion." Highly maneuverable formations and
unit dispersion on the battlefield, can therefore
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dramatically reduce the impact of EMP. In addition, much
OF NATO's military hardware is hardened against EMP threat
by shielding, special circuit design, grounding and various
other protective devices.
Fourth, Schneider is correct in assuming that the in-
troduction of nuclear weapons would generate enormous stress
upon decisionmakers. The propensity of NATO decisionmakers
toward "irrational and emotional responses," however, is
largely due to the absence of nuclear options and alter-
natives. The availability of several discrete nuclear
options would help decisionmakers avoid a rapid and po-
tentially uncontrollable escalation process by providing
levels of response at which both sides can reestablish an
intra-war deterrent. Furthermore, the presumption that any
nuclear weapon detonation will trigger an all-out exchange
is purely speculative. Former Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger has argued that
...should there be a breakdown of deterrence, there will
be very powerful incentives on both sides to restrain the
destructiveness of the use of nuclear weapons, and to
come as rapidly as possible to the termination of not
only the war but also the causes of war that led to that
hopefully small-scale use of nuclear weapons.
Finally, the inevitability of escalation because of a
Soviet theatre nuclear arsenal which is characterized by
high-yield and low accuracy weapons can no longer be con-
sidered a valid conclusion. Likewise, claims that Soviet
military doctrine makes no provision for limited nuclear
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wars is being challenged by analysts throughout Western
defense establishments. Advanced warhead technologies have
very likely been incorporated into the latest Soviet theatre
nuclear weapons, SS-20/21/22, all of which are estimated to
represent a significant reduction in yield over their pre-
decessors.
After extensive study of the unclassified Soviet mili-
tary literature, analyst Joseph Douglas has concluded that
the Soviets are capable and prepared to fight a nuclear war
confined to a specific theatre of operations.
The characteristics and objectives of theatre and inter-
continental war are so clearly dif ferent--objectives,
risks, forces, strategy and tactics—that the Soviets
seem to have no difficulty in envisioning a nuclear war
limited to the theatre— so long as the theatre does not-
expand to include strikes on the Soviet Union itself.
...the Soviets also appear to have recognized explicitly
the limited use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction in local wars.
James Schlesinger noted this trend several years earlier
during his tenure as Secretary of Defense.
In their exercises the Soviets have indicated far greater
interest in the notions of controlled nuclear war and non-
nuclear war nthan has ever before been reflected in Soviet
doctrine.
In short, while the control of nuclear escalation is in
no way a foregone conclusion in a NATO-Warsaw Pact confron-
tation, neither is its automaticity. Although the initial
escalatory framework will depend upon the dictates of cir-
cumstance, it appears that downward pressures to constrain
escalation frequently will be as prevalent and as strong
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as any incentives to the contrary. Without a viable
theatre nuclear employment doctrine and associated strat-
egies, however, NATO will be unable to take maximum ad-
vantage of those pressures to limit the extent of nuclear
exchanges
.
Present nuclear doctrine restricts NATO to a rigid em-
ployment sequence with a minimum of flexibility. A "nu-
clear demonstration" of NATO resolve in an area peripheral
to the central theatre of operations is likely to prompt a
rapid and militarily decisive nuclear response by the So-
viets, not withdrawal. Such a demonstration by NATO would
be a squandering of its first-use initiative. NATO's other
nuclear alternative, resort to limited nuclear options
with long-range theatre and strategic weapons, cannot re-
spond to the exigencies of battlefield operations. More-
over, it would begin the escalation process at the upper
end of the escalation spectrum, eliminating any possibility
of confining nuclear warfighting to a small-scale employment
of low-yield, strictly battlefield weapons.
Fighting in Europe is most likely to be kept under con-
trol if NATO, by altering the theatre balance after the
onset of hostilities, can persuade the Soviet Union not only
that the costs of its aggression will be prohibitively high,
but that its ability to conduct that aggression will be
230
severely degraded. NATO simply cannot accomplish this
mission with its present force structure and strategy.
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Conventional forces are inadequate and theatre/tactical
nuclear forces lack sufficient guidelines to govern an ef-
fective employment strategy. A force which possesses nu-
clear weapons but is unprepared to operate with them on the
battlefield against a similarly equipped, but well trained
adversary, does not contribute to the credibility of the
deterrent or defense aspects of the weapons. As long as
theatre and tactical nuclear weapons remain in the NATO
arsenal, the wrong signal is being sent to the Soviets if
they can assign little credibility to NATO's threat to ac-
tually use the weapons.
Without a doubt, a thoroughly credible conventional
force posture is the least threatening and most promising
alternative to the fears of escalation generated by nuclear
war fighting strategies. However, NATO's unwillingness to
fund the necessary improvements in its conventional forces
and the Soviet's formidable theatre nuclear arsenal makes a
tactical nuclear option an essential addition to the menu of
NATO's response alternatives. Lacking a tactical nuclear
option, NATO may find itself in the midst of an East-West
confrontation faced with the choice of "suicide or capitu-
lation," a choice virtually guaranteed to accompany a pre-
dominant reliance on massive retaliation as a deterrent.
B. FOUR ALTERNATIVE TACTICAL NUCLEAR POSTURES
Proposals for alternative theatre and tactical nuclear
postures abound in the unclassified strategic studies
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literature. Academics, politicians, military men, think
tanks and "armchair strategists" frequently make recommen-
dations prescriptive in nature but lacking in sober assess-
ment of the costs, force requirements and political
viability. Most reflect an exaggerated concern with the
deterrent qualities of theatre/tactical nuclear weapons and
strive to posture those forces accordingly. Few attempt to
construct a framework for battlefield employment of the
weapons, placing their faith in a hopefully incontestable
deterrent and fears of escalation.
However, it is unwise and dangerous for NATO to assume
away potential failings of an exclusively deterrent posture.
Structuring forces to maximize their deterrent value does
not necessarily yield the most credible of defense forces.
It was this realization in the late 1950 's which led the
move away from massive retaliation toward flexible response.
Forces structured and oriented toward a credible defense
(war fighting) posture, on the other hand, tend to present a
well-rounded and effective deterrent. Not only are the
socio-political costs of aggression made prohibitive at the
upper end of the escalation ladder, where strategies of
massive retaliation and assured destruction come into play,
but also at the lower end by posing more than a mere spectre
of defeat for the adversary's forces on the battlefield.
When deterrence fails, however, and the opponent has de-
liberately weighed the risks and still decided to attack,
the dividends of a viable warfighting defense are
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unquestionable. But unless such a defense if acquired*
it is too late to try to regain it after a war starts.
Applied to theatre and tactical nuclear doctrine, this
means that a strategy for the battlefield employment of
those weapons must (1) assist in the defense of Europe in a
militarily significant and decisive manner against a range
of serious Warsaw Pact threats and (2) provide a credible
linkage to U.S. strategic forces. The necessity of a trans-
Atlantic nuclear linkage precludes a "no-TNW" alternative
from NATO's response options.
The range of choice available to NATO is outlined below
in four theatre nuclear posture options. Although none of
the variants are completely exclusive, each has qualities
which sufficiently distinguishes it from the others to war-
rant separate treatment. Most posture recommendations will
fall within the general structure of only one of the cate-
gories described with minimal overlap between options. In
reviewing each option, particular attention is given to
feasibility with present force levels, advocacy of enhanced
radiation weapons, level of nuclear control, prospects for
escalation control, and collateral damage potential from
NATO's own weapons.
1. Updated Flexible Response
Updated flexible response is the option which des-
cribes the present status and direction of NATO's nuclear
posture. Theatre nuclear force modernization is an integral
component of the updated flexible response posture and part
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of an overall effort aimed at rehabilitating NATO's aging
military hardware, nuclear and conventional. Nuclear-
related programs are limited primarily to modification and
upgrade of existing weapons and associated support systems.
Included are improvements in theatre command, control and
communications (C3) , deployment of long-range theatre nu-
clear missiles with advanced warhead guidance and acquisi-
tion technologies (Pershing II/GLCM) , and the development
and stockpiling of enhanced radiation warheads for the
8-inch and 155mm artillery-fired atomic projectiles (AFAPs)
and Lance missile.
Programmed improvements are almost entirely hardware
oriented. The absence of any parallel changes in theatre
nuclear employment doctrine portends a continuation of the
existing policies and strategies into the late 1980' s and
1990' s. Without concomitant changes in employment doctrine,
the updated flexible response option suffers the same dan-
gers and internal inconsistencies which plagued NATO's
232flexible response strategy in the 1970' s and early 1980' s.
Problems of escalation control remain and are somewhat
heightened by the deployment of the long-range, high-yield
Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise missiles. The near
obsession of the NATO governments with their deployment
assures the Pershing II and GLCM central positions in NATO's
nuclear defense posture under the updated flexible response
option. However, NATO's deployment plans for the 572
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launchers— 108 Pershing II and 464 GLCM-—reflect no clearly
identifiable military rational or Alliance concept for
233
employment. Early resort to these weapons precludes a
timely and controlled execution of a low-level nuclear op-
tion and begs a Soviet response in kind. Even the battle-
field option is of questionable utility (and credibility)
as long as NATO maintains a short-range nuclear arsenal
largely composed of medium (ll-50kt) and high (51-500kt)
yield weapons. Collateral damage considerations, "a la
Carte Blanche," will channel the NATO nuclear decisionmaking
process toward the irresistible conclusion that any em-
ployment option will prove self-destructive.
Updated flexible response merely preserves an ob-
solescent strategy with new technology. It adds little to
NATO's security assets which can be construed as either
credible deterrent or effective defense. In short, updated
flexible response is the continuation of intra-Alliance com-
promise on nuclear-related issues in order to achieve a con-
sensus at the lowest common "strategic" denominator.
2 . Inflexible Response
The inflexible response option is primarily a Euro-
pean originated answer to the dangers of extensive collat-
eral damage inherent in updated flexible response. As such,
it could be called a collateral damage minimizing option.
Although it is the most aggressive of the theatre nuclear
options, inflexible response is perhaps the most palatable
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option to NATO governments after updated flexible response.
Advocates of this option argue that the nuclear aspects of
the present (updated) flexible response strategy were de-
vised when NATO possessed undisputed theatre nuclear supe-
riority. Since that superiority has passed to the Soviets,
such a strategy is no longer credible.
One variant of the inflexible response option, pro-
posed by Alton Frye, rejects short-range battlefield nuclear
employment altogether. According to Frye, the first-use of
tactical nuclear weapons subjects Western Europe to intoler-
able direct and collateral damage. Furthermore, not only
does the forward location of NATO nuclear stockpiles invite
preemption, but any movement of stockpiled warheads to mate
with missile or artillery batteries is bound to be detected
and would signal imminent escalation to the Soviets.
Initial nuclear employment should therefore be
targeted against Soviet military targets in Eastern Europe.
...initial use of nuclear weapons by NATO should be di-
rected against Soviet military targets in Eastern Europe
in order to minimize collateral damage to those already
suffering from conventional attack and to signal that,
if escalation is necessary , -the enemy will pay the entry
price on his own territory.
Frye discourages the use of enhanced radiation weap-
ons. He claims that Soviet armored and troop formations
would be so dispersed as to require the employment of very
large numbers of the low-yield enhanced radiation weapon.
This would result in much the same extensive collateral
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damage expected from significantly fewer "traditional"
tactical nuclear weapons. Rather than avoiding collateral
damage, the ERW may magnify it. Instead, Frye recommends a
small, compact and invulnerable arsenal of highly accurate,
long-range theatre nuclear weapons.
Several problems arise with Frye's particular ver-
sion of inflexible response. First, NATO would have to
develop and deploy a new theatre nuclear missile force to
make the strategy viable. The Pershing II and GLCM forces
are of too high a yield to be used against strictly military
targets. Both lack the requisite invulnerability, being
"movable" not "mobile," to credibly threaten a first-use
against Eastern European targets. In addition, the GLCM
has a long flight time which is unable to respond to mobile,
time-urgent Warsaw Pact targets, the type expected to be
moving through Eastern Europe toward the front. Such mili-
tary considerations say nothing of the tremendous political
and economic costs a new nuclear missile development and
deployment program would place upon NATO.
The second, and most conspicuous, weakness of Frye's
inflexible response is that it fails to deal with the Warsaw
Pact forces coming across the West German border and pene-
trating deep into NATO territory. As a result, NATO govern-
ments may be faced with a Soviet fait accompli as Warsaw
Pact forces occupy a critical portion of West Germany and




A second inflexible response variant seeks to remedy
these problems, but at the cost of greater risk of escala-
tion. Francois de Rose, former French ambassador to NATO
(1970-75) , recommends a strategy which entails the employ-
ment of enhanced radiation weapons against a Soviet armored
assault coupled with nuclear strikes against military tar-
gets in the Soviet Union If Warsaw Pact forces have made
strikes of this type against Western Europe. Any nuclear
reply by the Warsaw Pact to short-range ERW employment by
NATO would trigger an immediate nuclear response against
military targets inside Soviet territory.
De Rose's inflexible response option, so titled by
de Rose himself, has the advantage of addressing both short-
range and long-range nuclear forces in the NATO inventory
and blending them into a coherent strategy. Unlike Frye
,
de Rose develops a credible defense against the Warsaw Pact
armies on the march inside NATO territory. Just as impor-
tant is the fact that de Rose's option is feasible with ex-
isting forces-in-being and explicity assigns a militarily
rational role for the Pershing II and GLCM.
This whole question has to be seen in the perspective of
Moscow's aims, as revealed by its attitude over the pre-
sent Euromissiles program—the Pershing lis and cruise
missiles now scheduled for deployment in 1983. If no
Soviet nuclear weapons could be used against Western
territory without immediately provoking American nuclear
attacks on targets within the Russian boundaries, the
coupling between European defense and American strategic
forces would be more solidly established than ever.
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It is, however, de Rose's instantaneous "strategic"
retaliation to any Warsaw Pact nuclear employment on NATO
soil which partially undermines his otherwise sound recom-
mendation by unnecessarily raising the risk of escalation.
Recalling Joseph Douglass 1 conclusion that the Soviet Union
is prepared to wage a limited nuclear war, "so long as the
theatre does not expand to include strikes on the Soviet
Union itself," it is apparent that Alton Frye ' s alternative
of an East European targeting scheme is an essential pre-
cursor to nuclear employment on Soviet territory. It can be
both militarily significant and an effective signal of NATO
resolve without presenting the Soviets with a threat which
might initiate large-scale nuclear exchange. At the very
least, it creates a nuclear plateau at which escalation can
cease that does not exist in de Rose's formula.
Two of the cardinal tenets of crisis management and
crisis bargaining state that decisionmakers should (1) avoid
taking steps which seal off an opponent's "escape routes"
and reduce his alternatives to zero, and (2) make every
2 3 6
effort to slow the pace of crisis events. A fusion of
the de Rose-Frye inflexible response concepts offers the
means to achieve these goals while simultaneously present-
ing an effective defense on the battlefield. The inflexible
response option appears to be a significantly more credible
pre-war deterrent than (updated) flexible response and a
viable warfighting strategy as well. In spite of the title
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inflexible response, the de Rose-Frye option contains the
seeds for a NATO defense strategy which integrates nuclear
and conventional weaponry.
3 . Unrestricted Tactical Nuclear Operations
The unrestricted tactical nuclear operations option
is predominantly the product of French strategists Pierre
Gallois and Marc Geneste, although a small contingent from
Los Alamos laboratories in New Mexico has proposed a simi-
lar nuclear-based European defense strategy. Gallois and
Geneste argue that NATO defense doctrine and strategy are
the products of American "ethnostrategic" thinking. Pro-
blems automatically arise since European and American per-
ceptions of the Soviet threat are not identical and, in
fact, are increasingly divergent. Consequently, detente,
East-West trade, even the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance
are viewed through a different prism on each side of the
Atlantic.
The American-devised flexible response strategy
depends ultimately on a credible assured destruction posture
which Gallois and Geneste claim is satisfactory for the
United States but incredible for Europe. Assured destruc-
tion merely prevents escalation from involving the super-
power' s homelands, making sanctuaries of Soviet and
American territory and discrediting U.S. promises to "trade
New York for Paris." In order to support these conclusions,
Geneste demanded that Europeans ask themselves
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...why U.S. strategic weaponry has advanced to include
MIRVs and ABMs during the past decade, while the nuclear
arsenal specifically designed for European defense still
consists of the blind "blunderbusses" of the_1950's likely
to devastate friend and foe alike if used.
The only realistic means of accomplishing European
defense against a numerically superior Warsaw Pact is be-
lieved to be a defense solidly grounded in nuclear weapons.
Requirements include a highly mobile tactical nuclear force
backed by a small but credible Euro-strategic retaliatory
capability akin to the French "force de dissuasion." The
risk of Soviet escalation to include U.S. territory arising
from a strictly European nuclear employment outside U.S.
control can be considered remote, "provided America carries
out her part of the mission by maintaining strategic parity
n 2 3 8
or (preferably) superiority vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R."
The proposed posture must include a (European) nuclear
second-strike capability in order to block Soviet recourse
to escalation confined to the European theatre.
On the battlefield, a moderate conventional force is
retained to induce the massing of Warsaw Pact forces along
primary corridors of attack and increase their vulnerability
to tactical nuclear strikes. Use of the enhanced radiation
weapon is recommended to reduce collateral damage and, more
importantly, to optimize the primary killing mechanism of
radiation against armored and infantry formations. In the
Geneste scheme, nuclear-equipped armored corps are kept be-
hind the "atomic killing zone" to fulfill missions of
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counterattack and territorial occupation after the initial
nuclear deluge. Territorial defense forces assure security
239behind the front lines.
The Los Alamos group, led by R. Sandoval and David
Buden, have proposed a detailed nuclear defense organiza-
tion, substituting nuclear firepower for conventional man-
power coupled to an air-defense system to deny Warsaw Pact
240
air forces an effective role over NATO territory. Four
integral components comprise the nuclear defense system:
(1) approximately 22,500 combat units of some 30 men to pro-
vide target acquisition and terminal guidance for low-yield
ERW missiles, (2) 600-900 mobile nuclear missile units with
Lance-type missiles capable of extremely quick delivery
(five minutes)
, (3) mobile heavy reconnaissance units of
4200 men each, covering roughly 500 square kilometers, (4)
heavy area air-defense using Roland and Hawk missile bat-
teries. This array of forces would be deployed across a
100-kilometer deep by 900-kilometer long defense zone. Like
Geneste's proposal, Buden and Sandoval recommend a militia
about 500,000 strong to provide local defense in areas be-
hind the front. In both schemes, nuclear release authority
is extended to a considerably lower level than the present
control by National Command Authority (NCA) , perhaps as low
as battalion or platoon commander.
The most notable obstacle to implementation of the un-
restricted tactical nuclear option is the inevitable domestic
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opposition to an all-nuclear defense strategy. The trouble-
some and highly vocal resistance to the Pershing II and GLCM
deployment reflects a Europe which, at best, barely accepts
the present requirements of a moderate size nuclear deter-
rent force. Moreover, the development and construction
costs of a relatively invulnerable second-strike force poses
unacceptable budget increases for nearly all the NATO
governments
.
Second, although an unrestricted tactical nuclear option
appears to compensate for any U.S. decoupling actions, Euro-
pean fears of a U.S. withdrawal from Europe are probably
greater than any confidence instilled by a European nuclear
defense plan. The European propensity to "go it alone" has
not been an evident characteristic of North Atlantic Al-
liance politics since 1949. In the same vein, no U.S.
Administration will easily relinquish its traditional con-
trol over a potentially nuclear European battlefield.
Finally, the problems created by European nuclear pro-
liferation for both superpowers would be most unsettling.
This is especially true for the Soviets in the case of a
"nuclearized" West Germany. Geneste, Gallois and Sandoval
all avoid the political implications of the problem.
According to Geneste,
Because only national sanctuaries are considered to have
credible protection, all European nations should be
"sanctuarized"—that is, each nation, if it so desires,
should possess the "key" to nuclear strategic retalia-
tion. This would not be difficult to arrange, since
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the hostaging system of strategic defense is based on
retaliation, not on first-strike capabilities.
Nonetheless, a strong Soviet response would be expected,
not only diplomatically, but in changes to its military doc-
trine, arms control position and East-West relationships to
account for the new "strategic" threat. Such changes may
prove dangerously destabilizing and threatening to European
security, negating any possible positive contribution of the
unrestricted tactical nuclear option. Since NATO is present-
ly unable to adequately accommodate nuclear weapons in a
flexible response strategy, it is unlikely that the Alliance
will be able to adjust to a strategy which completely omits
a conventional response. The unrestricted tactical nuclear
operations option will remain only the subject of papers and
lectures by messieurs Gallois and Geneste.
4. Integrated Battlefield Operations
The integrated battlefield operations posture is an
attempt by strategists, almost exclusively American and
British, to reach a happy medium which alleviates some of
the perceived problems of the previous two options, in-
flexible response and unrestricted tactical nuclear opera-
tions. Whereas Frye neglects the battlefield problem
completely and de Rose targets the Soviet Union proper un-
comfortably early, the integrated battlefield option re-
sponds to the exigencies of the battlefield and Warsaw Pact
reinforcements echeloned in Eastern Europe without posing
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unacceptable risks for further nuclear escalation. Unlike the
unrestricted tactical nuclear option, on the integrated bat-
tlefield tactical nuclear weapons are part of a composite
conventional and nuclear strategy. Importantly, there is
no attempt to treat nuclear weapons as the "employable
equal" of conventional weapons. Rather, nuclear weapons are
used in a militarily significant manner against targets when
conventional weaponry is considered insufficient.
The purpose of the integrated battlefield option is
to stop an attack at or very near the border by striking
the leading elements and immediate reserves of the advancing
Warsaw Pact armies. While conventional operations are es-
sentially unrestricted within the European theatre, nuclear
weapons employment is confined to an area close to the FEBA.
Laurence Martin advocates the use of a tactical nuclear
242
"covering force" in support of battlefield operations.
The covering force would conduct a very shallow nuclear
interdiction campaign against logistics and reinforcement
centers such as major road junctions, railheads and air-
fields. The interdiction campaign would be directed against
critical but stationary targets thereby eliminating problems
of target acquisition evident on the battlefield with highly
mobile, armored formations. In all cases, Warsaw Pact com-
mand and control elements and deep reserves are avoided in
order to minimize the escalatory threat.
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The most important feature distinguishing the
integrated battlefield option from the others is the call
for a credible conventional defense effort and nuclear em-
ployment only after the conventional defense is in danger
of failing. A Warsaw Pact assault does not trigger an auto-
matic nuclear response but places nuclear forces on alert
for rapid and possibly early action. Since tactical nuclear
doctrine is revised accordingly and incorporated into NATO
battle plans, the decision to employ nuclear weapons is not
hampered or delayed by a prolonged NATO decisionmaking pro-
cess. Instead, it awaits the outcome of the initial Warsaw
Pact assault against NATO's conventional forward-deployed
defenses before applying an essentially pre-planned nuclear
response.
Civilian strategist Colin Gray and Army Major Ronan
Ellis recommend a Presidential pre-release plan for low-
yield tactical nuclear weapons, particularly ERW, with stra-
tegic and long-range theatre weapons remaining under the
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close control of the NCA. Major Ellis specifically pro-
poses a command by negation control scheme, the opposite of
the present fail-safe procedures used by the strategic bomb-
er force requiring positive NCA confirmation before weapon
launch. With command by negation, the theatre commander
sends the NCA a message outlining nuclear employment plans.
If no reply is received within a predetermined time frame,
the plans are assumed approved. Only short-range, low-yield
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weapons are covered by the command by negation control
scheme
.
The underlying assumption of the integrated battle-
field option is that, once faced with a limited but mili-
tarily decisive employment of tactical nuclear weapons by
NATO/ the Soviets will not opt for further escalation to
achieve their aims fearing an uncontrollable escalatory
spiral. The key, of course, is for Soviet leaders to real-
ize that the battlefield nuclear strikes are consciously
limited in nature. The force structure and targeting plans
of the integrated battlefield option are designed to rein-
force these Soviet perceptions. This not only shifts the
burden of escalation to the Soviets, but also dramatically
reduces the chances for a successful Warsaw Pact blitzkreig
into Western Europe. For a successful "bolt from the blue"
or limited warning scenario to be advantageous to the So-
viets, a large-scale preemptive nuclear strike would appear
to be a prerequisite. This, however, is an unlikely alter-
native considering the potential for U.S. strategic, or
long-range NATO theatre, nuclear involvement against targets
within the Soviet Union.
In the integrated operations option, tactical nu-
clear weapons are no longer a symbolic deterrent, but a
viable and controlled war fighting instrument. Battlefield
and near-battlefield targeting of Warsaw Pact assets can
effect a favorable shift in the theatre balance for NATO
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and thwart Soviet attempts at quick victory or a fait
accompli. It is low-level nuclear initiative which "pro-
vides for minimum escalation, deters conventional attacks
244
and can be implemented immediately at minimum cost."
The option forsakes notions of nuclear punishment as a de-
terrent in favor of local defense by denial. Moreover, an
effective coupling apparatus between NATO theatre and U.S.
strategic forces is tightly knit into the strategy by plac-
ing a heavy escalatory burden on the Soviets for any measure
of success to appear likely.
The option is not without problems. Questions will
inevitably arise as to what determines the breakpoint of a
failing conventional defense and battlefield nuclear em-
ployment. For planning purposes the option requires fairly
rigid criteria be applied so that an employment decision can
be made early and without prolonged debate. Paper scenarios
and war plans, however, frequently bear only slight resem-
blance to the unexpected events of a real crisis. In ad-
dition, the brief period of conventional forward defense
allows at least some penetration of Warsaw Pact forces into
NATO territory and introduces problems of collateral damage
subsequent to any nuclear employment. The use of enhanced
radiation weapons would reduce but not eliminate the problem




Finally, the nuclear orientation of the integrated
battlefield option could create one of the same problems
which continues to plague flexible response, that of main-
taining adequate conventional forces and equipment procure-
ment. The decade and a half under flexible response
provides more than enough evidence of NATO's incessant habit
of underfunding conventional force goals, choosing instead
to rely on a formidable nuclear arsenal and the uncertainty
of nuclear response. Constant attention must be devoted to
maintaining a balance between conventional and nuclear
forces if integrated battlefield operations are to be con-
ducted effectively.
No one individual option can solve NATO's "nuclear
dilemma" or capture all the desirable attributes of the
optimal nuclear employment strategy. Drawing from the op-
tions outlined above, particularly inflexible response and
integrated battlefield operations, it is possible to devise
a nuclear employment strategy which combines military ef-
fectiveness on the battlefield with an escalatory resis-
tance not present in NATO's existing flexible response
strategy. The precise and discriminate employment of nu-
clear weapons has been made possible by a revolution in war-
head and guidance technology.
As long as NATO continues to incorporate some sort
of nuclear option into its defense plans, it must take
advantage of the technological advances of the enhanced
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radiation weapon. The weapon is no less nuclear than its
fission counterpart, only more effective. It can be seen
from Table 6 that, for all burst heights, an ER warhead pro-
duces the same radii of military effectiveness as a fission
warhead of ten times greater yield with considerably less
collateral damage potential and less residual radioac-
245tivity. Significant reductions in warhead yield are
therefore possible. The new Lance ER warhead (W70-3) is
reported to have options in the range of 1-5 kiloton, a
tenfold reduction over the presently deployed Lance fission
u a 246warhead.
When tied to accuracy improvements in modern de-
livery systems, short-range nuclear missiles can be employed
against time-urgent battlefield targets where mobility and
dispersal would make conventional munitions ineffective ex-
cept by an extremely heavy and costly concentration of fire.
Terrain contour matching, infrared signature recognition,
microwave discrimination and distance measuring equipment
are presently available missile guidance technologies with
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a circular error probable (CEP) of less than 50 meters.
Accuracy is no longer a function of range; precision weap-
ons delivery is a reality. As a result, fewer weapons of
lower yield are required to complete a designated theatre
mission, accomplished with possibly less collateral damage
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While developments in nuclear weapons technology
have overcome many of the preconceived employment problems
—
collateral damage and residual radiation among the most im-
portant—advances in theatre and battlefield communication
systems make nuclear command, control and communication (C3)
more reliable, secure and survivable. The Department of
Defense is continuing to upgrade satellite communication
links between the NCA and theatre commanders. The Ground
Mobile Forces Satellite Communication (GMFSATCOM) program
and MILSTAR, a new satellite communications system with ex-
tremely high frequency (EHF) communications channels, in-
corporate a number of survivability features and provide the
deployed commander with real-time, jam-resistant tactical
communications throughout the theatre of operations. New
theatre nuclear C3 equipment is highly mobile and hardened
against EMP effects.
Improvements have not been limited to technological
advances. Several theatre C3 systems are the products of
multiservice efforts to correct deficiencies in coordinated
battle management capabilities and enhance interoperability
among U.S., as well and NATO, tactical forces. The Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) is a
merger of the Army's Battlefield Data System (BDS) and the
Air Force's Pave Mover program intended to provide wide-area,
moving target surveillance and targeting capability. The
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) is
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a joint service program for distributing high-capacity,
secure and jam-resistant digital information to tactical air,
land and naval forces. Used in conjunction with the Army/
Marine Corps Position Location Reporting System (PLRS-JTIDS
Hybrid) , it provides combat commanders with precise, near-
real-time identification and locating data of own forces.
Similar programs to those outlined above are in progress to
assure adequate interoperability among U.S. and NATO tactical
c 248forces
.
The combination of these battle management systems
and discriminate nuclear warfighting capabilities gives NATO,
for the first time, the ability for a truly flexible, re-
sponsive strategy against the Warsaw Pact at several levels
of escalation. At all but the lowest levels of nuclear em-
ployment, the burden of escalation rests with the Soviets.
It would be a Soviet decision to initiate a major nuclear
aggression to which NATO could credibly respond and stale-
mate at any level. No strategy, conventional or nuclear,
flexible or inflexible, is immune from the dangers of es-
calation. However, in an environment where mutual assured
destruction (MAD) is the capstone of superpower deterrence,
defense strategies must internalize a large measure of es-
calation resistance. Measured responses, restricted target-
ing, and qualitatively limited weapons employment are actions
which can create multiple plateaus at which an escalation
process can be stopped or possibly reversed. A strategy
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devised from a synthesis of the frameworks outlined by
Frye, de Rose, Ellis and Gray can produce such controlled
actions.
"Deterrence is not, and cannot be, bluff." Posses-
sion of an acceptable deterrent force does not obviate the
need for a parallel defense capability. Doctrine, force
structure and strategy must embody a credible employment
scheme for a variety of crisis conditions. In spite of the
understandable political difficulties, and as long as NATO
foregoes an adequate conventional defense force, a plausible
nuclear warfighting doctrine must be the skeleton which sup-
ports the body of deterrence.
With respect to the nuclear components [of a deterrent]
,
the unquestioned ability to implement an all-out response
must be maintained. Yet, for certain aspects of deter-
rence, the number of weapons is less critical than the
existence of a doctrine, the will to abide by that doc-
trine, and weapons systems consistent with that doctrine
which permit the deliberate use of weapons in those.
q
circumstances that may require a nuclear response.
In the brief paragraph above, former Secretary of
Defense James Schlesinger has cogently summarized the im-
portance to deterrence of combining a viable nuclear em-
ployment doctrine and strategy with deployed nuclear systems
NATO's failure to do so has made a scarecrow of its theatre
nuclear deterrent. After years of peering "over the fence,"
the Soviets will eventually realize that the scarecrow




Perhaps more valid Armes
,
Weapons more violent, when we next meet,
May serve to better us, and worse our foes,
Or equal what between us made the odds,
In Nature none: . .
.
He who therefore can invent
With what more forcible we may offend
Our yet unwounded Enemies, or arme
Our selves with like defence, to mee deserves
No less than for deliverance what we owe.
No aspect of NATO military doctrine is shrouded by
greater uncertainty, speculation, and moral sophistry than
nuclear war-planning. Debate on the subject is character-
ized by the complete absence of field data from which to
judge the efficacy of limited nuclear weapons employment.
No tactical or theatre nuclear weapon has been "tried and
tested" in an operational environment to prove its battle-
worthiness, nor will one be in peacetime. Lacking the
plentiful facts and figures available for conventional weap-
on systems, defense planners and strategists find develop-
ing nuclear war fighting options discouraging.
The personal and professional costs of advocating such
nuclear options are reflected in the almost exclusively ad-
verse media coverage critical of public statements made by
prominent government officials and private analysts con-
cerning NATO's ability to wage and win a limited nuclear en-
gagement with the Warsaw Pact. As a consequence, what
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limited nuclear war-planning is accomplished is confined
to the secretive halls of the Pentagon and defense-oriented
"think tanks." In all cases it is out of the public eye and,
more importantly, out of the public mind. Yet, the attempts
to quietly reconcile nuclear dilemmas generally focus on
maximizing the deterrent value of the weapons, not on their
warfighting utility.
The fact that the existing NATO force structure presents
a formidable deterrent to Soviet aggression is not in dis-
pute. More than 500,000 troops, thousands of tanks and
aircraft, and a sizable tactical nuclear arsenal unquestion-
ably pose serious problems for any Soviet offensive. But
what if the pre-war deterrent fails?
Most NATO officials, including SACEUR, concede that in
order for Western conventional defenses to repel or stale-
mate a Soviet offensive near the inter-German border, NATO
must mobilize before the attack to reinforce front line and
reserve units. A recent study of twentieth century conven-
tional deterrence by John Mearsheimer concludes that NATO
conventional forces are adequate to hold the line long
enough to press the Soviets into an unattractive war of at-
trition. Mearsheimer ' s conclusion, however, is based upon
the assumption that NATO mobilizes in tandem with any Soviet
mobilization effort. He admits that "once the gap in mobi-
lization starting time reaches seven days (in the Pact's
favor) , NATO begins to face serious problems that become
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even more pronounced as the mobilization gap widens
251further." ZD±
Nevertheless, Western fears of a mobilization spiral
similar to that which preceded World War I may very well
"immobilize" NATO's reaction to otherwise ample warning of
an impending Soviet invasion. The precedent already has
been established in NATO's inaction immediately prior to the
2521968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moreover, in
light of its inherent weaknesses, Soviet commanders may
choose to boldly test NATO's present flexible response
strategy relying on NATO's own uncertainty and confusion to
bottleneck the nuclear decision and release process long
enough to penetrate deep into West German territory. Once
7 to 100 kilometers inside the West German border, urban
sprawl and increasing population density will most likely
eliminate a NATO nuclear option, at least at the tactical
level.
A previously established and credible threat of tactical
nuclear employment increases the capability of those conven-
tional forces already deployed. Soviet armor and troop
formations are forced to increase dispersion and, because
of limited space, echelon their attacking forces in nearby
rear areas. Vulnerability to conventional NATO fire is
heightened.
If NATO is unprepared or unable to respond with suffi-
cient conventional force, it may be necessary to employ
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tactical nuclear weapons in order to maintain a forward
defense line. The need for a viable tactical nuclear strat-
egy is not only obvious but imperative. The availability of
useful tactical nuclear options renders the prospect of a
successful Soviet surprise attack or armored blitzkreig con-
siderably more precarious and may entirely blunt such an
attack in the event it does occur. Considering the risks,
and assuming rational leaders in Washington and Moscow, both
sides will find it difficult to justify escalating a nuclear
conflict beyond the battlefield as long as reasonable
chances for a settlement exist.
That is, as long as the NATO commitment and means to de-
fend Western Europe are well-defined and NATO resolve is not
questioned. As Thomas Schelling has pointed out, "if the
commitment is ill-defined and ambiguous—if we leave our-
selves loopholes through which to exit—our opponent will
expect us to be under strong temptation to make a graceful
exit (or even a somewhat graceless one) and he may be
253
right." " The importance of establishing and maintaining
closely integrated declaratory and action defense policies
cannot be overemphasized. A large disparity between the
two, or a belief by the Soviets that such a disparity would
be likely, can invite aggression rather than deter it.
Serious problems for deterrence and crisis management arise
should the Soviets expect NATO to succumb to the "temptation
to make a graceful exit." Signals sent to the Soviets
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should not be wholly ambiguous and open to interpretation.
The development of credible tactical nuclear options fills
an important gap in NATO's threatened escalatory sequence
which extends beyond the mere symbolic to operational link-
age of conventional and strategic nuclear responses.
Finally, the development and preparation of tactical nu-
clear warfighting plans could have a positive impact on the
difficult theatre nuclear arms control process. Between
1979 and 1988 NATO will have unilaterally reduced its tac-
tical nuclear arsenal by some 2 400 weapons, more than one-
254third the pre-1979 total. In return, NATO will have
received no compensatory reductions from the Warsaw Pact.
NATO, for all of its good intentions, has no concrete idea
of the type or size nuclear arsenal it needs. The diffi-
culty of negotiating an acceptable arms control agreement
from such a tenuous position is obvious. With an employ-
ment strategy and guidelines in place, the United States
would negotiate with concise arms control goals in mind.
The balance between NATO's arms control and nuclear force
postures would be readily apparent. Flexibility in nego-
tiations would be less susceptible to political pressures
and more responsive to NATO security requirements.
NATO's refusal to undertake a large conventional force
build-up has important implications in the event its de-
fenses are tested by the Soviets. The Alliance may find it
necessary to employ nuclear weapons at or near its borders.
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For more than thirty years emotion, misconception, and
bureaucratic inertia have thwarted serious attempts to
formulate an effective limited nuclear war strategy. More-
over, it is the American "style of strategic planning" to
spend considerably more time managing large defense programs
than attending to operational issues. In the 1980' s, the
Warsaw Pact threat and advances in nuclear weapons technol-
ogy have combined to make limited nuclear war an issue with
which NATO must contend. Pragmatic nuclear employment plans
cannot and will not be devised on a nuclear battlefield.
A sensible tactical nuclear employment doctrine serves to
expand the alternatives available to NATO, enhancing deter-
rence and defense.
The decision to deal with the problem must be made today
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